

MASTER

Organizing Climate Justice

Activist Research of a Social Innovation Initiative in the Dutch Climate Movement

van Wieringen, S.

Award date:
2021

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Organizing Climate Justice: Activist Research of a Social Innovation Initiative in the Dutch Climate Movement

By S. (Simone) van Wieringen

Student ID: 0905629

October 13 2021

Eindhoven University of Technology



In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science in Innovation Sciences

Supervisors:

Dr. ir. H. (Henny) Romijn	Faculty of Industrial Engineering & Innovation Sciences
Dr. ir. E.J.W. (Erik) Laes	Faculty of Industrial Engineering & Innovation Sciences
Dr. ir. E. (Evelien) de Hoop	Faculty of Science, Athena Institute, Free University Amsterdam

Organization:

M. (Maarten) Ros	Organizer Milieudefensie
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ABSTRACT

The climate crisis attracts more attention. Across the world social movements arise demanding action. Their prominence in the campaign for sustainability transitions cannot be ignored. However, the role of these movements, as well as civil society organizations, is rarely examined in transitions studies. This research combines work on Transformative Social Innovation (TSI) with activist research to examine how a Social Innovation (SI) Initiative is coproduced through the relations within the initiative, relations to the network of other SI-initiatives, relations to institutions, and relations to the socio-material context. Activist research refers to a genuine engagement of the researcher with the field. This thesis concerns a SI-initiative that uses novel ‘organizing’ techniques to build a climate justice movement across localities in the Netherlands. The combination of TSI and activist research uncovers paradoxes that occur in a SI-process. Such paradoxes can lead to capture of the initiative by dominant institutions, which impedes action that challenges these institutions. These paradoxes for instance concern; the embeddedness paradox, tensions between localities around climate (justice) discourse, top-down vs. bottom-up, the definition of ‘us’ and ‘them’, and the alignment of long-term and short-term goals.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Within transition and STS research there is a call for more research on the role of social movements, civil society organizations and activists, in the context of sustainability. This thesis explores this subject through the lens of Transformative Social Innovation (TSI), which defines four sets of relations of a social innovation (SI) process; relations within, relations to the network of SI-initiatives, to institutions and to the socio-material context. Together these relations co-produce a SI-initiative. In addition, I add activist research methods to conduct the analysis of the SI-initiative. Activist research requires a genuine engagement with the field, which allows for conducting critical interviews and analyzing of the ‘political’ and paradoxes which occur in the SI-process. Through the analysis chapters I answer four sub questions which reflected the four sets of TSI relations. Together they answer the research question: *“Why and how does the effort of the Dutch CSO Milieudefensie to institutionalize climate justice in the coalition agreement lead to transformative social innovations along four sets of relations as defined in TSI?”*

Literature Review

Researchers developed TSI theory to answer the need for coherence in SI literature. It does so through asserting the innovative agency of CSO’s, social enterprises and social movements. The basis of TSI is in literature on socio-technical transitions. TSI aims to open up innovation discourses, which are often too focused on technological frontrunners and firms (Pel & Kemp, 2020). Thereby, introducing a more inclusive and democratizing account of innovation (Pel & Kemp, 2020). In TSI, SI is made up of, shaped by, and produces doings, knowings, modes of organizing and framings. An SI-initiative can innovate in one or more of these dimensions. What makes an initiative transformative might only be due to changes in the context, but extra-ordinary properties of the SI-initiative itself can lead to transformation as well. This would manifest in an initiative’s ability to challenge, transform, dismantle, etc. dominant institutions. In TSI, institutions are defined as dominant ways of doing, knowing, organizing or framing, this is discussed. Critical to the emancipation of an SI-initiative is its embeddedness in a network of SI-initiatives. Here, SI can expand or disperse, and actors can develop a collective political voice, shared identities and shared narratives of change are empowering. Lastly, relation concerns the socio-material context. This is not just conceptualized as the sum of the previous relations (within, between and relations to institutions) but also accounts for broader societal trends, contingencies and path dependencies shaping TSI processes. To further discuss the relation to institutions I draw upon research on the ‘political’. This makes it possible to easier identify which doings, modes of organizing, framing and knowing actively challenge these institutions. This is especially relevant for the climate (justice) movement and tackling the root causes of the climate crisis, which requires politicization. I discuss the extent to which depoliticized tendencies are adopted into the climate movement, ideas on how to re-politicize the climate movement.

Methodology

I rely on activist research methods to apply TSI to a SI-initiative in the climate movement. This means I took part as an activist in the SI-initiative itself. Activist research relies on rigorous methodology and approaches research as inherently biased and non-neutral. I interviewed nine Milieudéfense employees to highlight the perspectives of the actors within the SI-initiative itself. These interviews provided the basis of the analysis chapters.

Analysis

To answer the first sub question, I introduce the SI-initiative through its knowings, organizing, doings and framings as defined in TSI theory. Through ‘Big Organizing’, the Milieudéfense department aimed to set-up local groups which support the Milieudéfense narrative. For the first ‘Operation Climate’ campaign this translated to a demand towards the newly elected government to tax large polluting companies and to pay for green solutions for all. The head-office stands in close contact with volunteers. Their function is to bring focus to local action to have national impact. The local volunteers’ main activity was canvassing and using these canvassing conversations to lobby with local politicians in light of the upcoming elections.

However, change is not achieved in isolation. Networks are essential for support, dispersal and expansion of TSI. The Operation Climate groups joined other local groups to organize a demonstration before the elections. These simultaneous demonstrations in 40+ locations were supported by the newly started national Climate Crisis Coalition, consisting of several nationally (and locally) operating organizations. To support all these local groups, the national coalition used Big Organizing strategies and a framing similar to that of Milieudéfense. Thus, the SI dispersed over its network, but as shown in the analysis, thrives best under specific conditions. Big Organizing yields best to these singular large events, which involve many people, and have a clear deadline.

Concerning the relations to institutions, the framing of the SI-initiative challenges the governmental policy of prioritizing large polluting companies over households and SME in policy, through subsidies, tax-breaks and lifting of regulations. Through (Big) Organizing the relationship between locally and nationally operating organizations is also challenged, moving responsibilities for nationally organized actions to local activists. By interacting with neighbors and local politicians, Operation Climate focuses on empowering people to become conscious citizens. Big Organizing realizes a new stage of translocalism in which local groups (should) know what they are fighting for and focus on the same goals as the national organization. Big Organizing also leads to exclusions and inclusions, as there is little room to construct or even discuss the central message. However, as TSI specifies, most SI-initiatives end-up in a co-productive relationship with existing institutions. For Milieudéfense this is for instance enforced in its relationship with politicians through lobbying, the organization’s reliance on capital from the government and donors. Milieudéfense now relies on judicial methods to not endanger their juridical position. At the local level, climate movement actors

also tend to repeat depoliticized framings of the climate crisis, focusing on consumer activism, personal responsibility and pandering to a governmental elite that has showed no intention in addressing the root causes of climate change. Locally (and to an extent nationally as well) many activists repeat an ‘altogether’ discourse; climate change affects us equally, thus all have to take responsibility equally, while overlooking conflict, chaos and resistance that will occur through climate (in)action. Thereby, the climate movement also remains in an isolated bubble of mostly white, progressive and educated people.

Looking at the larger socio-material context, the Covid-19 pandemic neither facilitated discussions around the political aspects of the climate crisis. Next to this, it made Organizing difficult due to the changing state of the governmental pandemic regulations. However, it also allowed national organizations to shift responsibility towards local organizations and strengthened the digital literacy of actors.

Discussion

In the discussion I reflect upon my own participation as an activist, specifically relating to the canvassing conversations and the interpretations of climate justice on a local level. From the analysis, the literature review and my own experiences, I discuss the possibility of broadening the movement to include more diverse groups and the possibility of realizing transformation. Furthermore, I discuss the implications of this research to transition literature, activist research and TSI. Lastly, I discuss limitations and suggestions for further research.

Conclusion

This research focused on the role of the climate movement, while not solely focusing on the heroic, but especially shedding lights on the conflicts and paradoxes that occur when an initiative tries to galvanize their demands. Discussing these areas of conflict can highlight what social movement actors can do themselves to strengthen the political dimension of their movement. Such tensions relate to top-down versus bottom-up, the framing of climate change across localities, creation of an ‘us’ and ‘them’, and tensions between long-term and short-term goals.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Writing this thesis would have been impossible without all the help and support from people around me. First, I want to thank Bruno, Eefje, Maarten and Souad of the Milieudéfensie Operation Climate team for all the training, teaching and support regarding (big) organizing, canvassing climate justice, coaching and so much more. Without saying, this also includes the other ‘office’ volunteers Jiske, Job, Koen, Leah, Loudi, and Loulou. Furthermore, I want to thank Elisa, Joep, Laura, Lynn, Maina and Peter for their participation in the interviews, providing me with many new insights and perspectives. Again, Maarten for his help with my thesis.

Two years of studying MLP, SNM, TM, TIS, SPT, ANT, MIP etc. did not fully prepare me to write this thesis. However, my education did make me realize there was something worth to study here. Essential was therein the support from Henny Romijn, my first supervisor, who not only was relentless in sending me relevant research, but most of all trusted me to carry out this unconventional research. Not only was Henny incredibly important for the beginning of this research. Together with my other supervisors Erik Laes, and Evelien de Hoop, she managed to bring structure to my chaotic thoughts and ideas and somehow managed to turn these ramblings into a thesis. This was not possible without all their skillful feedback, insights and new perspectives. But most of all for not pushing me to make a choice between activism and scholarly activity.

The TU/e and its staff also deserve my gratitude. For opening my eyes not only through coursework in the bachelor’s and master’s but also for opening many doors. From the multidisciplinary work in Team CASA, as well as the opportunities to study abroad (twice).

Next, I want to thank my family and friends for their support. My parents, for actually managing to proofread this thesis at multiple stages during this process. My friends who provided much appreciated serious and not so serious feedback.

I want to thank all local activists from both Operation Climate groups and local Climate Crisis Coalitions in Brabant and Limburg for all their enthusiasm, activism and dedication. Even during a pandemic these people managed to organize actions without physically meeting one another. Yet, extra special were the moments we got to spend together offline, whether it was at the climate alarm, canvassing or the many cycling protests. Seeing all this activism sprout all over the country, seeing alliances being made and supporting the growth of a social movement, was wonderful. All this new activity around climate change does not mean I became optimistic regarding the future, but it does mean I am hopeful that another world is possible, because so many of you remain active.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- CCS: Carbon Capture Storage
- CJA: Climate Justice Action Now
- CSO: Civil Society Organization
- MLP: Mulit-Level Perspective
- NGO: Non-governmental organization
- SI: Social Innovation
- SME: Small and Medium Enterprise
- SMS: Social Movement Studies
- STS: Science and Technology Studies
- TSI: Transformative Social Innovation
- TT: Transition Towns
- XR: Extinction Rebellion

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1. INTRODUCTION

In the recent Science and Technology Studies (STS) Research Agenda by Sovacool et al. (2020), co-author Stirling argues that more and more ‘sociotechnical’ research is driven by ‘cockpitism’, referring to the focus on a single expert as an agent for political change. This involves little questioning of political drivers of sustainability challenges (Sovacool et al., 2020a). Wellbeing, equality and ecological integrity are addressed as marginal ‘externalities’, residual ‘institutional failures’ and a challenge to ‘optimize’ ‘policy mixes’ (Sovacool et al., 2020a). Instead of approaching human well-being, social equality and ecological integrity as deeper transformations of entrenched interests, concentrated power, centralized authority, elite privilege and related flows of appropriations (Sovacool et al., 2020a). Stirling argues that the technocratic approach present in sociotechnical literature contrasts the central role that ideas and values of democracy play in activism (Sovacool et al., 2020a). The relevance of democratic struggle to progressive change is thus more obvious to activists than academics (Sovacool et al., 2020a). Rather than focusing on research in servitude of mainly single actors and policy makers, a more “*humble but effective role arguably lies in scholarship and analysis of collective actions in their own right*” (Sovacool et al., 2020a, p. 18). Scholars can help seed, catalyze and picture the wider complexities of democratic struggle, essential to progressive transformation (Sovacool et al., 2020a). As also argued in the transition studies research agenda, understanding the changing practices within social movements can inform policy and practice more effectively (Köhler et al., 2019). Opening the ‘black box’ of Civil Society Organizations (CSO’s) and social movements, is a research avenue for transition studies according to Köhler et al. (2019). Since, behavior change likely only occurs when values, lifestyles and cultural norms change through a changing social context, this context includes social movements (Seyfang et al., 2010). CSO’s and social movements are motivated by alternative visions of society, articulating new directions of societal change (Köhler et al., 2019).

This direction towards social movements and CSO’s is also partially reflected in the growing interest in Social innovation (SI) (Pel & Kemp, 2020). However, SI scholarship is rooted in different social sciences disciplines and still characterized by ‘conceptual ambiguity’ (Pel & Kemp, 2020). The need for coherence is answered by the development of Transformative Social Innovation (TSI) theory (Pel et al., 2020). For this thesis, I use TSI to study a campaign (called Operation Climate) of a focal organization (Milieudefensie) in the Dutch climate movement. TSI conceptualizes SI as changing social relations, which involve new ways of doing, organizing, framing, and knowing. TSI is then the process of SI challenging, altering or replacing dominant institutions in a specific socio-material context. Next to more traditional research methods such as conducting interviews, I was able to deepen my reflections by genuinely engaging with the climate movement as an activist. To construct my role as a researcher and activist I rely (mostly) on work by Kenis (2015, 2019) and Hale (2008). Their work adds a lens of the ‘political’ to TSI. This allows for more critical engagement with

activism and a better understanding of the paradoxes that occur during SI-processes. Therefore, it puts the emphasis on activism and opening the ‘black box’ of Civil Society Organizations (CSO’s) and social movements (Köhler et al., 2019a). Especially, as social movements are on the forefront of progressive socio-technological change and hold an important role in pressuring governments to realize climate action (Mazzucato, 2021).

The intermediate goal of the Milieudefensie campaign is to get climate justice policy in the post-election governmental coalition agreement. In the long-term Milieudefensie aims to reach a ‘climate justice’ based society. (Climate) Justice is not only a subject addressed by CSO’s, but also receives increasing attention in the transition studies field (see e.g. Köhler et al., 2019; Schlosberg & Collins, 2014; Smith & Stirling, 2018; Sovacool et al., 2020a). The campaign uses ‘Big Organizing’ tactics, as employed first by the Bernie Sanders campaign in 2015 (Bond & Exley, 2016; Howey, Rosenblatt, Young, Beach, & Baker, 2020). Big Organizing combines grassroots activism with centralized coordination. I approach this campaign as an SI-initiative through a TSI lens. This leads to the following research question and sub-questions, which are based on the four sets of relations as defined in a TSI trajectory:

Research Question

Why and how does the effort of the Dutch CSO Milieudefensie to institutionalize climate justice in the coalition agreement lead to transformative social innovations along four sets of relations as defined in TSI?

Sub-questions

1. *What does, organizing, framing and knowing form the SI-initiative?*
2. *How is the SI- initiative embedded in a broader network of SI-initiatives?*
3. *What existing and novel institutions are put into practice in novel ways and how do these institutions shape the SI-initiative?*
4. *How is the Social Innovation process shaped by broader changes in the socio-material context?*

In **chapter 2** I introduce TSI and why this theory provides an interesting lens to study SI. Furthermore, I discuss the ‘political’ in context of the climate movement. **Chapter 3** is the methodology chapter, here I introduce the case study as well as my approach to activist research and methods involved. **Chapters 4 to 7** are the empirical analysis chapters, following the sets of relations. **Chapter 4** constructs the SI-initiative itself, through its relations within. In **chapter 5**, I discuss the network of social innovations in which the SI-initiative is embedded. **Chapter 6** describes the SI-initiatives interaction with existing institutions and creation of new ones, as well as the paradoxes that occur in such interactions. Lastly, **chapter 7** describes the socio-material context in which the SI is embedded. In **chapter 8**, I critically reflect on my own engagement as an activist researcher and discuss the results of the analysis chapters. **Chapter 9** concludes with an answer to the research question, implications and avenues for further research.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter is divided into three parts. First, I discuss the requirements of a framework to answer the research question (**section 2.1**). These requirements make it possible to exclude many frameworks from Transition studies as well as from Social Movement Studies. These requirements lead to TSI theory (**2.2**) to which I add an activist research lens in chapter 3. After, I also discuss research on the climate (justice) movement, which helped identify paradoxes in SI-processes (**2.3**).

2.1 FRAMEWORK REQUIREMENTS

To analyze a social innovation process in the climate movement, I set-up several requirements that a framework needs to meet. Here I introduce these requirements and why they are necessary for answering the research question.

The framework should:

- Include, a **systemic approach**, instead of viewing social innovation in terms of a case alone, a theory should approach social innovation as interrelating with a wider system, e.g., comprising of other actors, networks, institutions, regimes etc. For instance, in the case of Social Movement Studies, analysis of this wider system is often not prioritized, as the focus is on the CSO / social movement itself.
- Be based on **relational ontology**: which acknowledges that a subject gets meaning in relation to other subjects, objects, substances etc., it does not exist in isolation.
- From this requirement follows that reality is **coproduced**: subjects affect and even create one another. A SI can change an institution but does not do so in isolation. Other subjects also affect this change process. In turn the institution can also shape the social innovation. The SI-process of Operation Climate is also coproduced by actors in their network, institutions and the socio-material context.
- Subsequently, **agency is distributed** amongst actors. Not one actor is responsible for realizing change. Other actors also contribute to change. Milieudefensie employees might have started Operation Climate, but other actors also contributed, in turn these actors also affect the SI-process. That agency is distributed does not mean it is equally distributed. Certain actors have more agency or a different type of agency.
- **Be non-teleological**: Haxeltine et al. (2017) discuss the pitfall of normative formulations of SI which becomes a problem when normativity embedded in a theory or SI is treated unreflexively. Especially when researchers make a teleological fallacy in which the research object is confused with a ‘desired end’ (Haxeltine et al., 2017). Therein, a theory should account for a diversity of actors involved and contingent outcomes of SI process (Haxeltine et al., 2017).
- **Acknowledge ‘the political’**: The climate crisis is a political crisis. My position is that fighting climate change requires transformative societal change. Behavior change likely only occurs when values, lifestyles and cultural norms change through a changing social context (Seyfang et al., 2010). This is a process full of contradictions and conflict. This position is further substantiated in 2.3. What benefits one group might sideline another. Consensus amongst all societal actors about how to solve climate change is thus not possible. Obscuring these conflicts and contradictions not only means creating new problems it also means exacerbating the climate crisis. The framework thus needs to be

able to expose the ‘political’, to make visible what is (un)consciously obscured. Only, from there it is possible to start looking for alternative solutions that can mitigate climate change. However, transition theories often display shortcomings when it comes to questions of politics and power (Kenis, Bono, & Mathijs, 2016; Köhler et al., 2019b; Sovacool et al., 2020a; Svensson & Nikoleris, 2018a; Williams & Doyon, 2019).

In this section I discussed several of the key requirements which a theory ideally should meet in order to study a social innovation in the context of the climate movement. Transformative Social Innovation Theory meets many of these requirements. In the next paragraph I discuss this theory in more detail.

2.2 TRANSFORMATIVE SOCIAL INNOVATION

TSI theory draws from literature on socio-technical transitions, these transitions can span decades of analysis. Analyzing social innovation asserts the innovative agency of social enterprises, civil society actors and social movements (Pel & Kemp, 2020). With an aim to open up innovation discourses, which are often too focused on technological frontrunners and firms (Pel & Kemp, 2020). Thereby, introducing a more inclusive and democratizing account of innovation, SI has then emancipatory significance (Pel & Kemp, 2020). Meanwhile, scholarship has clarified the vulnerability of SI discourse to preoccupations with neoliberal and productivist ideologies, as well as stereotypical understandings of innovation – which are not transformative nor emancipatory (see for instance; Avelino, Dumitru, Cipolla, Kunze, & Wittmayer, 2020; Jessop, Moulaert, Hulgård, & Hamdouch, 2013; Krlev, Mildenerger, & Anheier, 2020; Erik Swyngedouw, 2009). Keeping these concerns with social innovation theories in mind, TSI theory was developed. In this section I discuss some of the theoretical foundations of TSI and how these fit with the requirements of the theory as mentioned in section 2.1. Next, I discuss the content of the framework itself, which relations it defines and what these relations mean.

2.2.1 FOUNDATIONS OF TSI

To develop TSI, researchers followed a transdisciplinary action research approach. Through critical engagement with SI-initiatives, the authors became aware of the strengths of such initiatives (Avelino et al., 2020). Researchers saw the ability of initiatives to empower local citizens to find ways to learn and adapt, to mobilize and inspire, and to translate global ambitions and concerns into practical, tangible and effective small-scale action (Avelino et al., 2020).

The theory is inspired by other relational ontologies such as actor network theory and assemblage theory (Pel et al., 2020). TSI builds from a relational ontology (Pel et al., 2020). In a relational ontology, relations between entities are more fundamental than the entities themselves (Wildman, 2010). TSI is a co-productionist STS approach, viewing participation as emergent phenomena and as social experiments in themselves and paying closer attention to construction, performance, dimensions and effects (Chilvers & Longhurst, 2016; Pel et al., 2020). The theory describes that social innovation develops in a context of dynamic ‘arenas of development’

(Jørgensen, 2012; Pel et al., 2020) and ‘strategic action fields’ (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011; Pel et al., 2020). Thereby, SI initiatives renegotiate organizational and institutional boundaries, operating in a hybrid institutional sphere (Pel et al., 2020). Using relational ontology, agency is understood as embedded and situated (Pel et al., 2020). This perspective thus highlights that agency is distributed, which makes it possible to gain insight into processes of (dis)empowerment (Pel et al., 2020). Therefore, it meets the third requirement I introduced in section 2.1. Since agency is distributed – neither existing at the practice or the actor – institutional change and emergence of practices are conceptualized as totally intertwined (Haxeltine, Jørgensen, et al., 2016). Agency is the central feature of the relational and embodied person, embedded in a dynamic social and interactive context (Haxeltine, Jørgensen, et al., 2016). Agency is fluid and changes over time. It is emergent, experiential, and embodied. It can only be understood within a subjective field, and not from a disengaged, rational mind (Haxeltine, Jørgensen, et al., 2016). SI initiatives are fragile entities; agency is constantly under negotiation between actors, institutions and ecosystems (Pel et al., 2020). Embeddedness in broader ecosystems is crucial for the agency of initiatives, and so are local and (trans-)national connections (Pel et al., 2020).

Not only is agency distributed, knowledge is also distributed (Pel et al., 2020). Knowledge on the operation of a system is shared amongst human actors, social innovation initiatives and networks, there is no complete view from the outside (Pel et al., 2020). Note that both Haxeltine (2016) and Pel et al. (2020) acknowledge that agency and knowledge can only be understood from within and not from a disengaged ‘rational’ mind. By using activist research, I engaged with the SI-process itself, this should make it possible for me to get a clearer interpretation of the agency of this initiative and how it is distributed amongst other actors and institutions in its field.

SI enact existing practices, as well as new and modified practices. Doing so SI creates and maintains existing and new social relations (Pel et al., 2020). In enacting practices, SI actors draw from institutionalized logics, forms and traditions (e.g., norms, rules conventions, values, assumptions, beliefs, identities) and make use of available resources (Pel et al., 2020).

From the perspective of TSI power does not rely only on a transactional view of politics, instead it incorporates a transformative perspective on the generation of social change (Haxeltine, Avelino, et al., 2016). Social change does not solely rely on using institutional power to realize (incremental) gains but aims to alter the public debate; changing and creating institutions (Haxeltine et al., 2016).

TSI theory does not look at driving actors or origins, instead it sees SI as a process of changing social relations (Pel et al., 2020). Thus, this avoids ‘cockpitness’ and focus on heroics of a single actor, often present in transition or STS research (see (Sovacool et al., 2020; Turnheim & Sovacool, 2020)). A SI combines ideas, objects, activities or (groups of) people, who are considered to be socially innovative in such manner that they contribute to changing social relations (Pel et al., 2020). This notion of SI moves away from teleological notions of SI (Haxeltine et al., 2016). This

concerns especially those notions of SI in which ‘social’ refers to desirable purposes, designated beneficiaries and ideological programs (e.g. Hubert, 2010; Jessop, Moulaert, Hulgård, & Hamdouch, 2013; Unger, 2015) (Haxeltine et al., 2016; Pel et al., 2020). Pel et al. (2020) argue that such notions are normatively idealistic, this way reproducing the pro-innovation bias in innovation sciences (Godin & Vinck, 2017). This results in overlooking the theoretical insights of path dependencies, unintended consequences, paradoxes and the dark sides of social change (Fougère & Meriläinen, 2021; Swyngedouw, 2005; Westley & McGowan, 2017). Pel et al (2020) prefer a reflexive, and sociological perspective over a teleological one. This is in line with co-productionist understandings and accounts of socio-technical change (Geels, 2010). There, the ‘social’ is taken in a broader sense: the ‘social’ in social-relations refers to socio-material relations that connect ideas, objects, activities and people (Pel et al., 2020).

A significant influence on TSI is the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) theory. MLP focuses on explaining ‘regime shifts’ in ‘technological regimes’, adopted from work in evolutionary economics (Haxeltine et al., 2017). TSI, similar to MLP, combines resources from evolutionary economics, STS (such as ANT), and narrative and durational approaches. However, it also integrates ideas and concepts from institutional theories (Haxeltine et al., 2017). The ambition for TSI is to use the complex-systems-theoretical strengths of transitions theory, while avoiding premature assumptions about what ‘regimes’, ‘niches’, ‘landscape’ and related distinctions of societal ‘subsystems’ constitute (Haxeltine et al., 2017). Although, there is the assumption that SI-initiatives only manifest transformative developments in co-evolution. However, on the other hand there is the acknowledgement that SI is a dispersed phenomenon and cannot be easily attributed to evolutionary mechanisms (selection, variation, retention) (Haxeltine et al., 2017). There is thus a tension between system-evolutionary explanations and relational descriptions (Haxeltine et al., 2017). Herein, relation refers to the (dialectic) relationship between the dynamic processes of change, development and actors (Haxeltine et al., 2017). Thus, it not solely refers to the relationship between actors.

TSI theory defines four sets of relations of social innovation processes. First, there are relations within SI-initiatives, connecting ideas, objects, activities and people. They create new social relations by innovating in their ways of doing, organizing, framing and knowing. Next, there are relations with other SI-initiatives which form into a network. An SI-initiative also has relations to institutions that shape the initiative and which the initiative tries to change. Last, there are relations to the socio-material context. Below I introduce these sets of relations, as well as what can make a SI ‘transformative’.




FIGURE 1: OUR SETS OF RELATIONS IN A SI-PROCESS. ADAPTED FROM HAXELTINE ET AL. (2016) AND PEL ET AL. (2020)

2.2.2 SOCIAL INNOVATION DEFINITION & RELATIONS WITHIN SI INITIATIVES

As mentioned before in TSI, Social Innovation is a process of changing social relations. It is a:

“Heterogeneous social-material collective comprising human and non-human elements, mutually constituted through the interweaving of the cognitive, the material, the social and the normative. SIs are made up of, shaped by, and produce (Chilvers and Longhurst 2014, 2015, 2016a, 2016b) (Haxeltine, et al. 2016, p. 9).”

- Doings (through material commitments, resources¹, the performance of practices, technologies);
- Organizing (how an initiative is configured, organised, governed, rules, decision making);
- Framings (as issue definitions, meanings, visions, imaginaries, discursive commitments);
- Knowing (knowledge, learning, cognitive resources, competencies, forms of appraisal). (Haxeltine, et al. 2016, Pel et al., (2020).

These four bullet points are called dimensions. An SI-initiative is thus a collective of these dimensions. Using this distinction makes it easier to consider the types of activity that agents in SI-processes are engaged in and define its relations to networks, institution and socio-material context (Haxeltine, et al. 2016). An SI-initiative is not likely to be innovative in all four areas (Haxeltine, et al. 2016). The wider context of social innovation initiatives, institutions and the socio-material context

¹ Resources are defined broadly as persons, assets, materials or capital, including human, mental, monetary, artifactual and natural resources (Avelino & Rotmans, 2009).

also act upon each dimension differently (Haxeltine, et al. 2016). What differentiates a social innovation from a technical innovation is that the social innovation creates new social relations which involves new ways of doing, knowing, framing and/or organizing (Pel et al., 2020). Social innovation can also be used to discuss the social dimensions of an innovation (Wittmayer et al., 2019). Examples of social innovations include the Global Ecovillage Network, Ashoka (which is a network of social entrepreneurs), special care cooperatives, repair cafés, LINUX, community gardens but also changes in diet, in traditions, or ideological (e.g., 16th & 17th century European church reformations, communism, neoliberalism etc.) these all create new social relations.

A SI-process is transformative when it challenges, alters or replaces existing institutional arrangements across the context (i.e., in more than one isolated experiment) (Haxeltine et al., 2016). Note that TSI is not used to analyze historical innovation processes, but according to the manifesto it is a call for SI that challenges current institutions. It is thus in the making (<https://tsimanifesto.org/manifesto/>). Yet, past initiatives have replaced institutions, even institutional logics. Due to the urgency of current socio-ecological crises, TSI researchers focus on current innovations. TSI can be both a driver of transformative social change and an emergent outcome of ongoing social transformation processes (Haxeltine et al., 2016). Transformative potential of SI-initiatives can be increased by ‘playing into’ the co-evolutionary interactions between innovation in the social-material context and the different meta-processes of change (Avelino, Wittmayer, Kemp, & Haxeltine, 2017).

2.2.3 NETWORK FORMATION PROCESS

The network formation process is a crucial link in the development of TSI (Pel et al., 2020). This requires a balanced account of the network which surrounds the Social Innovation initiative (Pel et al., 2020). As mentioned above, agency is conceptualized as distributed and networked (Pel et al., 2020). Therefore, it is acknowledged that SI-initiatives themselves are embedded and empowered through a broader constellation of actors, i.e., the network (Pel et al., 2020). This network consists of relevant SI initiatives. It is not a network consisting of all types of relations of an SI initiative. An SI-initiative’s transformative impact depends on the changing tensions and stability of the action field they operate in (Pel et al., 2020). The changing tension and stability thus depend on the communities the initiative is rooted in, its translocal dimension as well as discourse formation (Pel et al., 2020).

SI can circulate and be replicated at other sites of this formed network, but SI requires work to be kept together (Pel et al., 2020). This growth of SI through its network, is understood in terms of dispersal and expansion (Pel et al., 2020). Political culture is important to dispersal and expansion of a SI and thus to transformative change (Pel et al., 2020). This culture refers to the systematic and routinized manner in which a community validates knowledge and makes binding collective choices.

Three dimensions are important to consider in network formation. The first dimension consists of the communities an initiative is rooted in (Haxeltine, Avelino, et al., 2016). These

networks form around the need to gain access to resources (Pel et al., 2020). Other organizations such as local governmental bodies, NGOs, CSO, unions and universities, can provide material help (e.g., subsidy, location, members) and immaterial help (legitimization) (Pel et al., 2020). This can work both in an empowering and disempowering way, depending on the changing opportunities in the dynamic ‘arenas of development’ and ‘action fields’ (Pel et al., 2020). Second, the clear translocal dimension of SI is important to consider. SI-Initiatives are or become aware of their role in broader (social) movements, in which local embeddedness is combined with translocal and transnational connectivity (Pel et al., 2020). Initiatives combine local embeddedness with translocal as well as transnational connectivity (Pel et al., 2020). Within this network the development of a collective political voice, shared identities and shared narratives of change are empowering (Pel et al., 2020). Translocal network formation is thus key to empowerment of SI-initiatives. Third, to these immediate supportive networks, extensive networks of societal discourses also impact SI initiatives (Pel et al., 2020). SI network formation also takes place through broader circulation and resonance of ideas (Pel et al., 2020). Discourse formation and its mediation through communication infrastructures crucially enhances the reach of SI network formation (Pel et al., 2020). The circulation of ideas and formation of networks has been researched in Social Movement Studies (SMS) (e.g. Castells, 2015; Garrett, 2006), as well as relational geography, literature on policy mobilities (see Temenos & McCann, 2013) and STS (see Jasanoff, 2004). A shared narrative is thus important to network formation.

2.2.4 RELATIONS TO INSTITUTIONS

TSI combines previous work into the definition that institutions are “*norms, rules, conventions and values that constrain and enable social relations and established ways of doing, organizing, framing and knowing. Dominant institutions are then dominant views of doing, organizing, framing and knowing, which are established in the social-material context*” (Haxeltine, Avelino, et al., 2016 p. 12).

The concept of Institutionalization is then used to describe the processes by which change in the institutional structure emerges and becomes (more) embedded (Haxeltine, Avelino, et al., 2016). Institutionalization refers to a “*process of embedding some aspects of social life (e.g. norms, rules, conventions, a mode of behavior and values) within an organization, a wider field of social relations, or within the social-material context as a whole*” (Haxeltine, Avelino, et al., 2016 p. 12). ‘Degrees’ of institutionalization for any institutionalization process differ at different times and in different contexts (Fuenfschilling & Truffer, 2014). Institutionalization is then treated in TSI as a variable with different effects on the stability of the system, actors and the potential for change (Fuenfschilling & Truffer, 2014). Influence and impact of a SI journey can then be “*assessed by identifying the degree of institutionalization of its core elements*” (Haxeltine, Avelino, et al., 2016).

Established institutions can be both formal and informal, both constraining and enabling (new) social relations as well as patterns of doing, organizing, framing and knowing (Haxeltine,

Avelino, et al., 2016). Thus, co-productive relations of SI-initiatives/networks both reproduce established institutions while simultaneously being constrained and/or enabled by them. Institutions (often) respond to SI initiatives in order to preserve or stabilize the system context (Pel et al., 2020). Institutionalization of a SI is therefore an inherently political deed, which usually leads to ‘capture’ (Pel et al., 2020). However changes in the context, but also extra-ordinary properties of the SI-initiative itself can lead to transformation (Pel et al., 2020). TSI-agency becomes possible as SI-actors use existing institutions and resources in order to perform practices in novel ways – with a resulting dialectic of change that leads to transformations in the institutional arrangements in the context (Pel et al., 2020). To become truly transformative an SI initiative needs an understanding of the dominant rule-sets in society (Geels, 2010; Grin, Rotmans, & Schot, 2010). Related to these rule-sets are an understanding of the processes through which TSI can fit in and transform incumbent structures (Pel et al., 2020). Innovators adapt their strategies to cope with constraints of the institutional environment (Pel et al., 2020).

Transformative change is conceptualized as change that challenges, alters and/or replaces dominant institutions in the socio-material context (Haxeltine, Avelino, et al., 2016). Drawing from McFarland and Wittmayer (2015) TSI theorists specify the differences between altering, challenging and replacing of institutions (Haxeltine, Avelino, et al., 2016). To ‘challenge’ means questioning the legitimacy or the existence of dominant institutions (ways of doing, organizing, framing, knowing) (Haxeltine, Avelino, et al., 2016). To ‘alter’ refers to changing or supplementing (parts of) dominant institutions (Haxeltine, Avelino, et al., 2016). To ‘replace’ means replacing (parts of) dominant institutions with new institutions (Haxeltine, Avelino, et al., 2016). Below I describe generic types of strategies that SI actors engage with in processes of institutional change, by using examples of Transition Towns² (TT), as specified in Haxeltine et al., 2016:

- Enacting an institution in a different way:
“What (existing) institutions are being enacted in (which) novel ways?” (p.25)
 For TT these are the questioning of conventions around energy use and lifestyle. After which TT promotes alternatives to these conventions. Which includes subverting norms around the use of public spaces through ‘guerilla gardening’³.
- Making (new) choices about which (intersecting) institutions to enact:
“What (novel) choices are being made about which (intersecting/overlapping) institutions to enact? Are these choices the result of ‘strategic action’ or just ‘muddling through’, or both/neither?” (p. 25)
 Emphasize the use of more manual social practices around making products, agriculture, sharing etc. Buying vegetable boxes via cooperative schemes instead of going to the supermarket. Redefining the ‘good life’ as one of social value and a low impact lifestyle (thus e.g., air travel becomes a taboo).

² For Transition Towns their fundamental concerns with society can be overcome through localization and revitalization of community life – building another form of living alongside the capitalist system (Kenis, 2019a).

³ Planting seeds of (edible) plants and trees in public spaces

- Use different resources / use resources differently / create resources:
“How are SI-actors using resources differently and/or using different resources (and/or creating new resources)?” (p. 25)
 TT for instance enhances social networks, uses a local currency, secures funding for a community-owned energy project, or gardens are turned into a shared food growing space.

There are also relations between institutions, which exist in institutional fields or logics (Pel et al., 2020). Since I did research from a single SI-initiative’s perspective, it is likely I am not be able to observe these relations compared to relations between the SI-initiative, its network and institutions. Thereby, a TSI journey does not develop in isolation of dominant institutions nor are they zero-sum frontal battle against dominant institutions (Pel et al., 2020). Socially innovative agency often seeks a co-productive relationship with dominant institutions they challenge and eventually intertwines with them, except for perhaps militant, guerrilla, ‘direct action’ activists or some social movements (Pel et al., 2020). In chapter 5 I discuss whether this is the case for Operation Climate and its larger network.

TSI cannot provide a clear account of substantive material changes in the systems targeted by SI (Pel et al., 2020). Pel et al. (2020) conclude this does not differ from other institutionalist, rule-based system understandings in transition research (see Svensson & Nikoleris, 2018). However, TSI research does account for relations between institutions and SI-actors, including paradoxes that form in such relationships (e.g., exclusionary participation, institutional mimicking, institutional isomorphism, innovation capture and dialectical cycles of (de)institutionalizing innovation) (Pel et al., 2020). It is impossible to challenge one institution without reproducing other elements of existing institutional arrangements (Pel et al., 2020). TSI acknowledges the ‘embeddedness paradox’: SI-initiatives seek to transform institutions which they are simultaneously shaped by. TSI also needs to find an ‘institutional home’ to access vital resources, which entails balancing between independence and dependence on (critiqued) dominant windows (Pel et al., 2020). A challenge for TSI is then how to avoid capture by current arrangements when creating/modeling change (Pel et al., 2020).

Realizing institutional change also requires institutional entrepreneurship and proactive adaption of strategies in response to changing circumstances (Pel et al., 2020). This introduces new power asymmetries (Pel et al., 2020). These paradoxes highlight the complexity of SI policy and practice (Pel et al., 2020). SI needs to be equipped with strategic repertoires to handle these paradoxes (Pel et al., 2020). However, theory does not describe how to do so. TSI research points to work which uncovers neoliberal, paradoxical and depoliticizing tendencies in social innovation (see e.g. Fougère, Segercrantz, & Seeck, 2017; Schubert, 2019; Erik Swyngedouw, 2005). However, TSI does not provide clear accounts or a framework on how to uncover these paradoxes and how to avoid capture yet (Pel et al., 2020). This is however very relevant for the climate justice movement; therefore, I also study Operation Climate from the perspective of activist research and studied the ‘political’ in terms of the SI-initiative, which is introduced in section 2.3.

2.2.5 RELATIONS TO THE BROADER SOCIO-MATERIAL CONTEXT

TSI pulls from scholarship on societal transformation, innovation theory and transitions theory to introduce the relevance of the socio-material context (Pel et al., 2020). It thus shows similarities to the ‘landscape’ as defined in MLP. The socio-material context is not just conceptualized as the sum of the previous relations (within, between and relations to institutions) but also accounts for broader societal trends and path dependencies shaping TSI processes (Pel et al., 2020). This must be balanced against the relational awareness of the contingent and fluid nature of societal transformation processes (Pel et al., 2020). The socio-material context is a multiplicity of initiatives and configurations, which tend towards stabilization but are fragile and open to change (Pel et al., 2020). Change can emerge from the combination of multiple strategies of multiple actors especially if these actors can take advantage of context dependencies and contingencies (Haxeltine, Avelino, et al., 2016; Pel et al., 2020).

Not only extraordinary properties of the SI(-Initiative) can lead to ‘transformation’. Seizing arising contingencies or opportunities in the socio-material context to challenge institutions can also lead to transformation (Pel et al., 2020). For example the TT initiative took the financial crisis in the early 2010’s as an opportunity to grow more members, and high oil prices meant people were looking for an alternative narrative (Haxeltine, Avelino, et al., 2016).

2.2.6 CONCLUSION

This section introduced TSI theory. This theory meets the requirements I discussed in 2.1; systemic approach, relation ontology, based on co-production, agency is distributed and acknowledgement of the political. However, TSI does not provide clear directions on how to study the ‘political’, paradoxes and capture when operationalizing TSI in the context of a SI-initiative in the climate movement, but it does point to some relevant works (e.g. (Fougère et al., 2017; Swyngedouw, 2005)). For instance, in Longhurst et al. (2016) analysis of TT for the development of TSI, paradoxes are not discussed. Therefore, in the next section I introduce work on how the ‘political’ is studied by other authors in the context of the climate movement and climate justice. In the methodology chapter, I discuss activist research, which serves the purpose of uncovering paradoxes which occur when a SI-initiative aims to realize change. Activist scholarship is especially equipped to defy the interests of power holders and is thus more likely to aim at transforming underlying social relations (Zahra, 2016). Therein, it lines up with the goal of TSI: transforming social relations. Although it is inevitable that institutions are copied, certain parts should not be copied as these can hinder the transformative change that is necessary to address the root causes of climate change, replication of certain institutions can exacerbate the problem. The next paragraph discusses certain institutions in terms of government, society, and the climate movement which all in essence lead to blurring or even making the ‘political’ invisible.

2.3 THE CLIMATE MOVEMENT & THE ‘POLITICAL’

Since 2016, Milieudefensie as an organization decided to focus on climate justice. In the analysis chapters I discuss Milieudefensie’s interpretation of climate justice, but first I briefly introduce the conceptualization of these ideas. The climate justice movement became popular during the 2009 Copenhagen COP9 (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014). It has its roots in the environmental justice movement (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014). Climate Justice cuts across borders and juxtaposes the mass of poor under consumers against the super-rich with high-carbon consumption lifestyles (Stavis, Morena, & Krause, 2020). Of which the first are least responsible for climate change, yet most affected (also in monetary terms), and the latter are most responsible but least affected⁴ (Stavis, Morena, & Krause, 2020). Climate justice overlaps with ideas on just transitions, which are concepts also articulated in transition studies (Schröder, 2020; Stevis et al., 2020; Williams & Doyon, 2019). Just transitions, popularized during the Paris COP21, discusses the injustices created specifically through sustainability transitions and complements climate justice, by describing what a transition should value (Stavis et al., 2020). Milieudefensie⁵ also mobilizes both ideas of climate justice and just transitions. In Appendix A a more detailed account of the history of the climate justice movement as well as its connection to just transitions can be found. In this section I focus instead on issues of de- and re-politicization, the ‘political’ and ‘post-political’ discourses in the climate movement. In the context of climate change the post-political manifests itself in managerial, consensual, and technocratic discourses. This can help to better understand what conflict, tensions, paradoxes and capture entail in terms of the climate movement. As SI getting captured by current institutional arrangements this might inhibit the challenging of dominant institutions and thus the transformative capabilities of SI. Bruno Latour says:

“The craziest of all are those who appear to believe that they can do something despite all odds, that it isn’t too late, that the rules of collective action are surely going to work here again, that one has to be able to act rationally, with eyes wide open, even in the face of threats as serious as these, while respecting the framework of existing institutions” (Latour, 2017, p. 24).

Thus, according to Latour, it is not possible to realize transformation without challenging existing institutions.

2.3.1 THE NECESSITY OF THE ‘POLITICAL’

First, it is important to make a distinction between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’. Not without contestation, but to most ‘politics’ refers to institutions such as the parliament or voting (Kenis,

⁴ See e.g. research on the distribution of pollution, subsidies and tax-cuts granted to polluting multinationals, transitioning costs deflected to Dutch citizen and investments made by the EU and the Netherlands in multinational fossil fuel companies operating in the global south (Green Livelihoods Alliance Just Energy Transition Programme, 2019; Kartha et al., 2020; Oxfam, 2015; Vergeer, R., Schep, 2018).

⁵ For more information on the position of Milieudefensie, see this webcast https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=511595573131766&ref=watch_permalink
<https://en.milieudefensie.nl/about-us/just-transition>

2019a). However, “*The political*’, refers to an order of discourse, a kind of logic of acting and thinking, which recognizes the reality of power, dissensus and decision which gives a place to conflict and debate on different ways to conceive of current and future society” (Kenis, 2019a, p. 834). Thus, central to the political is a place for dissensus, where different ideas about society clash. As the necessity of sustainability transitions becomes more and more apparent, accompanying questions arise about who benefits, who pays the costs, which socio-environmental relations are necessary, which technologies and policies to deploy etc. These cannot be answered by an ‘altogether’ idea of humanity against CO₂, in which there is no place for dissensus and all other social issues are ignored to fight CO₂ (Kenis, 2021; Swyngedouw, 2020). Discourses are called ‘post-political’ when they either i) misrecognize the constructed nature of society and involved contingencies, ii) conceal that social construction entails exclusion creating conflict and antagonism (‘us’ vs. ‘them’ debate), iii) cover-up that social construction of society involves acts of power (Kenis, 2015; Kenis & Lievens, 2014). Such depoliticized or even post-political discourses remain blind to their political dimension (Kenis, 2019a). A discourse that is aware of its political dimension is politicized. Kenis (2021) argues that this politicization has started to take form in the climate change debate, but not through the climate movement. The ‘gilets jaunes’ in France showed that climate politics is also a class struggle, thus challenging climate politics uncontested nature (Kenis, 2021).

Kenis (2019a) draws from Mouffe (2006) to explain that depoliticization is deeply problematic. Democracy itself requires a recognition and uncovering of the power which organizes society, of exclusions and conflicts generated through these exclusions (Kenis, 2015, 2019s). A society is democratic when it recognizes that it is contingent and does not have an ultimate foundation (Mouffe, 2006). According to Mouffe (2006) ignoring antagonisms leads to unmanageable conflict and polarization. This eventually leads to a clash of bitter enemies, ardent on destroying one another (Mouffe, 2006). Next to democracy itself being challenged by depoliticized discourses, tackling climate change requires the basic parameters of society to be reconstructed. It is not a crisis of nature but about how society relates to its ecological conditions (Foster, Clark, & York, 2011; Swyngedouw, 2020). Thus, real solutions require profound social change (Foster, Clark, & York, 2011; Swyngedouw, 2020). Crucial are then a grasp of the root causes, recognition of the contingency of societal structures and power relations that underpin these causes (Kenis, 2015). Social change inevitably entails exercise of power (Pel et al. 2020, Kenis, 2015). It generates conflict, exclusion and opposition (Pel et al. 2020, Kenis, 2015). Solving climate change is not a win-win situation for all of humanity, in which everybody will be included and has an equal say (Kenis, 2015). It is political and requires difficult choices, thereby creating exclusions, conflict and opposition. Moreover, change presupposes a questioning of the status quo (Kenis, 2015). In other words, change presupposes the challenging of dominant institutions. This requires a space where previously muted voices can be heard and new ideas are formulated (Kenis, 2015). This is a space of potential conflict, plurality, antagonism and opposition. Thus not a space where depoliticized discourses reign supreme. To realize

change, the invisible need for change has to become visible, actors who can realize this change have to come forward, and the strategies to be used become visible as well as the imaginaries that can underpin alternatives (Kenis, 2015). This requires politicized narratives and discourses. Using such a political perspective in my analysis of Operation Climate to institutions allows for closer examination of the mobilization of the climate justice narrative in Operation Climate, of which elements it is made up, and how it is (re-)articulated when operationalized. I aim to analyze how the climate justice concept developed by Milieudefensie is adapted by others, through a SI-process in the climate movement, and how it re- and depoliticizes through the initiatives' relation with existing institutions. Below I discuss two depoliticized framings in the climate change debate which provide 'solutions' to climate change. However, these framings do not challenge institutions related the root causes of climate change, and thus fail to address the climate crisis. These dominant discourses also lead to dominant ways of doing, framing, organizing and knowing and thus form dominant institutions. Afterwards, I discuss how traces of these depoliticized discourses manifest in the climate movement.

2.3.2 DOMINANT DISCOURSES

Many people, including many of those in power, do recognize something has to be done concerning climate change (Kenis & Lievens, 2012; Swyngedouw, 2020). Their notions of change are limited to conscious consumerism on the demand side and ideas of 'Green Growth' or 'Green Economy' on the supply side.

From this view people primarily are seen as consumers, can consume themselves out of the climate crisis. The 'rational' consumer is responsible for what they consume and thereby can change society by changing their consumption pattern. This will create increased demand and thus also increase the supply of new 'sustainable' products. Consumerist notions of change shift responsibility towards consumers and away from intergovernmental organizations, governments and companies (Sandilands, 1993). Therewith individual and collective resistance is undermined, changing political action into practices such as recycling, buying organic and bringing your own bag to the supermarket (Sandilands, 1993). Perhaps these actions have impact, but they are in no manner based on a serious analysis of societal structures which caused the climate crisis (Sandilands, 1993). Framings concerning sustainable consumption see consumptions as the major solution to climate change and deny the complexity and structural nature of environmental problems (Kenis & Lievens, 2012). This neglect of structural problems and inequality goes against ideas of climate justice. Consumerist discourses also lead to privatization of environmental action, as engagement relies on purchasing power (Kenis, 2015). Thereby, individuals become objects of change rather than potential subjects of change (Kenis, 2015). At best people become conscious consumers rather than conscious citizens (Kenis, 2015). Next to this, there is also the question of for whom it is possible to become a conscious consumer. This framing presumes it is equally possible for all. However, those with smaller wallets or do not live in areas with access to these products, do not have the ability to 'vote' with their wallet.

These people are at the mercy of those who can access these products to drive up demand and drive down costs. Meanwhile, conscious consumers can indulge in the thought they are not part of the problem as they own an electric car, while others do not. Tactics of individual change are also predominant in environmental policy and much research, where appropriately placed and priced sermons, sticks and carrots should lead to self-interested rational actors which make the right choices (Dobson & Bell, 2005; Seyfang et al., 2010). This approach does not require any further governmental intervention: an enticing approach for the liberal-capitalist order (Dobson & Bell, 2005). These governmental constructions also impact the strategic field of the climate movement, leading to tendencies which hide what is politically at stake behind individualizing, economic and moralistic discourse (Kenis, 2015).

On the supply side, Green Economy proponents believe the climate crisis should be tackled using the system as is, by using capitalism, technological fixes (e.g., Carbon Capture Storage (CCS) and nuclear power) and market mechanisms, thereby creating a new array of economic growth opportunities (Kenis & Lievens, 2012; Swyngedouw, 2020). This Green Economy discourse is heavily depoliticized and relies on technocratic, managerial and relies on economic ideas of change (Kenis, 2019a). Green Economy proponents thus ‘capture’ the climate problem to support their own business interests (Swyngedouw, 2020). Hereby, market failures can be overcome through tackling climate change by creating markets such as emissions trading. Kenis (2019a) describes this as a ‘peculiar means-ends reversal’, since free-market capitalism causes these market failures in the first place (Kenis, 2019a). Kenis & Lievens (2012) thus argue that a ‘Green’ Growth Economy is not possible, cannot stop the climate crisis and might even exacerbate the crisis.

2.3.3 THE POLITICAL AND THE CLIMATE MOVEMENT

Some authors believe the multiplicity of voices in the climate movement itself disproves the post-political thesis (Chatterton, Featherstone, & Routledge, 2013; Featherstone, 2013; North, 2011; Urry, 2015). According to these authors, activists participating in TT and Climate Justice Action Now⁶ (CJA) challenge Western (neoliberal) hegemony and its connection to climate change, disproving the post-political thesis (Chatterton et al., 2013; Urry, 2015). Kenis (2015, 2019a) on the other hand, uses her position as an activist to investigate the Belgian climate movement, specifically the TT movement and CJA. Both TT and CJA use the language of climate change to frame their projects and fundamental concerns with society (Kenis, 2019a). Both grassroots organizations were popular in Europe for a period of time. Together with Swyngedouw and others she acknowledges the profound de-politicization of the climate change debate (Kenis, 2019a). The multitude of discourses – of which some counter-hegemonic – does not disprove the post-political thesis (Kenis, 2019a). Instead, her

⁶ For Climate Justice Action their fundamental concerns with society can be overcome through climate justice and system change. Thereby changing the capitalist system itself, thus the focus on climate change is used to fight the capitalist economy (Kenis, 2019a).

empirical research shows that depoliticization is a real problem within the climate movement and there is a necessity to overcome it (Kenis, 2019a).

However, over-politicization can also For instance, CJA strongly politicizes or even over-politicizes (Kenis, 2019a). CJA extends its conflict approach so far that it renders debate with Green Economy proponents impossible as well (Kenis, 2019a). As they are seen as enemies rather than adversaries: they need to be defeated instead of convinced (Kenis, 2019a). CJA activists sometimes took part in debates and discussions, the activist more often refrained, as the assumption was that there was barely any common ground to make a genuine debate meaningful (Kenis, 2019a). Through this overpoliticization CJA alienated potential allies who are less familiar with climate justice ideas (Kenis, 2019a). CJA, campaigned against WWF, for subscribing to ‘false solutions’ created by governments and companies, such as emissions trading (Kenis, 2019a). In this radical attack CJA aimed to make cleavages within the climate movement visible, showing there are a variety of environmentalisms and ‘being green’ is not enough (Kenis, 2019a). However, CJA sympathizers did not understand the message and why these political divergences had to be intensified, instead of fighting against the ‘real enemy’ (polluting companies or CO₂ itself) (Kenis, 2019a). Thus, alienating those who might support climate justice if they were approached in a less antagonistic manner (Kenis, 2019a). Kenis concludes that the focus is too much on creating a ‘them’ thereby forgetting to build the ‘us’. In a very different way, the counterhegemonic discourse of TT rejects ‘us’ and ‘them’ discourse altogether (Kenis, 2019a). For Transition Towns, dismissal of conflict discourses renders discussion with the Green Economy proponents and CJA impossible (Kenis, 2019a). TT takes a paternalistic approach to CJA, denying the existence of conflict, as everyone should be positive and collaborative to solve the climate crisis (Kenis, 2019a). To TT there is nothing to be won with antagonism and fracturing (Kenis, 2019a). Thus, creating a depoliticized discourse.

This leads to a dilemma: democratic change requires repoliticization but also requires a lot of people to be involved (Kenis, 2015). Only fighting for ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ distinctions is not enough to establish the necessary ‘us’ (Kenis, 2015). There thus seems a necessity for a balance between de- and re-politicization, as too little renders debate impossible as it denies the existence of conflict, while too much over problematizes conflict, denying the existence or possibility of partial consensus which is necessary for a fruitful debate as well.

Both TT and CJA largely fell apart. This does not mean that the current climate movement no longer struggles with the ‘political’. As both Kenis (2021) and Swyngedouw (2020) write, the movement is still profoundly depoliticizing, even in an increasingly political world.

Swyngedouw (2020) argues that current activist discourse obscures or denies the real underlying social and ecological contradictions causing climate change. It is exactly this denial and obscuring acts of the real situation that forms the basis of the current climate impasse (Swyngedouw, 2020). Kenis (2019b) also applies the post-political thesis to the Belgian faction of Extinction

Rebellion (XR) and Youth for Climate. These are new grassroots activist groups partially filling the gaps Transition Towns and Climate Justice Action have left in their disintegration. For these groups, there is politicization on the tactics (Kenis, 20121). For example, the school strikes, creating a debate whether skipping schools to demonstrate against climate change is legitimate (Kenis, 2021). However, Youth for Climate's interpretation of climate justice is now mobilized to reinforce an 'all together' discourse, externalizing climate change as the enemy, instead of uncovering the political or enforcing an 'us' vs. 'them' discussion (Kenis, 2019b). Thus, while polarization is on the rise, the climate movement wants to bring/keep everyone together (Kenis, 2021). Kenis (2021) argues this might allude to a wishing for the restoration of a post-political condition which the movement sees as necessary to tackle climate change. Kenis (2019b) sees there is a demand for change, so nothing has to change ("when the snow in the Alps melts, we can no longer go skiing, so we need to take measures against climate change so we can keep skiing"). The demands thus remain empty: focused on climate law, which experts can design based on neutral facts (Kenis, 2021; Swyngedouw, 2020). The climate has to be saved so (rich) people can return to their past mode of consumption. These climate activists want to return to 'a garden of Eden' which never existed for most people around the world in the first place (Swyngedouw, 2020). Climate change is an emergency, but for whom? Saying there is an emergency puts all social divisions aside; some people benefit from a crisis, others suffer (Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, & Walgrave, 2018).

Meanwhile, Youth for Climate specifically targets politicians, CEO's and powerful people who – if brought together – can implement the necessary measures in order to tackle the climate crisis together (Kenis, 2019b; Swyngedouw, 2020). These activists demand a technocracy even though the past actions of these people, promises no change (Swyngedouw, 2020). Pursuing climate justice through such a procedural lens, places too much hope on the premise that the state and legal system will help those it currently injures through policy change, advocacy, and the enforcement of regulation (Davies & Mah, 2020).

Like consumerist and Green Economy discourses, activists obsess over CO₂ (Swyngedouw, 2020). This obsession obscures underlying structures and processes which cause the climate change problem (Swyngedouw, 2020). Swyngedouw (2020) argues CO₂ is only a symptom of the problem. Just addressing the CO₂ symptom, leads to technical, administrative and institutional adjustments that do not change the fundamental organization of society responsible for climate change (Swyngedouw, 2020). CO₂ is an enemy without social content, without social positioning nor embedding, and without social embodiment (Swyngedouw, 2020). Dreams of a more social and just world found in the foundations of climate activism, make place for a passionate urge to reduce emissions (Swyngedouw, 2020). Other social issues are forgotten in this process of fighting CO₂ (such as classism, racism, feminism, homophobia etc.) (Swyngedouw, 2020).

Thus, Swyngedouw (2020) calls it a fantasy that climate problems are a threat to all of humanity. No longer being able to ski stands in stark contrast with environmental activists being

murdered or incarcerated, people losing their homes or no longer being able to pay the energy bill. There is no homogenization and universalization when it comes to climate change discourses. Currently, many suffer while the rich seize this crisis to extract more value.

2.3.5 IDEAS FOR REPOLITICIZATION

In Mouffe's (2006) view genuine re-politicization requires alternatives. Although climate justice and system change can function as a point of inscription for ideas of an alternative society, what this system change entails remains ambiguous (Kenis, 2015, 2021). A focus on the problem and its effects is not enough (Jensen, 2002, 2004). Discourses which are democratic, emancipatory and action-oriented also need to identify root causes, strategies and alternatives (Jensen, 2002, 2004). Kenis (2021) argues that establishing alternative visions, could partially correct that establishing 'us' vs. 'them' distinctions become a goal in itself, which was (almost) the case for CJA.

Following this need for alternatives, Kenis and Swyngedouw believe that situating doomsday in the past allows for an opening up of the future. Thereby, problematizing the concept of a doomsday which constantly gets postponed (as global warming will continue to get worse) and is per definition not universal, as many people around the world already live in a state of despair and the rise in temperature differs geographically. The authors also argue that doomsday thinking also stifles creativity (Swyngedouw 2020, Kenis 2021). People are only allowed to think of solutions that conserve current socio-ecological relations (Swyngedouw, 2020). Apocalyptic imaginations displace or move social conflicts and contradictions – which are the basis of 'the political'—to a general and hopefully avertable future (Kenis, 2021; Swyngedouw, 2020). The apocalypse also justifies the violation of human rights to mitigate climate change (e.g., development of solar farms leading to landgrabs⁷ or windfarms leading to the displacement of indigenous people (Oceransky, 2008; Yenneti, Day, & Golubchikov, 2016)). It also shifts the focus away from systemic solutions that address root causes of climate change (Swyngedouw 2020, Kenis 2021). Not focusing on averting an imminent doomsday, allows for radical creativity and opening possibilities for a future with different socio-ecological relations (Kenis, 2021). Currently, there is no political subject which is the embodiment and carrier of another future (such as the proletariat for Marx) (Swyngedouw, 2020). The future is only embodied in negativity, apocalypse, there is no promise of salvation (Swyngedouw, 2020). Such ideas make activism seem futile and hysterical (Swyngedouw, 2020). Instead, activists should start rebuilding again, to open the future for emancipatory politics (Swyngedouw, 2020). Even though system change might be too big, and most actions will be futile; the future remains open (Swyngedouw, 2020). Politicization on the passion, is what Badiou calls it, for a real chance and urgency for an egalitarian and communitarian world (Swyngedouw, 2020). The question includes which socio-ecological relations do we want, which socio-ecological environment can we create, for

⁷ The buying or leasing of large pieces of land by domestic and transnational companies, governments, and individuals at the expense of local population.

whom and where (Swyngedouw, 2020)? Such questions require political answers (Swyngedouw, 2020). For instance, we should not question whether the car is allowed in a city-center, but what type of society the automobility regime produces (Swyngedouw, 2020). Setting up climate-accountancy based on the total, geographically differentiated climate emissions of the supply chain, from origin until consumption would be a real solution to move towards an alternative society as well as re-politicize the climate change debate (Swyngedouw, 2020). This would create a very different perception of goods and services, as well as require a totally different set of policies, management techniques and interventions (Swyngedouw, 2020). Such policies are systemically lobbied against by powerful companies, and have serious consequences for their operations and the social order (Swyngedouw, 2020). The social sciences have a role as well and can more systemically engage with narrating and symbolizing proliferations of alternative socio-spatial and socio-ecological arrangements (Swyngedouw, 2021). Thus, researchers can add symbolic weight to narratives showing humans can think and desire differently, symbolizing emerging radical imaginaries which can create a new future (Swyngedouw, 2021).

Although not a panacea, Kenis (2021) hopes opening-up the movement, to include e.g., populists, Black Lives Matter or migrants, can politicize climate change again, and these movements can show what is at stake. According to Gramsci a group can only transform society once it becomes ‘ethically political’ (Kenis & Lievens, 2012). Which means a group does not only concern itself with their own immediate needs but defends general or even universal needs (Kenis & Lievens, 2012). Thereby coalitions need to be formed based on shared ideas of a future society (Kenis & Lievens, 2012). To form such coalitions, groups need to be able to partially sideline their own concerns to defend the concerns of the other group (Kenis & Lievens, 2012). Secondly, they need a shared philosophy which inspires and mobilizes (Kenis & Lievens, 2012). Groups have to become aware of their own power, their own ‘social project’ and dare to get into conflict around it (Kenis & Lievens, 2012). Lastly, another option for re-politicization is to find an internalized enemy (#Shellmustfall) (Kenis, 2021). Internalizing an enemy would lead to moving beyond solely targeting CO₂ as then the enemy gets a face and specific practices can be challenged (Kenis, 2021).

2.3.6 SECTION CONCLUSION

In this section I discussed the importance of the political for studying the climate movement. I discussed two dominant discourses which are heavily depoliticized, and which are unlikely to provide a solution for the climate crisis. The work by Kenis (2019a, 2021, 2015) and Swyngedouw (2020) show the extent to which these depoliticized tendencies are adopted into the climate movement. These authors also provide some ideas on how to re-politicize the climate movement and thus also identify the dominant institutions present in the movement. This makes it possible to identify which doings, modes of organizing, framing and knowing actively challenge these institutions.

2.4 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

In the beginning of this chapter, I introduced five requirements for a framework which can deliver an answer to the research question posed in the introduction. These requirements were: a non-teleological relational ontology, based on co-production and distributed agency, which acknowledged ‘the political’. Transformative Social Innovation theory fits with these requirements. It provides a method of analyzing a Social Innovation process in terms of its co-productive relations to its network, institutions and socio-material context. In the last section I discussed ‘the political’ and its embeddedness in the climate movement. In the next chapter I discuss how I mobilize these theories and ideas into a concrete methodology on how to analyze the SI-initiative by Milieudefensie. This warrants an approach which is able to study the relations from within.

3. METHODOLOGY

In this chapter I first introduce the Milieudefensie campaign as a case study (3.1). Second, I describe my role as a researcher and related worldview (3.2). I describe my own approach to activist research, how I applied activist research to the case and which methods followed from this approach (3.3). This is largely based on work by Kenis who studies actors in the Flemish climate movement (2015, 2016, 2019). The Flemish climate movement is similar to the Dutch movement. Dutch activists for instance would go to Belgium to participate in actions by CJA (Kenis, 2015). After I describe how I use TSI (3.4), I introduce which data I collect and how, as well as the data analysis procedure (3.5). Through these methods I intend to describe the way the process of a SI-initiative (operating within an NGO) aims to realize institutionalization of their goal: climate justice.

3.1 CASE STUDY

When answering a ‘how’ or ‘why’ question in a contemporary setting where the researcher has little to no control over the unfolding events, case studies are the most appropriate research strategy (Yin, 2009). The embedded design of my research allows me to investigate how a SI-process in the Dutch climate movement is coproduced.

Milieudefensie started as a grassroots activist group after the publishing of the famous “Limits to Growth” report by the Club of Rome (Cramer, 2014). With such a long history comes a certain status, and Milieudefensie is considered an ‘established’ NGO (Cramer, 2014). Milieudefensie is an association, meaning members can vote on the direction of the organization. With over 100.000 subscriptions and millions in donations, the organization has moved far from its grassroots start in the 1970’s. Through the 1990’s to the early 2010’s Milieudefensie is more recognized by its general public campaigns than its grassroots organizing and activism (Cramer, 2014). Around 2016 climate justice became a focal goal of the organization (Milieudefensie, 2016). The NGO also enlarged the role for the local volunteers and the climate movement in 2016 (Milieudefensie, 2016).

Running up to the Dutch parliamentary elections in 2021, the Organizing department at Milieudefensie adopted the Bernie Sanders campaign strategy, called Big Organizing. This will be further detailed in the next chapter. The goal of this campaign is to get ‘climate justice’ policies into the coalition agreement, with a focus on large companies paying for their own pollution and increasing accessibility of green solutions. These solutions are detailed in Milieudefensie’s policy proposals related to transport, housing and food (see Rooijers et al., 2020). The campaign, dubbed ‘Operation Climate’, officially kicked off in summer 2019 – one and a half years before the election. I consider ‘Operation Climate’ as a SI-initiative. From January until March the local Operation Climate groups formed coalitions with other local grassroots groups to organize a decentralized protest called the Climate Alarm initiated by national organizations.

3.2 ROLE & WORLDVIEW

Below I describe what taking part as an activist means for how I approached the empirical analysis in terms of activist research line-up with TSI, neutrality of research and contributions to those outside academia.

As mentioned before TSI is a relational ontology. Elements do not exist separate from each other; it is their relationship to the other that creates meaning. This is also true for my own position in the research, as I participated as an activist as well. The researcher, next to many others, coproduced the SI-Initiative, narratives and its local manifestations. Discourses co-produce society themselves (Kenis, 2015). They do not reflect a pre-existing condition, rather they form a process that is a part of society and co-produce our understanding and relation to society (Kenis, 2015). As well as the research I did, the interviews I conducted help structure people’s ideas and structure their own engagement. Activist scholars thus also believe that real insight into change processes can only be achieved through active engagement with the process itself as then these relations become visible (Reason & Bradbury, 2001). As an ‘outsider’ it is impossible to experience and understand all the layers of the issue at stake (Kenis, 2015). This engagement with the process itself is to a lesser extent echoed in TSI by Avelino et al. (2020) and by related work on strategy as a process (Andersen & Esbjerg, 2020).

Meanwhile, research can be used to delegitimize political positions while defending others (Kenis, 2015). The combination of neutrality and the use of research to support certain political positions leads to a paradox: when research is perceived as neutral, it becomes easier to use it to justify hegemonic positions (Žižek, 1994). Thereby, these positions cannot be challenged as they are based on neutral ‘facts’ (Žižek, 1994). By presenting research as ‘objective’, values or conflicts underlying research become neutralized and obscured, thus foreclosing a chance for political discussion (Žižek, 1994). Žižek (1994) calls this the masterstroke of ideology in which a dominant ideology can present itself as natural, logical, and evident. This ideology is seen as neutral and thus opposite of ideology (Žižek, 1994).

Other researchers object to this perceived neutrality of research and try to avoid this masterstroke of ideology by acknowledging their research is not neutral. Humans are social and political beings and cannot separate these features from their research when studying social phenomena (Creswell & Creswell, 2017). From this perspective, there is no dichotomy between research and activism, as science is neither 'neutral' nor 'objective' (Kenis, 2015). Rejecting this dichotomy means that activism and research, are then already combined by definition (Kenis, 2015). Yet, in no other form of research is this dichotomy rejected as explicitly as in activist research (Kenis, 2015; Hale, 2008). Since, objectivity and neutrality are then impossible, it is necessary to be reflexive on how research is influenced by the researcher (Kenis, 2015). It is neither possible to be reflexive enough to cover and transcend above all biases, prejudices and values (Kenis, 2015). Transcending all biases leads to a contradiction, as this risks the pursuit of a neutralized position again, falling in the objectivism trap (Kenis, 2015). Mouffe (2006) says it is not possible to move beyond hegemony – to completely separate oneself from a hegemonic framework and take a distance. Complete transparency is not possible, yet reflexivity still has its merits (Kenis, 2015). Thus, activist researchers claim methodological rigor, as their analysis warrants acknowledgement of tensions, requiring a deeper and more sustained analysis of sociopolitical conditions which frame the research process and research question (Hale, 2008). Therewith activist researchers can also be held accountable by not only fellow researchers but also by the situated context in which they perform their research (Hale, 2008). Activists will hold activist researchers accountable when the knowledge they produce is irrelevant or even alien to those working on the ground (Hale, 2008).

Kenis (2015) adds on previous activist work by adding another layer of reflexivity. Through reflecting on what it means to take a stance and the conditions that make it possible to take a stance (Kenis, 2015). By taking a stance you not only urge people to become self-aware and choose a position themselves but taking a stance oneself also facilitates the creation of discursive conditions that make it possible to take a stance (Kenis, 2015). This means activist researchers defend 'the political', without defining which side is to be preferred beforehand (Kenis, 2015). The distinction is not one between scientific and political discourses, as scientific discourses are political to a degree as well (Kenis, 2015). Nor is it between status quo scientific discourses that refuse to take sides and scientific discourses that take the side of the oppressed (Kenis, 2015). The distinction is between discourses that acknowledge the political: recognizing they take part in a field which has conflicts, in which power is exercised and decisions are made versus discourses that present itself as neutral (Kenis, 2015). Proper acknowledgement of the political needs to make the hegemonic field visible and adopt a stance (Kenis, 2015).

Critical scholarship argues that researchers should not only be reflexive, but their research should also serve in struggles for emancipatory social change (Hale, 2008). Meanwhile, activist researchers argue it is not enough to produce knowledge from a desk which is published in academic journals. Walker

(2007) argues this position is focused too inward, unintelligible to potential beneficiaries outside of academia: *“No matter how brilliant, a light in a sealed box does not illuminate. And it consumes resources, energy, and space in the process, that could be used otherwise”* (Walker 2007, p. 365). Merely admitting marginalized people and ideas into institutionalized learning does little to disrupt the normative reproduction or the continuity of repression (Walker, 2007). Hale (2008) calls for an exit of the academic arena to search radical collectives, to (partially) avoid being caught in hegemonic discourse.

However, activists are busy (Hale, 2008). Activists rarely take a breath, often there is no time to allow a researcher to set-up interventions or studies in the conventional deductive manner following a strict scientific protocol (Hale, 2008). Neither do activists respond well to outsiders coming in and then leaving after they collected enough information (Hale, 2008). These researchers might support the activist cause but their focus is on university (Hale, 2008). To avoid leeching off activist’ work, research must take place in a longitudinal manner, following and participating in activism in situ (Hale, 2008). However, giving back is a largely invisible and hard to measure affair (Walker, 2007). Therefore, I take solace in the fact I already contributed through my participation; the research is then just a positive side-effect.

Thus, fostering communication and collaboration with the climate movement both challenges researcher’s own understandings as well as potentially contributes to knowledge in the movement (for instance, when it comes to systems thinking and Transition Studies approaches). But mostly, researchers can take a more long-term perspective and be reflexive, instead of getting lost in the sense of urgency activists experience (Hale, 2008). Activist scholarship is thus a matter of critique not (just) advocacy (Hale, 2008). It produces new knowledge, integrates abstract and universal knowledge with concrete sorts of knowledge, while keeping action and its possibilities at the center of attention (Hale, 2008). This is combined with the dire understanding that the world needs improvement (Hale, 2008). This is an understanding which often comes from social movements, struggles, and campaigns that aim to change public agendas, not solely by providing expertise to those in power (Hale, 2008). While remaining critical of these struggles – especially as criticism helps in the betterment of the movement itself – activist scholarship names and confronts difficulties and contradictions head-on (Hale, 2008). Scholarship can become too complacent, affirmative of the existing order and self-justifying (Hale, 2008). Thus, activist research forces confrontation between different perspectives, explanations and statements presumed as facts (Hale, 2008). This also requires authors to make political alignments explicit, as this alignment acknowledges that a researcher will more likely commit to listening to these voices (Hale 2008).

Using an activist approach means I subscribe to the Transformative worldview as described by Creswell & Creswell (2017). This world-view is focused on the political, is change-oriented, power and justice oriented and collaborative (Creswell & Creswell, 2017). The explicit focus on the

political, marginalized (views and people) and social justice, differentiates the transformative worldview from post-positivist and also constructivist worldviews, which also are not focused on taking action or contributing to the work of activists. This worldview also often relies more on qualitative methodologies.

3.3 ACTIVIST RESEARCH IN PRACTICE

I did not enter the climate movement as a researcher, but first as an activist. As Kenis (2015) says: “*I was not only seen as one of them, I actually was one of them: I did the same shitty tasks and took the same risks. Being an activist researcher of a particular kind gave me access and credibility, but also gave me a responsibility not to disappoint this trust.*” (Kenis, 2015, p. 41).

Besides genuine engagement in the field as an activist researcher, I relied on the analysis of press releases, plans, websites, and other materials, but mainly on nine semi-structured interviews with Milieudefensie employees. Details on the interview set-up can be found in the next paragraph.

From July 2020 I volunteered as an ‘office’ organizer in the Operation Climate campaign. Before, I only participated in actions. I ended up volunteering four days a week from 9:00 to 16:00, from July 2020 until the end of March 2021. From July 2020 until December 2020 my main activities concerned the ‘Operation Climate’ campaign. In January 2021 the sprint to the elections started and my tasks shifted from the Operation Climate groups to the local coalitions that formed to organize the ‘Climate Alarm’ on March 14th, an initiative of the ‘Climate Crisis Coalition’. The next months I took a step back as I worked on my thesis, only occasionally participating in (local) actions but rarely organizing them. Note that I held a position in between the NGO’s head-office and what happened locally.

My regular activities as a coach for both the Climate Crisis Coalition and Operation Climate included:

- Calling and helping (new) volunteers
- Meeting with teams
- Starting teams
- Working with the online platform(s)
- Data analysis
- Organizing videocalls
- Setting-up actions
- Participating in Milieudefensie (strategy) meetings

3.3.1 OBSERVATIONS

There are several reasons why my research does not rely on observations or an ethnographic study. Firstly, in this case observations create an overload of information, as the research question was not fleshed out when I started. Although I took notes, these notes were not of a systematic character. Besides, I was expected to participate, not observe. The pandemic did not enhance the possibility for systematic note taking; I was only able to work for a few days a week in the summer with the rest of the team and local volunteers. Almost everything else took place online. Although, all my closest

team members were aware I was working on my thesis, we rarely discussed this subject. Participating in the process itself as an activist also makes people forget a researcher is present, thus blurring the lines between research settings and private settings. This ethical aspect is also why Kenis (2015) decided to leave out observations in her work. I also decided to rely on information gathered by interviews, where my role as a researcher is clear. However, the interview questions themselves were written using my own experiences. The semi-structured nature of the interviews made it possible to ask about topics I would not have known about were I not involved as an activist.

Regrettably, the lack of systematic observations also means a neglect of important and relevant information that both shaped my research and provided new insights, which I had to leave out as I did not address it in the interviews. On hindsight, starting with a structured methodical approach could have led to more useable systematic observations.

3.4 TSI APPLICATION TO THE CASE

Here I discuss why this case in particular is interesting from a TSI perspective. In the literature review I already introduced TSI and previous work using TSI. In this section I briefly introduce Operation Climate through the TSI lens, to show why it fits and to further support my choice for this theory. I discuss to what extent Operation Climate is transformative, thereby showing this case study fits with the requirements for case studies analyzed through TSI, which I further reflect on in chapter 8. Lastly, I explain how I answer the sub-research questions in chapters 4 to 7 by analyzing the sets of relations in TSI. Since these sets of relations co-produce the process of the SI-initiative, I can answer the research question by answering the sub-questions. In the empirical analysis chapters I aim to construct the four levels of relations as described in the previous chapter, and the (relevant) relations between them. Through combining these I aim to show how this particular SI-process and its climate justice goal are coproduced. Thereby taking the perspective of Milieudefensie as an NGO with local manifestations. My perspective starts at Milieudefensie Organizing department and its relations to others, thus the others and their relation to Milieudefensie might be not as established (e.g., how local volunteers relate to Milieudefensie). This is due to the activist approach I took, which allowed me to get closest to Milieudefensie.

3.4.1 TRANSFORMATIVE AMBITION, POTENTIAL & IMPACT

The transformative impact of SI-initiatives depends on the changing tensions and stability of the action field they operate in. The changing tension and stability thus depend on the communities the initiative is rooted in, its translocal dimension as well as discourse formation. An SI-Agent ideally has a transformative ambition, transformative potential and transformative impact (Haxeltine, Avelino, et al., 2016; Haxeltine et al., 2017). Realistically, an initiative is not necessarily transformative across all three, or even aware of its transformative capacities. Here I briefly introduce ‘Operation Climate’ through this lens to determine whether it is worthy to be analyzed through a Transformative SI lens.

Note, that this transformative capacity can only truly be assessed in hindsight, which would either mean when the governmental coalition agreement is written or Milieudefensie's ten-year ambition (from 2016-2025) ends.

Transformative Ambition refers to an explicit or implicit vision or ambition which aims to achieve or contribute to an identified transformative change (Haxeltine et al., 2016; Haxeltine et al., 2017). For Milieudefensie this is to put climate justice central and radically – defined as addressing root causes – changing undemocratic and unsustainable systems, instead of improving these systems (Milieudefensie, 2016). In the case of Operation Climate, the campaign has the aim to get climate justice in the national government coalition agreement, which should lead to a shift in who benefits and who loses in Dutch sustainability transitions. As currently taxes related to the sustainability transitions hit those who are decreasing their contribution to climate change the hardest, while those increasing pollution rarely pay anything at all (Vergeer & Rooijers, 2017). This ambition thus changes how the national government approaches sustainability transitions, who stands to benefit and who loses. If such agreements are taken-up into the coalition agreement, they can cascade into lower levels of government as well.

Transformative Potential signifies whether an object, idea, activity or SI-agent displays inherent and/or intended qualities which can challenge, alter and/or replace dominant institutions in a specific social-material context (Haxeltine et al., 2016; Haxeltine et al., 2017). It is hard to decide whether this case prefiguratively has transformative potential. However, similar cases have shown their potential. The Bernie Sanders campaign was able to de-problematize democratic socialism for many Americans, and made cancellation of student debt, a Green New Deal and Universal Healthcare major talking points in American politics (Bond & Exley, 2016). In chapter 8 I further reflect on the transformative potential, as transformative qualities come to the foreground in the empirical chapters.

Transformative Impact describes whether an SI-agent can show evidence of having achieved transformative change (Haxeltine et al., 2016; Haxeltine et al., 2017). Milieudefensie as an organization has had several impactful campaigns, which attracted media attention and likely changed certain (individual) institutions. The recent lawsuit against Shell is an example. Milieudefensie showed a multinational can be brought to court as well as be convicted for their *future* climate inaction. Other (international) NGO's and organizations copy this strategy and challenge multinational companies in court over their future (in)actions. Changing how multinationals are perceived and treated by governments but also by the public.

To conclude, Operation Climate has transformative ambition, transformative potential and possibly transformative impact as well. Therefore, it provides an interesting case to analyze from a TSI perspective.

3.4.2 ANALYSIS STRUCTURE OF SETS OF RELATIONS

The sub questions are divided into the four levels which co-produce the SI- initiative. First, I discuss the relations within to answer the first sub question. A social innovation initiative consists of patterns of doing, organizing, framing and knowing. An initiative is innovative when it innovates in at least one of the four dimensions (Pel et al., 2020). Operation Climate is especially innovative in applying the Bernie Sanders campaign method of Organizing to a climate justice campaign (see 4.2.2). In my analysis I focus on the innovative mode of organizing and its related climate justice framing. Here, I relied on interviews and documents for data. To avoid confusion, I refer to Organizing as in ‘movement building’ with a capital O and a lowercase o for any other reference to organizing. For framing, I discuss the Operation Climate narrative, its problem definition, the solution and who is involved based on Wittmayer et al. (2019). Narrative research is directed to the future and is combined with models of change and (future) concepts of alternative futures (Wittmayer et al., 2019). This thus fits within the climate justice narrative which is also focused on a vague future society in which current socio-environmental crises are solved justly. Narratives are build-up of a rationale (problem description and desired future), relevant actors (those ignorant, those in opposition, those counteracting, and the proponents) and a plot (contextualized activities and developments which lead to the desired future (Wittmayer et al., 2019). Using narrative structure as a basis allows to point to relevant reasons, actors and approaches to change (Wittmayer et al., 2019). This may also reveal whether there are paradoxes that occur in the SI-process relating to the narrative/framing, and how established the narrative is in the network of SI-initiatives. I do not aim to judge the contents of the narrative of Operation Climate/Milieudefensie along a climate justice scale. Therewith, this analysis thus also informs the other chapters. Although, the framing and modes of organizing dimensions are the focus, I also briefly discuss the other dimensions as these are affected by the modes of organizing and the framing. For the dimension of doing, I discuss new technologies introduced for Operation Climate as well as newly adopted practices. For knowing, I discuss knowledge on Organizing as well as canvassing.

Next, I analyze the SI- Network Operation Climate operates in, specifically discussing the mass mobilization called the Climate Alarm and how these co-produce each other, relating to modes of organizing as well as the framing.

In the chapter concerning institutions I discuss which institutions Operation Climate and its network enacts, whether this is done differently or reproducing the status quo. I also discuss if Operation Climate creates new institutions. TSI already acknowledges ‘embedded paradox’: TSI challenges institutions they are shaped by. Since, TSI needs to find an ‘institutional home’ in order to access vital resources, which entails balancing between independence and dependence on (critiqued) dominant windows. I discuss this paradox, as well as how the initiative and its network potentially perpetuate depoliticization and related issues introduced in 2.3 as well as simultaneous acts of obscuring and revealing the political nature of Operation Climate’s climate justice narrative.

In the last empirical chapter, I discuss how the socio-material context, path-dependency related to Milieudefensie as an NGO and contingencies such as Covid-19 relate to the social innovation initiative, its network and institutional change.

Finally, through the discoveries from these chapters I can discuss how this SI-Initiative process and its goal of institutionalizing climate justice is coproduced by its relations. Thus, answering the research question. I also reflect on my own experiences, which informed the set-up of my research, but which I do not discuss in the analysis.

3.5 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS PROCEDURE

To ensure validity I used data triangulation, by including documents, other sources as well as interviews (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). I value information gathered by the interviews as the main source of data, document analysis as secondary, since (quality) documents on Operation Climate were scarce. Interviews are a suitable method to grasp how people make sense of their engagement and to investigate the process of formation of discourses, partly in response to what is discussed in the conversation (Valentine, 2005). They themselves are a method of social construction (Kvale, 1995), and meaning is discursively (re)produced (Kenis, 2015). Through the interview, the interviewee can (re)construct a coherent story on their own engagement within the organization of the Climate Alarm or Operation Climate.

3.5.1 INTERVIEW SET-UP

I opted to solely interview people that work at the national level. I made this choice due to time constraints, and due to the high variability of local manifestations, thus requiring a much bigger interview sample. Otherwise scientific integrity becomes compromised. This approach omits the valuable perspective of local Organizers and their relation to the national organization. This choice for the interview sample is supported by the research question as well, which studies the process of the SI-initiative, not necessarily the perspectives of local organizers on this process. I analyze how the SI-Initiative process develops in the climate movement context. The focus thus starts from the initiative, other elements such as local grassroots groups are of a lesser importance than the initiative itself in answering the research question. I examine how the initiative relates to them, and how this changes the process of the SI-initiative.

For the topics of the interview, I drew from my personal experiences, notes, as well as documents, and the work on narratives of change by Wittmayer et al. (2019) and Kenis (2015, 2019a), work on post-politics and Belgian climate activists.

Kenis (2015) used theses during the interviews. She provided the interviewees with a set of statements produced by the grass-roots movements she investigated (Kenis, 2015). A redundant exercise for some, for others it helped to structure their answers as they found it more difficult to articulate a response to the open questions (Kenis, 2015). I also included theses in my interviews, half came from Milieudefensie documents and the others I set-up myself. These theses were helpful for the

interviews I conducted as well as to verify and scrutinize my interpretations of these statements. The interviews themselves were a snapshot of a particular person's opinion at a specific time. However, through giving the interviewees the opportunity to review the draft thesis, this snapshot is elongated to four more months.

The interview had several goals. First, I wanted to reconstruct the climate justice narrative of change as produced by Milieudefensie and the Climate Crisis Coalition as well as its relation to institutions, the network, local manifestations and the socio-material context. Next to this, I wanted to see if this narrative creates any paradoxes, as well as depoliticizing tendencies. Next to investigating the narrative, I also aimed to construct the use of (big) Organizing through the lens of TSI. This is done specifically through also asking people to speak from their own perspective. Thus they **do not** represent the view of Milieudefensie as an organization, but the diversity of opinions and views from its employees regarding the operation of the organization at that specific time period.

All semi-structured interviews were conducted online over Zoom due to the Covid-19 pandemic and took approximately one hour. The interviewees were invited to review the transcribed document as well as the final draft. This ensured their words were interpreted correctly. The list of questions can be found in Appendix B. Not all participants received the same list of questions. Some questions were omitted based on the expertise of the participant.

3.5.2 SAMPLING

I conducted six interviews with Milieudefensie employees working on Operation Climate, two with employees focused on Climate Crisis Coalition and one interview with an employee prioritizing both. These people all had an active role in launching or broadening the initiatives.

I did not aim to find general or universal statements. Therefore, the representativeness of the 'sample' is not a criterion for either the transferability or credibility of the study (Schuermans, 2013). However, I can state that the interviewees are representative of the perspectives and ideas within the Milieudefensie Organizing department at the time. The sampling took place as follows: I used purposeful sampling to select participants who were part of the organizing department or affiliated with it. At the end of each interview, I asked who else I had to interview. As a follow up, I send personal mails to these people to approach them for an interview.

3.5.3 DATA ANALYSIS PROCEDURE

Interviews were transcribed (see supplement), coded and analyzed using NVIVO. The results are presented in chapters 4 - 7 following the structure of TSI's sets of relations. To ensure external validity I provide a rich, thick and detailed description in the analysis. This way anyone interested in transferability has a solid framework for comparison (Miles et al., 2014). In the analysis I indicate where I use an interview as a source by indicating the participant's name followed by the question number (Qn). Thus, if I refer to the answer of John to question 6 it is indicated as such: (John: Q6).

4. RELATIONS WITHIN

The empirical analysis consists of four chapters in which I answer the four sub questions of my research question. These were built upon the sets of relations s provided by TSI. First, I discuss the dimensions of the SI-initiative itself. This is more of an introductory paragraph in which I discuss the SI itself. In the following sections the theory as described in chapter 2 becomes more relevant. After discussing the SI-itself, I discuss relations of the SI to the overall network of SI-initiatives in chapter 5. Over 2020 and 2021 local and national initiatives started to formalize their relationships in national and local coalitions and organized the decentralized ‘Climate Alarm’ protest. Thereby, the SI also dispersed to other sites. Third, I discuss relations to institutions and paradoxes which are formed when an SI-initiative interacts with them in chapter 6. Lastly, I discuss the initiative in terms of its socio-material context in chapter 7. These sets of relations also affect one another, thus where relevant I discuss how these relations co-produce one another. First, I discuss the relations within the SI-initiative.

As mentioned before a social innovation comprises of four dimensions; doings, organizing, framings and knowings (see figure 2) which create new social relations. Splitting a Social Innovation into these four dimensions helps with distinguishing the transformative and innovative capacities of an SI-initiative, as well as discussing the types of activities that agents in SI processes are engaged in (Haxeltine et al., 2017). This is also the structure of this chapter.

In this chapter I aim to answer the first sub question: “*What knowings, doings, and modes of organizing, form the social innovation initiative?*” Answering this question describes the initiative itself, as well as along which dimensions of the SI-initiative is innovative. The goal of this chapter is to give a clear account of the SI itself, so later it becomes easier to discuss its relation to the network, institutions, and the socio-material context.

Note, that the dimensions do not exist in isolation and innovation in one dimension might lead to changes along another dimension as well. I start with discussing the beginning of the initiative based on the climate justice narrative of the whole NGO and the realization of the Organizing department of Milieudefensie that the goals of the NGO require a new approach to Organizing (4.1). Hereafter I discuss the dimension of knowings: the knowledge which contributes to the SI process (4.2). Thus, knowledge on (Big) Organizing and canvassing. Thirdly, I introduce the modes of organizing dimension. It is here that the initiative becomes innovative through applying ‘Big Organizing’ concepts to a campaign for climate




FIGURE 2: AN SI-INITIATIVE AND THE FOUR DIMENSIONS OF KNOWING, DOING, FRAMING OR ORGANIZING

justice (4.3). The new mode of organizing also meant the introduction of new doings: material commitments, resources, the performance of practices, and technologies introduced by the SI initiative (4.4). Lastly, I discuss how these all come together in the framing and narrative of the initiative (4.5).

4.1 BEGINNING OF SI-INITIATIVE

Before, Milieudéfensie worked with smaller campaign teams that focused on specific topics (e.g., wood or food) (Maarten: Q1, Eefje: Q2 Bruno: Q3, Peter: Q1, Lynn: Q1). After the campaigns ended, people were gone (Maarten: Q1, Eefje: Q2 Bruno: Q3, Peter: Q1, Lynn: Q1). As Lynn explains: *“These [campaigns] were also overly complicated, people needed a lot of training to be able to get involved. Which makes it difficult to scale-up. Thus, the Organizing department looked for something that was repeatable, of which the basis was easily comprehensible, and you did not need to understand the complete strategy to participate.”* (Lynn: Q1).

Meanwhile, Milieudéfensie also set an ambitious goal to help realize a society built on climate justice principles in 2026 (Milieudéfensie, 2021). To realize this goal, public and political support for climate justice must rise sharply. However, the Milieudéfensie staff cannot manage all the people who need to be involved to create this support on their own. Thus, next to the identified issues with the previous approach to Organizing, the goal for climate justice also required a new Organizing approach from the head-office of Milieudéfensie. The organization thus also decided to focus on ‘movement building’ in 2016 (Bruno: Q3, Maarten: Q4). A new campaign for the 2021 Dutch elections, should then not focus on achieved policy change alone, but rather on building collective Organizing capacity (Liacas, Ali, Silberman, & Holtz, 2020). This should lead to a shift in strategy towards people power rather than reliance of the NGO on lobby and individual mobilizing actions (Liacas et al., 2020). For the Organizing department this meant “working somewhere in between grassroots and the rigidity of an NGO” (Bruno: Q3). This translates into relying on frameworks and guidelines which are shaped and filled-in through co-creation (Bruno: Q3). Thus, combining focus with creativity (Bruno: Q3). This new focus on movement building and climate justice led to the decision to focus on building local groups which can support a single national campaign for a longer period of time.

To make climate justice visible in the public debate, Milieudéfensie decided to bring the small, separate campaign teams together in one Organizing team, focusing on two campaigns per year in combination with continued engagement for volunteers (Maarten: Q1, Peter: Q1). Operation Climate is the first bundled campaign and is the basis to start building local Milieudéfensie groups that work together on a national campaign (Maarten: Q1, Peter: Q1). The SI thus started in the larger context of the NGO, its goals warrant the creation of new social relations within and to volunteers in the network.

4.2 DIMENSION: KNOWINGS

Below I introduce the academic research on which the Operation Climate campaign is built.

Following the need for changes in the Organizing department also meant the inclusion of different knowledge. This is mostly research based on Organizing knowledge from the United States by Marshall Ganz and the Bernie Sanders campaign. However, the Milieudedefensie Organizing team also pulls from their own experiences. As Maarten said: *“We saw more and more that if you are able to touch people with your story and organize people to organize themselves, that this is more effective”* (Maarten, Q1). Of course, knowledge from other teams such as mobilization, lobbying, communication also provided input for the Operation Climate campaign. Through experimentation in the NGO this knowledge was combined into the new mode of organizing which provides the foundation for a Big Organizing campaign for climate justice in the Netherlands.

4.2.1 ORGANIZING

Organizing is a necessity for activists. It refers to establishing planning and decision-making structures, building communication channels, building relationships, gathering necessary cultural material and motivational resources required for activism, ensuring internal cohesion and structuring external relations (Dolata, 2018). Another definition is: *“Organizing is leadership that enables people to turn resources they have into the power they need to make the change they want”* (Ganz, Sinnott, & Gibbs, 2014, p. 4). Thus, it refers to all activities necessary to build a movement that can realize change. Since the 1960’s theories about Organizing and mobilization became widespread, especially in the United States (Engler & Engler, 2016). In more recent times Harvard professor Marshall Ganz became one of the most prominent figures in Organizing. He defined an Organizing framework consisting of five key principles in Organizing: telling stories, building relationships, structuring teams, strategizing, and acting (Ganz et al., 2014). From Ganz’ perspective Organizing focuses on power. Who has power, who does not and how can power be built to shift the power relationship and bring change (Ganz et al., 2014). His model is also known as ‘the snowflake model’, which is a distributed approach to leadership (Ganz et al., 2014). In this model interconnected teams work together on common goals, no person or group holds all power, responsibility is shared. This structure should create mutual responsibility amongst all members (Ganz et al., 2014). ‘Coaches’ help with structuring teams and building relationships. According to Ganz coaches are key to leadership development; coaches help people find their own solutions to meet challenges, and coaches ask questions so people can uncover these answers.

4.2.2 BIG ORGANIZING

Besides the work by Ganz, ‘Big Organizing’ as used in the Bernie Sanders campaign was a source of inspiration for Milieudedefensie. Big Organizing differs from community Organizing, in which organizers seek already active communities and support them in building a movement or become part of a larger movement. In Big Organizing there is one goal, one team, one task (Bruno: Q9). Local

activities all contribute to a nationally chosen goal (Bruno: Q9). Big Organizing combines tactics from past progressive movements in the West and novel communication technologies (Bond & Exley, 2016). Volunteers become involved because of their personal commitment to the multitude of values and ideas of a campaign (Bond & Exley, 2016). Because of this commitment, volunteers were willing to put much of their free time into the campaign (Bond & Exley, 2016). To ensure the national (paid) team could remain small it was key to provide volunteers with simple, yet impactful, activities that build personal relationships and were easy to follow (Bond & Exley, 2016). Big Organizing approaches its volunteers as highly competent people who need strategic resources and material to realize revolutionary change (Bond & Exley, 2016). These people can thus also be trusted with large responsibilities and control should be handed over to them (although major decisions are made centrally) (Bond & Exley, 2016). While other campaigns use Big Data to make a pre-selection of who would be easiest to convince, Big Organizing uses technology to reach as many people as possible, regardless of their interest in the message (Bond & Exley, 2016). Bond & Exley say that movements need to set ambitious, revolutionary demands centrally, while the work itself is distributed. Problems will be solved as they arise, there is thus no extensive risk management, yet continuous evaluation (Bond & Exley, 2016). Due to the massive scale of the campaign, not all people who signed-up were able to find their place in the campaign (Bond & Exley, 2016). Milieudefensie adopted several of these tactics to set-up the Organizing strategy for Operation Climate, including the activities: canvassing through door-to-door conversations as well as phonebank canvassing.

4.2.3 CANVASSING

Political campaigns often involve canvassing: door-to-door campaigns in which volunteers talk to (potential) constituents. Research on the topic is novel, but so far it shows it is by far the most effective manner of political campaigning. However, it is the most time intensive mode of campaigning and requires a massive amount of motivated volunteers (Bond & Exley, 2016). The Bernie Sanders campaign made use of ‘deep’ canvassing techniques, which are built on non-judgmental listening and storytelling instead of debating or persuasion.

The first deep canvassing campaign was for marriage equality in 2011 in the US (Brookman & Kalla, 2020). A study on antitransgender prejudices showed further evidence that a single 10-minute conversation could substantially reduce prejudice lasting at least 3 months and increased support for an antidiscrimination law (Broockman & Kalla, 2016). In 2020, People’s Action – a merger of three national US based networks of community Organizing groups – also used these canvassing methods in their anti-Trump campaign. Even though the campaign was based on phone calls, deep canvassing was estimated to be 102 times more effective⁸ per person compared to the average Presidential persuasion program and is the only proven field strategy that can shift the choice in vote for president (Brookman & Kalla, 2020). The research is based on over 500.000 conversations

⁸ As other strategies have negligible effectiveness

(Brookman & Kalla, 2020). In deep canvassing conversations, voters are asked to share relevant, even emotionally significant experiences as well as reflect on them aloud, volunteers need to remain non-judgmental, ask follow-up questions, reinforce relevant values and share stories (Brookman & Kalla, 2020). Deep canvassing encourages active participation in the conversation which increases openness to engage with other viewpoints (Brookman & Kalla, 2020). In general, people resist persuasion since this requires admitting to inconsistencies in their views (Brookman & Kalla, 2020). Non-judgmental listening does not pose a perceived threat to a person's views and also means people feel heard (Brookman & Kalla, 2020). Exchanging stories is also perceived as less manipulative and more engaging than dumping facts, while simultaneously creating an emotional connection (Brookman & Kalla, 2020).

4.3 DIMENSION: MODES OF ORGANIZING

As can be read above, the Organizing team in collaboration with other Milieudefensie employees aimed to introduce a new strategy which allowed to involve more people in a central campaign. This choice was necessary to gather public support for Milieudefensie's narrative around climate justice. Therein the team combined work on Organizing from Ganz and the Bernie Sanders campaign and applying it to the Dutch climate movement context. It is from this dimension that novel choices were made, and new social relations were established.

The Organizing team concluded that activists should be recruited for longer periods of time through Organizing methods (Maarten: Q1, Eefje: Q2 Bruno: Q3, Peter: Q1, Lynn: Q1). This means that within local groups leadership should be interchangeable and transferable (Maarten: Q2). For Operation Climate it is the structure of teams that has to remain stable while people should be able to come, become a leader, and go again (Maarten: Q2). Office organizers take up a coaching role as described by Ganz and contact local leaders instead of every activist personally. The local leaders receive training and should be able to build groups on their own and organize activities related to the overall campaign (Maarten: Q1, Eefje: Q2, Bruno: Q3, Peter: Q1, Lynn: Q1, Liacas et al., 2020).

Organizing is therein the tool to create local leaders (Maarten, Q1). Thereby shaping local responsibility in a sort of snowflake, creating shared responsibility along layers of organization (Maarten, Q1). To see whether the US based knowledge on (Big) Organizing could be transferred to the Netherlands, the summer of 2019 was used to trial the canvassing questions together with a handful of volunteers (Eefje: Q1). The test questions were based on public opinion research by I&O, questions which received positive responses were included for the testing (Eefje: Q1). The trial involved seeing how different people reacted, what volunteers should wear, and where they should canvas (Eefje: Q1). The final survey ranges from questions about personal concerns about climate change, contributions of multinationals to climate change as well as availability of clean mobility, insulated homes and sustainable and local food, for every citizen. From summer 2020 volunteers used a new set of questions. The list of questions can be found in the Appendix E. Of the local Organizers

which were trained in August, many remain active today and have built stable groups (Eefje: Q1). In the last two years the Organizing department built a strong Organizing team in the national office, consisting of both volunteers and professional organizers (Lynn: Q4). Lynn saw so far, a sharp decline in imploded groups and stronger continuity in groups (Lynn: Q4). Thus, Operation Climate combines knowledge from Marshall Ganz, Big Organizing and canvassing. Within Milieudefensie this effectiveness of local activity surprises (Bruno: Q5). So far, this campaign has already raised awareness within the NGO to pay more attention to the effectiveness of their efforts to recruit and retain volunteers that can lead local teams (Liacas et al., 2020). The enthusiasm of the local volunteers provides employees with a feeling that they are in this together (Laura: Q4).

4.3.1 THREE-STEP STRATEGY: LISTENING, INFLUENCING, MOBILIZING

The campaign starts from a three-fold strategy; i) listening, ii) influencing, iii) mobilizing (Bruno: Q1). Listening refers to the canvassing campaign, in which local volunteers talked to citizens about climate justice topics. Political party campaigns in the Netherlands already use this tactic. However, it is novel for an NGO to do so in the context of a larger ‘Big Organizing’ climate justice campaign, as well as aiming to use deep canvassing. The questions in the survey were changed one time in July 2020. In total 10k doors were knocked on and 4000 conversations were held. Due to Covid-19 the canvassing campaign was halted and restarted several times. Canvassing helps with gathering stories and information from the ground, which is necessary when climate justice solutions are crafted (Laura: Q11). However, canvassing alone does not have enough impact on political change, except for when you scale-up immensely (Eefje: Q2, Peter: Q13). For it to become effective Peter thinks they need 10.000s or 100.000s of conversations, and especially with people outside of the green bubble (Peter: Q3). Still, canvassing does have impact on building the movement which can support more directly visible campaigns such as the lawsuit against Royal Dutch Shell or the Climate Alarm and spread climate justice ideas (Eefje: Q2, Joep: Q13). The setting-up of these structured groups allowed volunteers to also make an effort to try and influence the political party programs (Joep: Q13). Next to this, the power of these conversations is visible when these local volunteers meet higher-ups at Milieudefensie or with politicians (Bruno: Q4). As Bruno says: *“Volunteers tell these stories from the heart, they held memorable conversations and transfer these memories to others”* (Bruno: Q4). Bruno sees that higher-ups propagate what they heard from local volunteers (Bruno: Q4). This is also when focus on Organizing becomes underwritten as the right choice (Bruno: Q4).

The collected data leads to the next point: influencing. This not only refers to the influencing of citizens at their doorstep but mainly to influencing local and nationally operating politicians. Local volunteers use the data they collected during canvassing to open a conversation about climate justice with politicians. Through the canvassing application authorized volunteers could download the responses of citizens in the region as well as data of respondents who indicated an interest in voting for a particular party. Thereby, politicians could see how people responded in their constituency as

well as supporters of their political party. Local politicians are sensitive to the needs of the majority of the population (Bruno: Q2). Canvassing thus helped both the lobbying by Milieudefensie employees as well as the lobbying done by volunteers (Laura: Q4). When volunteers can present the data of their canvassing conversations, politicians need to be ready to answer (Bruno: Q2). Both because they should act as a tool of democracy, but also because these conversations have an effect on them emotionally (Bruno: Q2, Laura: Q5). Especially the open questions and the experiences themselves moved these politicians, not just the quantitative survey data (Laura: Q5). Hence, politicians look for concrete examples and want to hear what ‘the people’ think (Laura: Q5). Thus, Operation Climate can make this topic personal for both politicians as well as the people spoken to during canvassing (Laura: Q5). From September 2020, these conversations served as a tool to gather support for specific amendments once political programs were drafted. Although interviewees recognize the power of contact between politicians and volunteers, the execution left room for improvement (Bruno: Q10, Peter: Q14, Maarten: Q4, Eefje: Q11). Bruno says the ‘radical focus’, as mentioned in Big Organizing, was missing, which was necessary to properly support these conversations with politicians (Bruno: Q10). The conversations did not have large scale impact yet, but there is potential for future impact (Bruno: Q10). Note, that while political parties also use canvassing, they do not use the data and experiences to influence other political parties and their programs. This is thus a point where Operation Climate starts to differentiate itself from e.g., the Bernie Sanders campaign.

The final step – mobilizing – refers to local volunteers participating in and Organizing local networks that can mobilize a large following in case of one-time actions and protests which have a national and local character. Such as smaller actions supported by Milieudefensie such as those around the lawsuit against Royal Dutch Shell, reaching local, national and international news (Maarten: Q4). Also, such visible actions – more than just canvassing -- lead to new applicants (Maarten: Q6). Being involved in the national climate movement, Milieudefensie also knew there would be one or more mass mobilizations before the elections. By the end of 2020 canvassing was no longer an option and political party programs were written. Thus, the national office decided to focus on the mass mobilization later named the ‘climate alarm’, this is further explained in chapter 5.

Thus, Operation Climate established new social relations between the Milieudefensie head-office and volunteers, who are now much more integrated into a larger collaborative campaign. But also new social relations between volunteers and their neighborhood, by talking to strangers about climate justice. Lastly, between volunteers and (local) politicians, as the canvassing conversations provide a foot in the door to discuss climate justice with local governance and build relationships with politicians.

4.4 DIMENSION: DOINGS

Doings refers to material commitments, technologies and the performance of practices. To introduce the new Organizing strategy, the Operation Climate team adopted technologies and novel practices. I briefly introduce these new resources and practices below.

Before Operation Climate, Milieudéfense was not active in creating a digital space for Organizing or mobilizing people (Joep: Q4). Around the time Operation Climate started, Milieudéfense developed a digital volunteer platform⁹. This is a social networking website on which volunteers as well as the Organizing department can share announcements, ideas, strategies and resources, as well as schedule trainings and meet-up data. As mentioned by Joep, this digital tool is also meant to move people to take the next step in their engagement with Milieudéfense (Joep: Q1). This technology thus serves to connect the national team to the local team. By introducing such a technology, Milieudéfense avoids its communication being mediated by generic social media platforms which have very different goals compared to the organization and users (see Flesher Fominaya & Gillan, 2017 for more information on the tension between activism and social media platforms).

Like the Bernie Sanders campaign, Operation Climate makes use of a web application for canvassing. Political party GroenLinks shared their canvassing tool, and the same web developer adjusted this application for use by Milieudéfense (Lynn: Q1). It relies on a large open database of every address in the Netherlands. A volunteer has to submit the zip code of the street in which they want to canvas and then select the address. The gathered data is not attached to the exact address, but it is attached to the zip code. See the schematic below which shows the integration of these technologies within the organizational structure.




FIGURE 3: SCHEMATIC OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, INCLUDING TECHNOLOGIES

⁹ It is not a (social media) platform in the strictest sense, as usually a platform connects (at least) two types of users. For instance, in the case of YouTube viewers are connected to content creators and advertisers. In this case the platform developers themselves connect to the users.

These technologies also yield novel resources, such as the collected data. The collected data is directly used locally to lobby with politicians. Of course, this requires the volunteers to have canvassed as this is often what initially interests politicians. With help from some volunteers, Milieudensie also published a single quantitative research based on the data (Dingemans, Feenstra, & Loos, 2020). The novel Organizing structure as well as the new technologies also form new practices. Although Milieudensie has trained and supported local groups (ABP, 2016), these groups tackled their own local environmental problems and were not involved in a continuous campaign by Milieudensie. The new groups are much closer attached to the national campaign and thus require more direction and support. The new social media platform needs to be managed, moderated and updated. The data gathered in the canvassing campaign need to be managed as well, local volunteers should be able to access it and be able to visualize their collected data. Although in 2019 the volunteers were invited to training weekends, during the Covid-19 lock-downs, instead more videocalls were used to train, update and involve volunteers (e.g. in co-creation sessions).

4.5 DIMENSION: NARRATIVE AND FRAMING

The fourth dimension concerns the framing of the SI-initiative in terms of problem definitions, meanings, visions, imaginaries and discursive commitments by the SI-initiative. I discuss these through establishing the narrative of change as described by Operation Climate. Thereby I discuss operation Climate's rationale (problem description and desired future), relevant actors (those ignorant, those in opposition, those counteracting, and the proponents) and the plot (contextualized activities and developments which lead to the desired future) (Wittmayer et al., 2019). Here, I thus touch upon the content of the framing dimension as described above. Although, not unique in their approach to the problems of climate change and questions of justice, Milieudensie and Operation Climate creates their own definitions, imaginaries, visions and meanings based on their own (Dutch) context. Milieudensie intends to spread this framing of the climate crisis, through the other dimensions of doing, organizing structure, and knowledge. Since, Operation Climate intermediate goal is focused on the Dutch election and coalition agreement, the emphasis lies on this specific context. In chapter 6 I critically discuss the narrative in terms of its effect on dominant institutions and how this narrative is able to create new social relations.

4.5.1 RATIONALE

Milieudensie points to a system crisis caused by a faulty economic system as the cause of the climate crisis as well as other crises (Milieudensie, 2016). The way people in the West produce and consume causes social, climatological and ecological crises (Milieudensie, 2016, Laura: Q6). The current economic system solely seeks financial value gains, while inequality rises, destroying and wasting of Earth's riches and leads to a loss of democratic control, as the government loosens its grip on companies through austerity policy (Milieudensie, 2016). Currently, resources are concentrated under the control of a small group of companies and people (Maina: Q7). A handful of companies are

responsible for the majority of emissions in the Netherlands, yet these companies are subsidized by the government, while citizens and SME's (Small and Medium Enterprise) are taxed (Laura: Q6). Next to carrying the burden in form of taxes, many people cannot afford solutions such as insulation, public transport and local food. Without these large polluters contributing, climate justice is not possible (Milieudedefensie, 2016, Elisa: Q7, Lynn: Q7). Meanwhile, operating within the current system, making compromises, the necessary change cannot be achieved (Milieudedefensie, 2016, Maina: Q7, Elisa: Q6). Milieudedefensie summarizes a desired (nearby) future in the form of a set of climate justice policies researched by CE-Delft implementable by policymakers (Rooijers et al., 2020). These were also used during canvassing and are related to three themes: residential heating, transport and food.

4.5.2 RELEVANT ACTORS

For Operation Climate the volunteers are the agents of change through their contact with their neighbors, local politicians, and participation in demonstrations. These volunteers receive support from the national team.

Meanwhile, in Milieudedefensie's point of view, large polluting companies hinder change. Large polluters need to be held responsible for their (and their consumers') actions (Elisa: Q7, Milieudedefensie 2016). Everybody has to change something to realize sustainability transitions, but it is for naught if big players do not do their share (Elisa: Q7, Lynn: Q7). Maarten says, "*companies barely participate and conjure subsidies out of nowhere*" (Maarten: Q9). Eefje notes these companies do not subscribe to laws and design fake solutions (Eefje: Q7). From this perspective, there is thus a lack of accountability when it comes to these companies. Currently, the national government does not do enough to realize the transition either, instead supporting these large companies through tax-cuts and subsidies (Milieudedefensie, 2021). Operation Climate specifically targets the government as an agent for change by aiming to get the taxing of polluting companies into the coalition agreement. This goal was formulated after the policy programs were influenced by volunteers and Milieudedefensie lobbyists through proposals of amendments (with partial success). Others need help to transition but are not necessarily opponents. Such as farmers, or constituents which volunteers talk to during canvassing.

4.5.3 PLOT

Change is only possible when ordinary people also benefit from sustainability transitions ("Wat is klimaatrechtvaardigheid?," 2021). For Operation Climate, this change draws nearer by getting climate justice policy into the Dutch coalition agreement. This policy specifically refers to a tax on large polluting companies, of which the profits should go to funding 'green solutions for all', which is a measurable goal towards a society build on climate justice in 2025.

Milieudedefensie sees a specific role for themselves in opening-up space for alternatives to form by connecting the undercurrent of people working on alternatives and by fighting the existing order

(Milieudéfensie, 2016). Thereby, the focus is on changing cultural values rather than changing individual behavior. (Milieudéfensie, 2016, Maarten: Q1) Organizing is therein the tool to both bring people together to rally for the same cause and give them the opportunity to learn how to organize themselves (Maarten: Q1). For Operation Climate this means building capacity of active citizens who want Climate Justice Policy as well as increase public support through the three-step strategy of i) listening, ii) influencing and iii) mobilizing (Maarten: Q1). These active citizens collect as many (diverse) opinions of their neighbors as possible and use this to gather information and bring these opinions to (local) politicians, who can take this information to national politics (Bruno: Q2, Peter: Q2, Laura: Q2). Bringing underexposed opinions forward and make them heard (Bruno: Q2).

4.6 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

In this section I aimed to answer the first sub question: *“What knowings, doings, and modes of organizing, form the social innovation initiative?”* Starting from the NGO setting a goal for a climate justice society in which the unequal distribution of costs and benefits in sustainability transitions are addressed. This goal required activation of more people than before and led to a reconsideration of the mode of organizing at the NGO’s Organizing department. The team chose to use Big Organizing which led to changes in the organizing, knowings, and doings dimensions. The strategy for Operation Climate draws from knowledge on organizing by Marshall Ganz, Big Organizing as in the Bernie Sanders campaign and ‘deep’ canvassing techniques. This strategy led to the adoption of new technologies and practices. Together, these create new social relations between the Milieudéfensie Organizing department, volunteers, neighbors and (local) politicians. The strategy follows three steps. The first step refers to the canvassing, the second step to the use of the gathered data to influence politicians and the third step to mass mobilizations, which are powerful to show public support (Bruno: Q2). Milieudéfensie cannot organize the necessary amount of people for mass mobilization on their own, thus relying on the larger climate movement (Maina: Q2, Peter: Q6). However, the movement also relies on Operation Climate. There is a co-productive relationship between the SI-initiative and its network. In the next chapter I discuss the second sub-question concerning the network of SI-initiatives in the climate movement.

5. RELATIONS IN THE NETWORK

In this chapter I answer the second sub-question: *“How is the SI- initiative embedded in a broader network of SI-initiatives?”* I specifically look at the network and coalition that formed over the past years. This national coalition formed under the name of the Climate crisis Coalition, organized a decentralized protest dubbed the Climate Alarm in March 2021 just before the general elections. Milieudéfensie prioritized this action, thus many people from the Organizing department became involved in the Climate Crisis Coalition. While locally Operation Climate groups focused on organizing the local actions and building local coalitions. The importance of such larger networks for

realizing large scale protests becomes evident, the same is said for the importance of the network for SI-initiatives in general (Pel et al., 2020).

First, I discuss how the national coalition formed (5.1). The network is crucial for the development and dispersal of SI (Pel et al., 2020). I discuss the Organizing differences between NGOs and grassroots organizations (5.2). Therefore, I also discuss how both (Big) Organizing tactics (5.3) and the climate justice narrative were dispersed (5.4). Therein new social relations form within the network as well.

5.1 FORMATION OF THE CLIMATE CRISIS COALITION




FIGURE 4: AN SI-INITIATIVE AND ITS NETWORK OF INITIATIVES

In 2019 the largest climate protest took place in Amsterdam. 40.000 people marched for stricter climate policy (Bijlo, 2019). The march was an initiative of Milieudefensie, FNV (National Trade Union), de Woonbond (housing union), de Goede Zaak, Greenpeace and Oxfam Novib (Bijlo, 2019). What connected the organizations strategically was the idea that societal pressure is necessary for system change, part of this pressure are large mobilizations, which requires cooperation (Maina: Q2, Peter: Q6). Notably, the new grassroots organizations were not involved yet (such as Fridays for Future, XR and Code Rood). The grassroots groups use many different tactics and strategies compared to the professional organizations, such as school strikes, die-ins, disruptive actions, blockades, etc.

This time the grassroots groups participated in the core of the organization as well. The organizers of the 2019 climate alarm realized that: “*Without including the grassroots it would be impossible to realize large mobilizations*” (Elisa: Q2). A year after the 2019 march the first steps were made to formalize a coalition. There were two reasons for starting this coalition (Maina: Q2). First the importance of the 2021 elections and the need to put the climate crisis on the political agenda (Maina: Q2). Thus, the organizations agreed to organize a large mobilization just before the elections (Maina: Q2). This action was later called the ‘Climate Alarm’. The second reason for starting the coalition was the fact that after 2019 the complete organizing infrastructure imploded (Maina: Q2). Maina says:

“The lesson was that if we want to organize large mobilizations over a longer period then we need to build a permanent structure” (Maina: Q2). Before, every time an action was organized parties had to work through the same differences in interests, experience, and ideas again (Peter: Q6).

Due to the Covid-19 pandemic it became clear such a mobilization as in 2019 was not possible (Peter: Q6). Note that the Covid-19 pandemic is a contingency occurring in the socio-material context, which is further discussed in chapter 7. This contingency significantly impacted the SI-initiative and its network and can thus be interpreted as evidence for the co-production of SI.

Next to struggling with forming a permanent national coalition, the organization of the actions had to look for a fundamentally different form of protest compared to the previous climate march (Peter: Q6). Instead of a single protest in a single city, the protests were to be held in a decentralized way (Peter: Q6). National (professional) organizations thus had to give up the control over the protest organization to local volunteers. Thereby, risking the public image of all organizations involved, if Covid-19 lock-down rules were not followed by local organizers. Thus, responsibilities shifted, instead of organizing a protest, the national organization had to work on clear directions, rules and frame for the action (Peter: Q6). As well as set-up digital communication infrastructure, contact local organizers, keep local organizers onboard and setting up an alternative online program. While, at the same time, local people had to set everything else in order. In the end the Climate Alarm was an action which mobilized 35.000 people (around 15.000 offline and 20.000 online) following Covid-19 regulations with most municipalities enforcing restrictions on the right to protest (Pols, Brouwers, Schoenmakers, Oudshoorn, & van Schaik, 2021; van Brummelen, 2021). Eefje says: *“with the Climate Alarm we showed that people are able to organize themselves with the support of a national organizing machine”* (Eefje: Q3).

Decentralization also means new social relations formed between the nationally active groups and local groups. Many of the responsibilities shifted towards local groups, who gained knowledge in organizing protests as well as building their own local network for organizing future actions. Critical were the local coalitions which formed that allowed people from different groups to come together. Thereby broadening contacts, making more actions available for people (Elisa: Q5). Thereby local activists got to consider their role in a larger movement. According to TSI, such translocal activity is key to empowerment of SI-initiatives (Pel et al., 2020). Thus, following TSI decentralization might have empowered the climate movement. By being embedded in such a translocal network, these groups get access to a variety of resources (e.g., monetary and equipment) and knowledge. Groups were encouraged to look for their own resources (mostly with success), but funding was distributed over all groups and in the end budget gaps were filled by the national organization. Some coalitions chose to include companies and political parties, others explicitly did not want anyone to join under the name of a political party. By being joined by neighborhood associations, energy cooperatives,

discussion platform organizations, this protest action included members not involved in organizing protests before. Other coalitions actively sought or were joined by groups not associated with climate action at first glance, such as groups focused on racial equality (e.g., Black Lives Matter), socialist and communist organizations and more. As both Peter and Eefje agree: every group has a role within the larger ecosystem of NGOs and grassroots groups (Peter: Q5, Eefje: Q4). However, it remains to be seen whether the local coalitions of groups with such diverse interests endure for future cooperative climate action.




FIGURE 6: NATIONAL COALITION STRUCTURE. A LIST OF ALLIES CAN BE FOUND ON: [HTTPS://KLIMAATMARS2021.NL/ORGANISATIES/](https://klimaatmars2021.nl/organisaties/)



FIGURE 5: MAP OF LOCAL COALITIONS. IN MAASTRICHT, AMSTERDAM AND GRONINGEN COALITIONS WERE ESTABLISHED A YEAR BEFORE.

5.2 NGO AND GRASSROOTS

In the coalition, one Milieudensie employee represented the whole NGO (Peter: Q6). This employee only needed to discuss the coalition plans with the manager (Peter: Q6). Meanwhile, grassroot clubs democratically decide what to do, while having to make sure people remain engaged (Peter: Q6). Although, Milieudensie gathers input from local volunteers and members, it is more top-down than grassroots initiatives (Lynn: Q5). By working with less radical NGOs, grassroots groups need to compromise: the climate alarm was not an action they would have organized themselves (Peter: Q6). Within successful grassroots groups people are willing to give-up two or three full days a week to work on the initiative (Lynn: Q5). These groups thus also are better at quickly

seizing opportunities, than Milieudéfensie volunteers who have two to four hours to spend per week (Lynn: Q5). Lynn also sees that there is more creativity, energy and ownership in the few successful local grassroots clubs, but many fall apart quickly as well (Lynn: Q5). Milieudéfensie has a centrally organized strategy, narrative and action perspective (Lynn: Q5). For grassroots groups it is more challenging to realize such a focus, because they are so democratically organized (Lynn: Q5). It is more difficult to find connection between groups, which all have their own campaign (Lynn: Q5). A national campaign does not get priority (Lynn: Q5). Every week stuff happens, which is where the power of grassroots organizations lies, but actions also go into every direction; people have conflicting ideas and opinions resulting in conflicting actions (Lynn: Q5). This is also visible in the strategy, which is sometimes focused on connection while other actions are very confrontational (Lynn: Q5). One day you reach out, the next day you block the street (Lynn: Q5). This sends out mixed signals (Lynn: Q5). Thus, through (Big) Organizing it becomes possible to set-up national campaigns with a narrative and focus across the Netherlands for a continued period of time.

5.3 BIG ORGANIZING & THE CLIMATE ALARM

By choosing to decentralize, the goal of the action became not solely to mobilize people for a protest, but mainly to create a stronger climate movement nationally and locally. Establishing a permanent infrastructure in which local networks can support national actions and receive support from the national organization. This interaction between a national organization and local manifestations working on the same goal fits with a Big Organizing approach.

There are barely any other organizations that use Organizing principles or even have real Organizing capacity (Peter: Q6, Maarten: Q3). For a grassroots organization it is much more difficult to implement such a structure, and this is not where the capacity of these organizations is (Peter: Q6). Grassroots organizations rely more on the creativity of local groups for actions and therefore have a harder time to organize these groups for a national action (Lynn: Q6). Other larger professional organizations use Organizing but not on the same scale as Milieudéfensie (Peter: Q6). Only the FNV focuses on Organizing, however this union is used to Organizing in the workplace, which is different from Organizing to build a climate movement of volunteers (Peter: Q6). The team organizing the climate alarm consisted of several sub teams, see figure 5. Separate teams within a larger organizing team were busy with Organizing youth, national allies, local coalitions and creating supportive materials such as guides and frameworks. As written above the tasks at hand for the organizing team were similar to those of Operation Climate: setting clear guidelines, managing digital communication infrastructure, supporting and coaching local Organizers. Milieudéfensie also decided to prioritize the organization of the Climate Alarm, thereby employees were directly involved in the national organization of the Climate Alarm. For the Milieudéfensie Organizing department this meant that several volunteering office Organizers moved to the local coalitions team to coach local coalitions instead of the Operation Climate groups. Thus, elements of the Operation Climate mode of organizing

as well as practices were adopted in the organization of the Climate Alarm. The basis is thus very similar to the Organizing approach at Milieudéfense (Elisa: Q5). Peter even says it was copied (Peter, Q6). Thereby, a part of the SI was embraced by and replicated at other sites, thus dispersing.

Thus, although Big Organizing ‘dispersed’ to other sites within Operation Climate’s network, its application is very specific and requires specific conditions (e.g. number of people involved, decentralization) to be implemented. Such as, large scale dispersed mobilizations.

5.4 NARRATIVE OF THE CLIMATE CRISIS COALITION

Within translocal networks the development of shared identities, narratives and a collective political voice is an empowering force (Pel et al., 2020). Creating a political culture, referring to the creation of systemized & routinized manner in which choices are made, is crucial to the dispersal of SI. In terms of the climate movement, this culture would then refer to the systemized consideration of climate justice in all choices (Pel et al., 2020). In chapter 6 I more critically discuss whether such a culture is present, here I focus more on the dispersal of the Milieudéfense narrative in the climate alarm narrative. The narrative as published by the Climate Crisis Coalition (see Appendix F), shows similarities to the narrative as described in 4.5. It names the fact that people with the least responsibility for climate change are most affected. As well as blaming the national government for the tax cuts and subsidies for large polluting companies. While households and SME’s bear the costs. The coalition says that everybody deserves a fair chance for a ‘green’ job, healthy food, a good house and sustainable travel. All parties involved in the national coalition thus either have the same narrative or agree with the Milieudéfense narrative. However, for Milieudéfense climate justice has been part of the organization for about five years (Maina: Q3). Back then, this was a distinctive feature, but not anymore (Maina: Q3). Yet, the centrality of climate justice in all Milieudéfense campaigns is still distinctive (Maina: Q3).

Extensive networks of societal discourses can also empower SI initiatives (Pel et al., 2020). However, according to Maina, the election debate was mostly about Covid-19 and leadership not about the climate crisis (Maina: Q5). The left’s narrative on the climate and Covid-19 crisis was much less effective compared to the right’s narrative (Maina: Q5). Thus, there was a missed opportunity in successfully seizing societal discourses such as those concerning the Covid-19 pandemic to strengthen the narrative. This connects to the fourth set of relations as described by TSI: the relations with the socio-material context.

5.5 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

In this chapter I aimed to answer the subquestion: “How is the SI- initiative embedded in a broader network of SI-initiatives?” I started by introducing the formation of the Climate Crisis Coalition, a coalition of nationally operating action groups, formed around shared viewpoints and need for a more permanent organizational infrastructure for organizing actions. The first organized action in coalition agreement was forced to decentralize to 40+ locations over the Netherlands due to the pandemic.

Thereby, many local groups had to come together. The national organization adopted Big Organizing techniques to support these groups, as well as a narrative similar to the Milieudedefensie narrative based on enforcing the contribution of large polluting companies to sustainability transitions. Thus, the SI introduced in chapter 4 is dispersed into its wider network both in terms of its mode of organizing, as well as its narrative. In TSI there are three dimensions which aid the network's transformative impact, these are based on changing tensions and stability in the network (Pel et al., 2020). This stability depends on the communities the initiative is rooted in, its translocal dimension as well as its discourse formation. As written above, the Covid-19 pandemic (a socio-material context contingency) destabilized the network and meant that the national organization had to shift responsibilities to local volunteers. Thereby, strengthening the translocal component of the movement. Meanwhile, the new grassroots initiatives also become more prominent in the movement. As written above, climate justice ideas are embraced by the national organization. The practical application of the narrative as well as the construction of a political voice is further discussed in relation to (existing) institutions.

6. RELATIONS TO INSTITUTIONS

In this chapter I discuss the third sub question: “*What existing and novel institutions are put into practice in novel ways and how do these institutions shape the SI-initiative?*” I do so by first discussing the narrative and practices of the initiative in terms of existing institutions and what is novel in the SI-initiatives enactment. After, I do the same for the institutions in the climate movement network during the organizing for the climate alarm, discussed in the previous chapter. Operation Climate focus' for the election campaign is mostly on the Dutch governmental coalition agreement, and galvanizing commitments to climate justice policies. Thereby, aiming to institutionalize their framing of climate justice and accompanying norms, values, and rules. The focus of this section and the research question is not so much on the achieved success of this institutionalization of climate justice in the coalition agreement. As this can only be determined ex-post when the coalition agreement has been written (although determining Milieudedefensie's role is difficult anyway due to confounding variables). Neither can TSI provide a clear account of substantive material changes in the systems targeted by SI. This does not differ from other institutionalist, rule-based system understandings in transition research (Svensson & Nikoleris, 2018). However, it does account for relations between institutions and SI-actors, including paradoxes that form in such relationships. I discuss such paradoxes that occur, as well as efforts to both re- and de-politicize the climate change discourse as described in 2.3, thus relating to discourses of the Green Economy, consumerism, and mystification of root causes. From here I can discuss the SI-initiative in terms of institutional change processes as described in TSI theory, such as understanding of dominant rulesets of society and how the SI-initiative is equipped to deal with constraints in the institutional arrangement. Institutions (often) respond to SI initiatives in order to preserve or stabilize the system. Institutionalization of SI is

therefore an inherently political deed, which usually leads to ‘capture’ (Pel & Kemp, 2020). ‘Transformation’ requires arising of contingency/opportunity in the context and/or extra-ordinary properties of the SI and/or SI-initiative itself (Pel & Kemp, 2020). In this section I focus on the properties of the SI-initiative in relation to institutions, some tendencies might lead to capture and others which can lead to transformation. Herein, I also draw from the ideas for repoliticization as discussed in 2.3.4 and discuss the presence of these strategies in the SI-initiative. The interwovenness also leads to paradoxes of institutional change. Initiatives engage in institutional ‘bricolage’ rather than institutional design (Avelino et al., 2017; Hielscher, Seyfang, & Smith, 2013). Including strategic repertoires of advocacy, lobbying, protesting, providing local alternatives; raising awareness and promoting reform or replacement of institutions (Pel et al., 2020). Thereby, also through their network SI-initiatives engage with political agency (Pel et al., 2020). Some embed into institutional arrangements (Pel et al., 2020). Building a platform and movement for institutional change requires shared identities and establishment of a political voice (Pel et al., 2020). Lastly, initiatives engage with processes of cultural change by aiming to change norms, values and lifestyles (Pel et al., 2020). Institutions are not only confronted in isolation, SI-initiatives also confront the institutional logics (e.g., market, state, or community logics) which shape established institutions (Pel et al., 2020). As well as, applying what is learned from one logics to another (Pel et al., 2020).




FIGURE 7: RELATIONS TO INSTITUTIONS

6.1 CHALLENGING OF EXISTING INSTITUTIONS

First, I discuss how Milieudedefensie’s narrative challenges dominant institutions. Afterwards, I discuss the practical implementation of this narrative through Operation Climate and how this mode of organizing challenges dominant institutions.

As discussed in 2.3.2 Swyngedouw (2019), Kenis (2019), and Kenis & Lievens (2012), examine the dominant discourse in relation to climate change which relies on the adjusting of capitalism towards a Green Economy in which consumers make ‘sustainably’ conscious choices and reward ‘sustainable’ production. First, the conscious consumer framing defers responsibility for climate change to consumers, who can solve this problem through buying ‘sustainable’ products. This framing also cannot be separated from dominant ways of doing, knowing and organizing. For instance, introducing practices related to buying consciously, introduction of new more sustainable products, but it also leads to greenwashing by companies and politicians. As mentioned before, this

discourse neglects the political nature of the climate crisis as well as its root causes. Thereby, the limited number of new institutions it might introduce, are not able to lead to the necessary ‘transformation’ of the economy and socio-ecological relations. As shown in 4.5 Milieudedefensie’s narrative departs from the conscious consumer framing. Below I discuss some comments made during the interviews by Laura in regard to this framing. According to her, people do not get motivated by consumerism, for example by buying a bamboo toothbrush (Laura: Q7). People get motivated because companies are not treated justly (Laura: Q7). Laura says: “*The emphasis should be on large companies, on large measures which realize a fair distribution of tax money. And not too much emphasis on the consumer, who cannot think of every [environmentally conscious] choice themselves*” (Laura: Q7).

The Green Economy narrative is also criticized. This framing sees sustainability as a new growth market. As written in 2.3.2 it leads to the push of ‘false’ solutions. These solutions (e.g., CCS and emissions trading) do not address root causes of the climate crisis or equity issues induced by current sustainability transition policy. Both Milieudedefensie policy and employees agree that unsustainable, undemocratic systems need to be radically changed, root causes need to be uncovered and replaced with sustainable, democratic systems (Milieudedefensie 2016, Maarten: Q8, Eefje: Q7, Bruno: Q7, Peter: Q9, Joep: Q9, Laura: Q7, Lynn: Q7, Laura Elisa: Q6, Maina: Q7). Eefje specifically condemns a sole focus on CO₂ reduction, as this not only neglects other GHG, but it also leads to embracing ‘fake’ solutions such as CCS (Eefje: Q7). Meanwhile, it provides no solution for issues such as energy poverty¹⁰ and land grabbing (Eefje: Q7). Milieudedefensie exposes the roles of companies and the national government in propagating the problem (Eefje: Q7). Milieudedefensie thus does not fall into the depoliticizing trap of defining CO₂ as the problem as described by Swyngedouw (2020) and Kenis (2021). Therein, Milieudedefensie from this perspective, aims to avoid campaigning for technical, administrative, and institutional adjustments that do not change the fundamental organization of society and thus get ‘captured’ by incumbent structures underlying society. Bruno believes that certain systems need to be destroyed and replaced by new solutions (Bruno: Q7). According to Bruno, seeking for solutions through a neoliberal lens, the world will not become more social, and neither will people gather behind such a message (Bruno: Q7). This leads to problematic solutions such as a European Carbon Market full of loopholes, also leaving room for multinationals to get away with greenwashing (Eefje: Q7). Changing this requires system change (Eefje: Q7). Peter says that without a systemic approach to implementing solutions you will create solutions that will cause a whole set of new major problems (Peter: Q5).

Thereby, Milieudedefensie puts these issues on the agenda by pointing at Shell’s (in)actions as well as governmental (in)action (Eefje: Q7). Thus, Milieudedefensie employees do aim to challenge dominant institutions and institutional logics, wanting system change. As solutions designed under

¹⁰ A lack of access to essential energy services such as heating, cooling or lighting due to poverty.

neoliberal institutions will not lead to necessary changes, messages under a neoliberal dogma also fail to mobilize people, according to Bruno (Bruno: Q7).

Milieudefensie aims to be the organization in the Netherlands that propagates climate justice (Eefje: Q3). As Eefje notes climate justice is a multi-interpretable concept, thus Milieudefensie wants to normalize its own interpretation (Eefje: Q3). From Milieudefensie's point of view, it is not companies that should take initiative in producing sustainable goods and services. Neither is it solely the responsibility of consumers to make the rational and sustainable choice. Instead, Operation Climate targets the government to halt their continued support to polluting companies. By building public support for change Milieudefensie can show to politicians it is necessary to make changes, as other factors make it hard to restrict such companies without government involvement (Joep: Q9). It is then the government that should tax these companies and make 'sustainable' solutions available. This narrative, while also leaving out nuances (Joep: Q9) differs greatly from frames around consumerism. It would require a reconsideration of the position of large companies, as well as other policies if this position is adopted into the coalition agreement. Although, pandering to a governmental elite, this narrative does not enforce an 'altogether' discourse as described by Swyngedouw (2020) and Kenis (2021), in which activist hope the powerful CEO's, politicians and scientists can come together. Neither does Milieudefensie demand a technocracy. Laura also says that: *"The phase of putting the climate crisis on the agenda has passed, it is much more about how we need to address it. We have a climate law, a climate agreement, and you can agree or disagree, but it is already policy. The goals are sharpened continuously as well. [...] Thus, that we have to do stuff is set in stone"* (Laura: Q5). For Laura, it is thus much more about what solutions will be implemented and not about raising awareness about the impending doom of the climate apocalypse. As mentioned in 2.3 focus on a future apocalypse is a depoliticizing force in the climate movement according to Swyngedouw (2020) and Kenis (2021).

Thus, within Milieudefensie there is an understanding of the political dimension of climate change, for instance in regard to rejection of neoliberal 'solutions' to climate change. This framing on first sight thus challenges dominant institutions regarding the framing of climate change. However, as I discuss in 6.2 there is discussion about its implementation, about the necessary degree of polarization, and what the 'system' is. Thus, the question remains whether these ideals also translate into action. But first I discuss the relation of the mode of organizing of Operation Climate to dominant and novel institutions.

In the canvassing campaign volunteers ask their neighbors to actively form their opinion on climate justice issues through a conversation. In turn, the volunteers also are encouraged to talk to the politicians in their municipality and discuss what they have heard on the streets. Thereby, these volunteers (and to an extent the survey participants) move beyond a role as consumer. Making it possible for people to turn their worries into action (Eefje: Q2). For which Operation Climate was

thus far very successful (Eefje: Q2). According to Eefje it worked very well for movement building, as earlier groups imploded lacking continued engagement (Eefje: Q2). Canvassing is also especially useful for lobbying (Laura: Q3). Politicians appreciate canvassing data and if many people agree with certain statements then they have to respond (Laura: Q3). By directing attention of volunteers to local politicians, Milieudedefensie challenges the lopsided power relationship in the Hague with regards to who gets to lobby (Peter: Q14). At the level of the national government, Milieudedefensie cannot compete with all the private company and branch organization lobbyists, who have access to the backdoors of politicians (Peter: Q14). However, these politicians need to work with their local representatives (Peter: Q14). These representatives help with shaping policy and party programs and often have different opinions compared to the party top (these are less favorable to multinationals) (Peter: Q14, Laura: Q12). Changing the course of a political party can happen from the bottom, as private lobbyist cannot reach these local representatives (Peter: Q14). Peter says: *“If you can play into this, which I already have seen is possible, then you can force these political parties to change course”* (Peter: Q14). From this perspective, local action is thus essential for national change (this perspective is shared by Naomi Klein see (Klein, 2015)).

The value of having canvassing conversations, and the priority of listening, is also something that changes how Milieudedefensie approaches campaigns and helped check if Milieudedefensie is on the right track (Laura: Q4). Milieudedefensie has certain ideas and translates them into policy ideas for politicians and policymakers (Laura: Q2). To test reception of these policies Milieudedefensie often uses opinion panels, but never tested whether these opinions match what people truly think on the streets (Laura: Q2). Since, Milieudedefensie employees are mostly white and highly educated, thus a very specific group of people (Laura: Q3). Meanwhile, the support base is also not as diverse as Milieudedefensie would like to see (Laura: Q3). As a movement, Laura believes they cannot think from the perspective of this very specific group and decide what is necessary regarding climate policies without including more diverse groups (Laura: Q3). Thus, talking to a diverse group of people about their perspective and what they consider as important is absolutely necessary (Laura: Q3). Then it becomes possible to make plans which are built on different perspectives and move beyond Milieudedefensie’s own non-diverse manner of thinking (Laura: Q3). Operation Climate gives the possibility to reach people which Milieudedefensie cannot reach otherwise and hear other perspectives (Laura: Q3). Instead of staying in the climate movement’s own bubble and focusing solely on reaching national media (Lynn: Q11). Lynn thinks having one-on-one conversations with people are the best way to talk to the countermovement, as people are stuck in their own social-media bubble and are no longer reachable through media (Lynn: Q11). Operation Climate data shows people are worried about climate change (Maarten: Q4), and that there is support from the general public for demands to make large companies contribute to sustainability transitions (Lynn: Q4). Meanwhile, through conversations people can realize they support climate justice policy, even though they were initially

reluctant to talk to a climate justice activist (Lynn: Q4). Thereby, Operation Climate helps Milieudéfensie to move from the ivory tower to listen to people (Laura: Q2, Peter: Q2).

This strategy also makes it possible to appeal to a new group of people. Thereby broadening the movement. As Bruno says: *“I believe that we found a niche target population, that wanted to become active but did not know how”* (Bruno: Q5). The Operation Climate strategy attracts people that search for connection, not for confrontational activism (Lynn: Q3. Bruno: Q3). These people are older than the average grassroots activist (Bruno: Q3). They have less free time due to occupation and family and no interest in devoting all of their free time to activism (Bruno: Q3). Thus, Operation Climate with its easy-to-follow activities, provides this specific group with a possibility to become active in the climate movement (Bruno: Q5). As mentioned in previous chapters, Operation Climate uses a top-down strategy, in which volunteers all follow the same narrative and activities, something the grassroots groups cannot realize. Operation Climate then exists next to the opportunities for young people in Fridays for Future (FFF) and Youth for Climate, for the confrontational activist in XR, FossilVrij and Code Rood, and for the elderly in Grootouders voor het Klimaat (grandparents for climate) (Bruno: Q5). Together, strategies can be combined to reach the necessary mass of people (Bruno: Q5). Milieudéfensie aims to approach the ‘grey’ middle, broadening the support base, thus seeking nuance (Eefje: Q7). According to Eefje, Operation Climate is a very soft campaign, it is humane and connective, thus reaching different people (Eefje: Q7). Operation Climate tries to give space to other people in the climate movement and make this visible (Eefje: Q7).

Generally, the use and success of Big Organizing is underwritten by Milieudéfensie employees. Of course, only time can tell if these groups sustain, and thus whether the assumption that this Organizing strategy is the way to go for Milieudéfensie holds true (Maarten: Q4). As Peter says: *“I hope other organizations start doing more community Organizing, But I think that for Milieudéfensie [this approach] is the sweet spot between being a large organization and involve as many people as possible in campaigns. That is only possible using Big Organizing”* (Peter: Q12).

Thus, Operation Climate was able to engage citizens to become more politically active, especially people that due to their lack of free time were not able to participate in the movement before. These people also engage with people Milieudéfensie could not reach before through something as simple as conversations. These citizens also challenge conventions around lobbying. In theory and to an extent in practice, the Operation Climate campaign was thus a genuine effort to open up the climate movement to other concerns and to highlight previously muted voices. Both discussed by Kenis (2021) as ideas to re-politicize the climate movement.

6.2 PARADOXES

Below I discuss to what extent it was possible for climate activism to move down from the ivory tower mentioned above, or whether it stays stuck within its non-diverse highly educated perspective. I also discuss Milieudéfensie’s relation to system change, whether the organization truly aims to

achieve system change or whether it remains stuck in band-aiding the current system and by doing so remaining part of the system itself. I also discuss Milieudefensie towards alternatives, for ways out of the system. TSI-agency becomes possible as SI-actors use existing institutions and resources in order to perform practices in novel ways – with a resulting dialectic change that leads to transformations in institutional arrangements. Thereby, a TSI journey does not develop in isolation of dominant institutions nor are they zero-sum frontal battles against dominant institutions. Socially innovative agency often seeks a co-productive relationship with dominant institutions they challenge and intertwines with them. In engaging with these institutions, I can discuss which tendencies lead to capture and which to radical transformation.

6.2.1 ORGANIZING, LISTENING & CANVASSING

There is still a search for the perfect Organizing method, as of yet Milieudefensie does not dare to choose between community or Big Organizing (Maarten: Q3). This is also because Big Organizing, as practiced in political campaigns, is meant for a singular urgent campaign with a clear deadline (Joep: Q12). Meanwhile Milieudefensie's goal is to build a longer lasting movement to realize climate justice, without a clear deadline (Joep: Q12). Big Organizing does not necessarily work for building a lasting structure and lasting groups (Joep: Q12). Next to this, Big Organizing can also turn into a top-down campaign only, instead of something which is shaped by both the local groups and the national organization (Maarten: Q3). However, Big Organizing does not exclude Community Organizing per definition (Lynn: Q10). Milieudefensie should then investigate how to integrate the two successfully to fit the Dutch context (Joep: Q12, Lynn: Q12, Eefje: Q10, Bruno: Q9). Community Organizing can help to find the link between what needs to happen locally to change nationally (Bruno: Q9). People feel connected to their local community and want to improve it, and Operation Climate does not address this now (Bruno: Q9) For Operation Climate, community Organizing can be used to further design the strategy such as through co-creation, listening to and cooperating with local volunteers, as well as the broader climate movement (Eefje: Q10). *“Thus, asking what do we want as a movement, instead of what do we want as the head-office”* (Eefje: Q10). According to Eefje, Big Organizing is the correct strategy, but there needs to be more space for local ownership such as through co-creation, which can also result in better strategizing (Eefje: Q10).

The canvassing did not happen on a grand enough scale to realize large scale change. Eefje and Peter think it was effective for building the movement but not yet for getting results (Eefje: Q2, Peter: Q3). Lynn thinks that the scale of these conversations should increase to 10.000 a year (Lynn: Q11). Peter wants to see somewhere between 10.000s and 100.000 conversations (Peter: Q3). According to Bruno Operation Climate was too timid, not ambitious enough, regarding the number of people and groups to be involved to realize the desired change (Bruno: Q2). Losing focus is another problem (Bruno: Q2). Often other Milieudefensie campaigns were prioritized instead of focusing on local politics and canvassing (Bruno: Q2).

Lynn thinks they should also focus on targeting specific groups that Milieudedefensie considers important (Lynn: Q11). Peter agrees that conversations outside the climate movement bubble are necessary to truly increase support (Peter: Q3). This would mean a departure from one of the Big Organizing rules, which dictates Organizers refrain from targeting a specific group. Laura notes that Big Organizing also mostly gets people involved who are closely affiliated with Milieudedefensie (Laura: Q10). Currently, most conversations also took place in larger cities within the city center (see examples of some cities below in figure 8, pictures made using R software for data analysis, using publicly available CBS data and data from the canvassing campaign.). Most conversations took place with people who expressed interest in political parties considered to be green or left-wing in the Dutch party spectrum (see Appendix D for political party preference based on about one thousand conversations). These are also the parties which align with the scoring of political parties along a climate justice scale according to Milieudedefensie (see <https://milieudedefensie.nl/verkiezingen2021/verkiezingswijzer>). Perhaps the conversations did not take place in locations where right-wing voters live. Or these people are not open to converse with Operation Climate volunteers, suggesting that even a conversation might no longer be possible with people outside the bubble. It is also possible people were not honest when answering questions.

Meanwhile, the people that support the socio-economic positions of Milieudedefensie, but do not support the progressive positions (e.g., regarding immigration, racism or sexism), are not reached through canvassing (Laura: Q10). Laura thinks it is important to continue conversing with these people and see if they can come up with ideas too, without telling them what to do or think (Laura: Q10). According to Laura, allowing these people to produce ideas, is also what currently misses within the climate movement (Laura: Q10). Peter also calls for bringing in knowledge from other social movement actors, as otherwise the climate movement will remain one of white, highly educated city-dwellers. (Peter: Q6) People that are busy surviving are hard to convince with a climate narrative which talks of future disaster or disasters abroad, yet from the climate justice perspective these people should be able to benefit from climate policy (Laura: Q7). Thus, there is intention to broaden the climate movement to new social groups and new ideas, but this did not translate into results in Operation Climate. Based on the location of conversations and the voting preference, it is doubtful that Milieudedefensie reached the group that Laura describes. Of course, this does not mean such conversations did not happen, but the majority of the conversations took place with the usual suspects. Thus, it does seem that Milieudedefensie has not reached the bottom of the ivory tower yet or created a space where previously muted voices can be heard.

It is also doubtful whether the questions allowed for personal input of participants. The data of the open questions, in which people were able to answer more nuanced to the questions and share their own experiences and perspectives, is not actively used by Milieudedefensie (except for the experiences of volunteers). Reflecting critically, Joep notes that these conversations were “*useful for lobbying to*

political parties, but I do not think that taking a survey makes a change in the thoughts of people. If that was the approach – that we want to build support by making people think differently through door-to-door conversations – then these conversations should look very different” (Joep: Q13). Joep says that at Milieudefensie the canvassing conversations are sometimes approached as if they were based on deep canvassing (Joep: Q13). According to him this is not the case yet and the strategy would look very different if deep canvassing was applied (Joep: Q13). If this was implemented not only would the questions and conversations look very different, but volunteers would also need more training as well (Joep: Q13).

Thus, looking who is talked to, who does the talking and how it is done, it is questionable whether Milieudefensie moved down from the ivory tower already. Milieudefensie argues for climate justice as an NGO consisting of a very specific set of people, while not reaching and listening to the communities which benefit from climate justice as much as to the usual suspects. In not being able to reach the target community and not practicing deep canvassing; Operation Climate was more about checking whether people support Milieudefensie’s positions than listening and channeling citizen’s and volunteers’ ideas on climate justice and sustainability transitions.




FIGURE 8: INDICATION OF WHERE VOLUNTEERS CANVASSED.




FIGURE 9: CANVASSING FOR THESE FOUR CITIES TOOK PLACE PREDOMINANTLY IN THE CITY CENTER.

6.2.2 SYSTEM CHANGE, BENEFITS, RESPONSIBILITY AND POLARIZATION

Concerning who benefits and loses, Milieudefensie states that climate justice leads to benefit for both Earth and everybody (“Wat is klimaatrechtvaardigheid?,” 2021)¹¹. Next to vagueness of what benefit means, this statement denies the political dimension of the climate crisis and transitions. It conceals that social construction entails exclusion creating conflict and antagonisms. It also enforces the

¹¹ This webpage was used for interview questions. Since, it has changed and become more critical. The statements used for the interview are still there

altogether discourse, which presumes there is one ‘humanity’ – one ‘everyone’ – to speak of. According to Elisa: *“that is an ideal situation. That we will realize a transition that will not cost money and where everybody benefits. [...] We need to make sacrifices and ideally you do not want the ‘regular’ citizen to pay too much. [...] But if large polluters pay and make it possible for people to shift to other jobs, that would make it a little easier”* (Elisa: Q8). For Maina, the justice part in Climate Justice is the most important. *“People will only support sustainability transitions if most people can benefit. Thus it [Climate Justice] is much more about solidarity, redistribution and who carries the heaviest burdens. [...] On the short-term, from a material perspective not all will benefit from Climate Justice, but from the perspective that this way children and grandchildren will live on a habitable planet, everybody benefits”* (Maina: Q8). Laura notes that: *“Some people become less rich, like the CEO of Schiphol Airport, but in the end, he will receive a better living environment for him and his children”* (Laura: Q7). Maarten says: *“I understand it will not get better for everybody, but it has to get better for the Earth. As a person, collective, or country, you have a responsibility to act accordingly and make sure it is fair relative to other parts of the world. [...] I think it is better, but others will see it as a restriction on them as an individual”* (Maarten: Q9). Joep says: *“We do not need to make it rosier than it is, it is about power and there is a contradiction in interests we need to address. If addressed the lives of the majority of people will improve”* (Joep: Q10). Within Milieudefensie, there is thus a lot more nuance and acknowledgement of arising conflicts due to the sustainability transitions.

In other documents Milieudefensie states that everybody is necessary to transition. All these actors have the same responsibility and need to come together to accept this shared burden. Joep acknowledges that transitions are complex and full of intra-dependent elements (Joep: Q9). He thinks not everybody, but the majority is necessary in order to have political impact, thus more than politicians, technicians and technocrats (Joep: Q9). Maina agrees: *“we are all connected to the economy, [...] if you change something there, it hits everybody and thus everybody is necessary. However, there are people that have stakes in delay, postponement, business as usual and the influence of these people needs to be constrained. [...] Participate is a neutral term, it is more about the amount of influence actors have on change, some people need more influence, others less”* (Maina: Q8). Bruno also adds some nuance: *“Not everyone is necessary to realize change, but the changes we want should work for everybody”* (Bruno: Q8). Eefje agrees that there are certain actors (large companies) who hold more responsibility based on their power and contribution to the problem (Eefje: Q7). Everybody is necessary, but everybody has a different responsibility based on their contribution and power to make changes (Eefje: Q7). Thus, especially large polluting companies (Eefje: Q7). There is thus some disagreement with the altogether framing.

In 6.1 I described the perspectives on (radical) system change of interviewees, below I discuss the different points of view regarding this matter and whether interviewees see these radical aspirations in practice.

As Elisa notes, system change is ambitious, since you start from the system, it is not possible to stop the current system and just start anew (Elisa: Q6). Eefje agrees and wonders how to realize radical change while functioning within such a system. (Eefje: Q7). Thus, acknowledging the embeddedness paradox as described by TSI: SI-initiatives seek to transform institutions which they are simultaneously shaped by. This is also why there is a lot of patching up of current policy to tackle the climate crisis, with a focus on climate adaptation instead of tackling the root of the problem (Elisa: Q6). According to Elisa this is also sometimes the case at Milieudefensie: *“we seek small victories to keep the climate movement happy, while we see that our current way of life hurts more than it is able to heal”* (Elisa: Q6). Thus, according to Elisa, Milieudefensie does not always strive for radical change (Elisa: Q6). Instead, Milieudefensie is complacent in the current system and seeks for possibilities to change it from within (Elisa: Q6). Peter agrees: *“we [Milieudefensie] still lobby too often and communicate about small tweaks to a system, [a system] which in my mind should be toppled”* (Peter: Q9). But Elisa does note that in e.g. the lawsuit against Shell this radical change is still visible, addressing what the role of companies is in the climate crisis and holding them accountable, which was also successful publicity wise (Elisa: Q6).

Within Milieudefensie there is also discussion about the necessity of multinational companies in sustainability transitions themselves. Are they part of the ‘us’ or the ‘them’. This concerns the right of these companies to exist. Peter says: *“There is a conflict within Milieudefensie between people who think these large companies – with so much power – are necessary to make rapid changes. While others say multinationals are part of the problem and need to be dismantled”* (Peter: Q10). Peter himself thinks that the current system cannot be upheld, it is the question who gets to decide what the next system looks like (Peter: Q10). Joep thinks that from a power perspective, large polluting companies which have stakes in the current system are obstructing change (Joep: Q9). Parties that have stakes in delay, frustration, business as usual, the influence of such parties needs to be resisted (Maina: Q7). Lynn also questions the position of these companies as even if they start paying a bit more, these companies still hold too much power over the economy and the well-being of the Earth (Lynn: Q7). Thus, the role of these companies is also not entirely clear, should they divest or be dismantled. In the lawsuit against Shell, the demand was not to dismantle the multinational but to make it divest. However, in court demanding a company to comply to the Paris Agreement was already nearly impossible.

Milieudefensie relies on current institutions, including modes of governance that Swyngedouw (2005) would describe as post-political such as negotiation tables between government, companies and CSOs. Maarten thinks that when an organization wants to go further than putting an issue on the

agenda, then they also have to think along (Maarten: Q5). Eefje says that the organization has become institutionalized, Milieudedefensie (together with other NGOs) works with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, receives subsidies and participates at climate negotiation tables with Shell and VNO-NCW (large enterprise branch organization) (Eefje: Q7). In which a set of undemocratically chosen actors can decide what is right. There is also a Milieudedefensie lobby in the Hague and due to the judicial campaign against Shell, Milieudedefensie can no longer participate in civil disobedience activism (Eefje: Q7). As e.g., occupying the Shell head office, would be detrimental to Milieudedefensie's lobbying and judicial position (Eefje: Q7). Milieudedefensie thus relies on legal juridical, judicial, and legislative methods to realize change (Eefje: Q7). This is also why civil disobedience-based groups such as XR do not participate in climate negotiation tables (Eefje: Q7). Milieudedefensie, as an NGO, benefits from current institutions and is in competition for donations, visibility and volunteers with other NGOs and actors in the climate movement. It is then questionable whether an NGO relying on the system itself, can truly aim for transformation. During the Climate Alarm differences in interests between grassroots organizations and NGOs came forward (Elisa: Q3). While grassroots organizations focus on building the movement and its ideology, Greenpeace and Milieudedefensie also have monetary concerns (Elisa: Q3). The NGOs need to be visible – they need to market themselves – during actions as this translates to new volunteers, donors and a louder voice (Elisa: Q3). Again, Milieudedefensie is thus embedded inside the system it aims to change. It criticizes those it relies on for subsidies and donations. It cannot focus on ideology alone, but also has to compete with other organizations for donations, members and volunteers. Its dependence on subsidies from the government, members and donations also make it vulnerable to 'capture' by these actors. Coercive isomorphism means an organization changes their activities based on the pressure from other organizations or actors which they depend on. As written above, for Milieudedefensie these include governments, members, media and laws.

Yet, it is not exactly clear which systems should be changed or what socio-ecological relations should be established, except that the fault is in the economic system. This also touches the unclear role of large polluting multinational companies, as described above. It is also not clear where this system manifests itself, Laura for instance, agrees with the changing of certain economic systems but would not say system change is necessary when it concerns the political system or governance of the country (Laura: Q6). This also concerns the role of Milieudedefensie in the realization of alternatives to the system. Currently Milieudedefensie focuses on the polluters having to pay, thereby neglecting the other side of the story: organizing solutions that are accessible for everybody (Laura: Q6). More focus on these solutions shows that climate policy is relevant for everybody (Laura: Q6). Therein, it should also become clearer what solutions are viable. Peter and Joep think that Milieudedefensie does not yet participate (much) in building new systems (Peter: Q10, Joep: Q9). According to Joep, Milieudedefensie has a different role in the transition to new systems: making societal pressure visible and phasing out

old systems (Joep: Q9). Responding to sustainability challenges requires to relieve the regime of rigidity and to open it for destabilization and reconfiguration (Ghosh, Kivimaa, Ramirez, Schot, & Torrens, 2020). Milieudéfensie thus focuses on relieving the rigidity of the system. Maina also sees that Milieudéfensie aims to raise public support, regulate and dismantle old systems as well as support new systems. (Maina: Q7). The lobby and the research department, investigated several policy solutions on the topic of food, mobility and heating of houses among others (Rooijers et al., 2020). Money freed through a CO₂ tax should go to making solutions accessible.

There is also a question concerning the amount of polarization necessary to grow support, so whether polarization is productive. As Kenis (2019) shows too much polarization can also lead to misunderstandings such as in the case of CJA's campaign against the WWF or changing adversaries into enemies.

Lynn thinks that polarization is necessary to realize change: *"historically, remaining in the vague middle is not how you realize change"* (Lynn: Q11). Change requires fed-up people that say something is no longer acceptable, and inevitably this leads to polarization; to statements 50% of the population disagrees with, which are necessary at some point (Lynn: Q11). On the other hand: *"you can get a backlash in which the countermovement gets the upper-hand"* (Lynn: Q11). Thus, Lynn thinks that Milieudéfensie needs to: *"on the one hand continuously propose their progressive ideals which scare part of society, while also often reaching out to these [scared] people"* (Lynn: Q11). For instance, the Operation Climate campaign tries to be progressive in words but also reaches out through non-threatening deeds such as conversations. As climate becomes a more polarized issue, such conversations can help to reach groups that cannot be reached otherwise (Lynn: Q4). Maarten thinks that in general the climate movement contributes too much to polarization, for instance in the case of the occupation of a pigsty by vegan activists (Maarten: Q5). Maarten believes that everybody knows that a transition is necessary, therefore such confrontational activism is not necessary (Maarten: Q5). Listening and holding conversations is then a differentiating act (Maarten: Q5). Perhaps the question is more to whom the movement should extend a hand and from whom it wants to disassociate itself. According to Elisa, Milieudéfensie campaigns on 'good feelings', not what you expect from an organization that says they want to realize radical change (Elisa: Q6). However, this is also part of the strategy, but a little bit of a rough edge currently misses (Elisa: Q6). Within Milieudéfensie there is a search for what speaks to many people but still makes demands visible (Elisa: Q6). Thus, balancing depoliticization and politicization. Peter also notes that naming root causes and asking for radical change is hard to campaign on, and Milieudéfensie's support base might not want to hear it, even if it is necessary (Peter: Q10). Thus, the SI-initiative has to adapt their strategy to cope with constraints of the institutional environment, which in this case means downplaying more transformative ideals. Peter also thinks the occurrence of new grassroots groups gave the Organizing department wings (Peter: Q5). As these in terms of strategy more radical groups

make Milieudefensie seem mild, the ‘Overton window’¹² shifts which means Milieudefensie has more influence on politics because it is no longer perceived as a radical activist group (Peter: Q5, Lynn: Q5).

Within Milieudefensie there are thus conflicting ideas on the responsibility of different people for the climate crisis, about the role of large polluting companies and who is set to benefit from these solutions. As well as what exactly system change entails and Milieudefensie’s role therein. Furthermore, as to what level of polarization is necessary to realize change. This will be further discussed after the next section in which I examine the climate movement’s operationalization of climate justice.

6.2.3 LOCAL APPLICATION OF CLIMATE JUSTICE

Next to the issues with the narrative as mentioned by Maina in 8.4, there are also issues with the lack of application of climate justice locally, which became visible during the climate alarm. Although, the narrative – like that of Milieudefensie – challenges dominant institutions and is embraced by the national organization of the movement, it is not embraced during actions. Joep says he sees some local Operation Climate groups who clearly apply climate justice, which are outspoken about it and have their own point of view (Joep: Q8). However, this might be because these people held these views beforehand, and therefore decided to sign-up, not because Milieudefensie taught them (Joep: Q8). For Milieudefensie climate justice has been part of the organization for about five years. Back then this was a distinctive, even controversial feature, but not anymore (Maina: Q3, Peter: Q5). Still, the centrality of climate justice in all campaigns is distinctive (Maina: Q3, Peter: Q5). Currently, there is consensus about the need for climate justice within the national climate movement (Maina: Q3, Peter: Q5). However, Maina says climate justice is only supported in words but not in deeds (Maina: Q3). The justice aspect was not that visible during the Climate Alarm (Maina: Q3). Although, demands for taxing large polluters were visible in the press, during the action itself the focus was on urgency, not on how this crisis should be tackled and how burdens should be shared (Maina: Q3). Locally, the narrative was meant for broad mobilization, however the focus remained on the mobilization of the local groups’ own support base (Peter: Q6). And thus, on climate change alone without the climate justice context (Peter: Q6). Including more diverse groups of social movement actors in all layers of organization might have led to a more diverse mobilization. Bruno notes that he heard people were tired of the questions being asked within the local coalitions such as about overpopulation (also by Milieudefensie volunteers) (Bruno: Q6). Maina believes this lack of local embracement of climate justice is because there is no consensus on what justice really means (Maina: Q3). A large part of the movement still seeks retribution in consumerist solutions, in personal

¹² The policy accepted by the public falls within the Overton window. For instance, if the window shifts to the left, politicians can propose more radical left-wing policies, while not being considered too extreme by the public.

responsibility (Maina: Q3). Or see justice solely as a border between the Global North and South, thereby neglecting justice as a question of class divisions in the Dutch context (Maina: Q3). Maina thinks there is thus a long way to go before such questions will be accepted and publicly displayed within the movement (Maina: Q3). Bruno thinks that “*maybe we need to stimulate our people to make the next step to think about all sorts of questions in the climate movement (e.g., regarding ‘overpopulation’). If you want a strong movement, we need to make sure we have such conversations*” (Bruno: Q6). However, during the organizing of the Climate Alarm, due to Covid-19 it was not possible to arrange local meetings in which such discussions could take place (Maina: Q3). Changing the movement to also embrace climate justice in deeds, is something which will take time (Maina: Q3).

6.3 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

At the head-office of the SI-initiative, both notions of a Green Economy and Ethical Consumerism are rejected. Instead, the initiative aims to realize climate justice, seeking solutions that specifically benefit those that are currently forgotten in Dutch policy. Thus, not solely defining CO₂ as the problem, but rather governmental inaction. These solutions exist outside of neoliberal ideology. Thereby, aiming to develop new social relations with a transformative character. Putting the current system up for discussion, requires asking questions that are not asked otherwise: it requires politicization. Especially, as now the focus should be on the character of these solutions rather than apocalyptic urgency of addressing this crisis by any means necessary. As shown in this chapter, this politicization is present within the narrative. However, it is not entirely clear what this system which needs replacing entails, or what socio-ecological relations should replace the current system. As Kenis (2021) also notes, system change is still ambiguous. Although, internally there is discussion concerning ‘altogether’ discourse, in many ways the CSO publicly frames climate change as all are responsible, while climate justice is also beneficial for all, thus devoid of conflict. Milieudefensie activities often focus on incremental bandaging of this system, rather than transforming institutions. There is thus a tension between long-term and short-term goals. The short-term often focuses on bandaging a broken system, while long-term ideals demand radical change.

However, TSI theory suggests that social change does not solely rely on using institutional power to realize (incremental) gains but aims to alter the public debate; changing and creating institutions (Haxeltine et al., 2016). There is also still discussion about the place of multinationals. Meanwhile, Milieudefensie participates in negotiation tables between CSOs, multinationals and the government, which are not democratic in nature. Due to the judicial and legislative actions Milieudefensie participates in, disruptive activism is not possible either. Thus, activism still must take place according to the rules of the system. Also, from the monetary viewpoint, Milieudefensie depends on actors who do not have stakes in system change or disapproves. Thus, making it more difficult to remain critical. However, with the arrival of grassroots groups who do participate in more

disruptive action, doors open for Milieudefensie which were closed before. This also means it is not clear who belongs to the 'us' and 'them' as discussed by Mouffe (2006) and Kenis (2019a).

Yet, in the climate movement, many local activists focus on technocratic measures, on alerting for impending catastrophes instead of focusing on creating new (socio-ecological) relations. Broadening the movement locally and defining justice remains a challenge. Although, Milieudefensie is not depoliticizing in many of the ways the actors described by Swyngedouw (2020) and Kenis (2021) are, the movement itself does seem to support depoliticization. There are thus tensions regarding climate change discourse and action between the nationally operating climate movement actors and local actors.

Operation Climate itself is the first attempt by Milieudefensie to build a single Organizing campaign with continued engagement. It appeals to a new group of people, broadening the overall movement and bringing in new ideas and perspectives. Through conversations, the idea is also that these people reach those Milieudefensie cannot reach, including people that benefit from Milieudefensie climate justice policy proposals such as free insulation of homes and increased public transport. However, the question is whether the canvassing campaign reached a new group of people outside of the general Milieudefensie support base. Canvassing mostly took place within inner cities and most responses were also from citizens who intended to vote for political parties which support Milieudefensie's climate justice ideas. The set of questions used from summer 2020 onwards were not usable for deep canvassing, and thus for truly listening to citizens.


Organizers also had to balance the top-down character of Big Organizing with other ideas of Organizing. Big Organizing was especially suited to the top-down, short-term engagement during the Climate Alarm, while a longer-term Organizing campaign also requires elements of more bottom-up Organizing strategies.

Pel et al. (2020) says socially innovative agency gets into a co-productive relationship with dominant institutions these actors challenge and intertwining with them (Pel et al., 2020). Operation Climate is part of a larger NGO which is already intertwined with existing institutions and at times diverts from its transformative goals to realize incremental gains. This NGO provides resources and the capacity to realize focus, which is not possible in grassroots groups (see chapter 5), but also might affect the transformative character of the SI-initiative. By already being embedded in an institutionalized NGO, the SI-initiative as well as the NGO have to balance transformative ambitions with access to resources in terms of recognition, legitimacy, relations to other actors, finance and capacity for learning and knowledge consolidation. But therein, the SI-initiative also prioritizes stability over freedom. As goals, strategy etc. are coproduced with the NGO and partially its voting members. All in all, this chapter uncovered several tensions in the relation between institutions and the SI-initiative and its network. In chapter 8, I further discuss the dichotomy between capture and transformation as well as reflect on my own experiences. In the next chapter I discuss specifically the

opportunities, contingencies and path dependencies in the socio-material context. There, I also further discuss the relationship of the SI-initiative to the NGO.

7. RELATIONS TO SOCIO-MATERIAL CONTEXT

In this last chapter of the empirical analysis, I answer the fourth sub-question: “*How is the Social Innovation process shaped by broader changes in the socio-material context?*” As mentioned before, the socio-material context, next to being the sum of the previous relations (within, in the network and relations to institutions), also accounts for broader societal trends and path dependencies shaping TSI processes (Pel et al., 2020). These can have both a stabilizing and destabilizing effect (Ghosh et al., 2020). Note that I cannot discuss all societal trends and path dependencies that might impact the SI-initiative. Therefore, I rely on which societal issues, trends and path dependencies come forward in the interviews such as the global pandemic and path dependencies within the NGO. This means other topics are not discussed (e.g., overall political trends, evermore alarming scientific reports concerning the state of environmental crises). The contingency of the pandemic thus affected the relations within as well as relations with the climate movement network. Both climate change, Covid-19 and digitization are seen in STS literature as trends and external shocks in the socio-material context (Ghosh et al., 2020). Here, I further discuss the relation of the SI-initiative to the larger NGO in which it is embedded. Whether the initiative is able to challenge and transform the NGO itself. Later I reflect more on the impact of Covid-19 on the initiative and its networked activities.



7.1 PATH DEPENDENCIES

I specifically describe path dependencies related to the NGO in which the SI-initiative is embedded. The implementation of Big Organizing in the Dutch climate movement context was also affected by the history of the NGO. In the previous section I already discussed some of the politicizing as well as depoliticizing aspects of this larger NGO. Eefje says the process is very much influenced by the strategy of the overall NGO (Eefje: Q5). In 2020, the goal was building a broad network to influence the elections. In 2021, the goal is about making this support base ‘visible’ (Eefje: Q5). Thus, first the Organizing department built a network and then this network needs to make impact (Eefje: Q5). For the 2020 goal, canvassing is logical, for the latter not so much (Eefje: Q5).

But it also works the other way around, the Organizing department also influences the NGO. As mentioned before the experiences from volunteers from the canvassing conversations had impact on higher-ups at Milieudefensie (Bruno: Q4). The focus on Organizing remains vague until local volunteers can present what they have done (Bruno: Q4). It shows the importance of Organizing to the

NGO (Bruno: Q4). Within other departments of the NGO Organizing is more and more seen as a method to create public pressure (Eefje: Q3). But the choice for a focus on Organizing was recent and is not completely embraced within the organization, as the impact is underestimated e.g., in case of the local press (Bruno: Q4). Sometimes the attitude at Milieudefensie is to ask the Organizing department for some volunteers to quickly support a certain action or campaign (Maarten: Q4). It is not possible to make volunteers sign a petition or share something on social media, which is not movement building and creates no involvement (Eefje: Q3). That is mobilizing not Organizing (Eefje: Q3). Organizing is a prerequisite for mobilizing, it is not about gathering some people, it is about responsibility and transferring leadership (Maarten: Q4).

However, the focus on Organizing within the organization also makes it possible to connect local groups to relevant campaigns, such as the lawsuit against Shell (Maarten: Q3). This lawsuit became embedded in a larger narrative of climate justice and regulations for companies (Maarten: Q3). Organizing shows, it is not solely about agriculture and food, but about agriculture and food within the larger context of climate justice (Maarten: Q3). By showing that Milieudefensie made this choice for organizing and its local groups, the DNA of the organization starts to change (Bruno: Q4).

Thus, Organizing becomes increasingly important for the NGO. Thereby, the focus of the NGO also changes, and it becomes easier to connect campaigns to one another, instead of separating campaigns on e.g., food, transport or housing).

7.2 THE PANDEMIC

The Covid-19 pandemic makes Organizing more difficult, especially when a campaign is based on canvassing and mass mobilization. One of the principles of organizing is building a one-on-one relationship, which was not possible during the Covid-19 pandemic (Maarten: Q3). It is thus a challenge to keep connected to local volunteers (Maarten: Q3, Joep: Q7). Maarten notes that “despite the circumstances, our effort is above average, and we are quite successful” (Maarten: Q3).

Canvassing could not continue, not only because at first restrictions did not allow it, once restrictions were lifted it was also a question about reputation and how such conversations would be interpreted (Eefje: Q5, Peter: Q3). In the US people will divert to the phone (Peter: Q3). In the Netherlands it is much more difficult to get people’s phone number, especially numbers of people that would be interesting to call (Peter: Q3). Neither is it normal to call and get calls from strangers. Milieudefensie tried to get phone numbers from the FNV, but due to privacy reasons this was not possible (Peter: Q3).

For the climate alarm, teambuilding was difficult on Zoom (Peter: Q6). Relying on videocalls meant the climate alarm project team missed certain sensitive issues and irritations, which led to escalations when pressure was high (Elisa: Q3). Many of these escalations could have been worked out easily in real-life (Elisa: Q3). They cannot be written down in a project plan but have to be known and felt, through formal and informal interactions (Elisa: Q3). In the summer of 2020 when many

restrictions were lifted, the organization ran a lot smoother; it was easier to solve irritations and gain clarity (Peter: Q6). The organization of the Climate Alarm also kept hoping the pandemic restrictions would be lifted by March 2021 (Peter: Q6). Having all people in one location can give a more powerful signal to politicians (Elisa: Q5). The continued insecurities meant that decision-making was postponed (Peter: Q6). The pandemic also meant a digital protest program was necessary, as municipalities restricted the number of participants (Elisa: Q5, Maina: Q5). Next to these restrictions, people also feared being in a crowd during a pandemic, which meant that joining this protest had a high threshold for people to participate (Elisa: Q5, Maina: Q5). Neither was it possible to participate anonymously as crowds would not be large enough (Elisa: Q5). As mentioned before, the election debate was mostly about Covid-19 and leadership (Maina: Q5). The left's narrative on the climate and Covid-19 crisis was much less effective compared to the right's narrative (Maina: Q5). As mentioned in the previous paragraph, it was also much more difficult to hold conversations within the movements about climate justice.

The Covid-19 pandemic not only makes Organizing more difficult, it also provided an opportunity to make different choices. As Maina notes: *“[the pandemic] forced us to decentralize completely. We focused on founding local coalition which designed their own podium program, approached their local media, Organized volunteers and mobilized locally. Thus, at the base many people have gained experience with Organizing local actions.”* (Maina: Q6). Relying on local Organizers for a mass mobilization was a new experience for everybody (Elisa: Q5). If everything was centralized, each individual organization would mobilize independently (Maina: Q6). But now, there was much more local collaboration (Maina: Q6). This also meant that the national organization had to take-up a different Organizing strategy, focusing on setting guidelines and providing support instead of doing the Organizing themselves (Peter: Q6). All these local actions lead to more diverse movement-building strategies, people also feel more connected to their local community than Organizing for a demonstration elsewhere, (Elisa: Q5).

Neither was the use of technology solely negative. Digital technologies make it possible to reach people that are further away and reach people more often (Joep: Q5). Before Operation Climate, Milieudefensie was not active in creating a digital space to Organize or mobilize people (Joep: Q5). Due to the global pandemic this digital space became more important, thus it was convenient that it was just developed (Joep: Q5). Instead of a few physical trainings and meetings a year, the contact between volunteers and head office became much more frequent (Joep: Q5). This was especially useful for people that live further away (Joep: Q5).

7.3 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

In this last chapter of the empirical analysis, I aimed to answer the fourth sub-question: *“How is the Social Innovation process shaped by broader changes in the socio-material context?”* As shown above the global pandemic affected the SI-process. Seizing arising contingencies or opportunities in

the socio-material context to challenge institutions can also lead to transformation (Pel et al., 2020). For Operation Climate, the pandemic meant that canvassing had to be abandoned and the focus of the campaign had to change towards solely the organization of the mass mobilization. This mass mobilization also suffered from the pandemic itself, such as a new Covid-19 wave, insecurities, changing circumstances, working online and municipal restrictions. Thereby, not mobilizing a mass of people that would realize serious impact. However, the pandemic also meant new choices were made and new social relations were created. Specifically, between local activists and the nationally operating organizations. Both Operation Climate and the Climate Crisis coalition had to become more digitally literate. The organization of the climate alarm was forced to decentralize and take up a supportive role, thereby making way for local groups to organize their own protest and build their own coalition. Local experience was gained, and local networks were built. Some of these local coalitions remain active and continue to build pressure towards e.g., the municipal election in 2022. Whether new choices made during the pandemic, lead to a more effective organizing, mobilization and perhaps ‘transformation’ for the next protest has to be seen.

For the NGO itself, the centrality of organizing and movement building is growing. The impact of organizing is more recognized, and the NGO moves towards fewer connected campaigns instead of smaller separated campaigns. This also serves Organizing focus on long-term movement building and climate justice ideas around connectedness.

However, in the end it is the multitude of strategies and actors that can collectively lead to transformative change if these actors can take advantage of context dependencies and contingencies.

8. DISCUSSION

In the analysis chapter I discussed the perspectives from Milieudéfensie employees on the SI-initiatives process. In this chapter I first reflect on my own experiences during my internship at Milieudéfensie and its connection to theories I used (**section 8.1**). From these experiences as well as the analysis chapter, I discuss implications of this research, both for Milieudéfensie (**8.2**) and for theory (**8.3**).

8.1 REFLECTION

Interning at the Organizing department of Milieudéfensie meant I had a unique position in between the local groups and the national organization, standing in close contact with both. This reflection puts an emphasis on the tensions discussed in chapter 6. Note that, these personal experiences already influenced the questions I asked during the interviews and what I chose to highlight in the analysis chapters.

8.1.1 CANVASSING AND TAKING A STANCE

As mentioned in chapter 6, there are issues with the way people are listened to during the Operation Climate campaign. Is it truly about (deep) listening or is it about evangelizing one’s own message and

make people listen? I visited several cities to canvas in a variety of neighborhoods. In my experience, the survey – if followed word for word – did not prioritize listening but rather tested Milieudefensie’s policy ideas in a mostly passive, one-way, manner. Note that the list of questions I used was not extensively tested, like the previous set Milieudefensie used the summer before. Discussions allowing for system criticism, responsibility for climate change, recognition of the constructed nature of society, or questions about constructing new socio-ecological relations, were not facilitated through the survey. Not only would inclusion of these questions make the conversations itself more interesting for both volunteer and participant but including such questions would also make the collected data itself more valuable. Albeit more time intensive to analyze. The collected data would then go beyond a simple agreement or disagreement with Milieudefensie’s policy proposals, which exclude a participant’s reasoning. This would likely mean prioritizing quality over quantity, which also has its disadvantages. Next to being more time consuming, volunteers would need more knowledge on the topics at hand as well as on how such conversations could be carried out.

For the interviewee and the interviewer, the strict survey protocol meant it was difficult to take a stance. Taking a stance here, would not mean the creation of conflict between volunteer and participant. It rather means making participants aware of the non-neutrality of climate change through thought provoking questions and listening, politicizing these conversations, unveiling power structures, creating an ‘us’ and ‘them’ (for Milieudefensie, citizens and SME versus large polluting companies) and allowing participants to take a well-considered position. The survey already facilitated this somewhat, many of the people I spoke were not used to talking about climate change and started to form opinions during the conversation.

These proposals concerning the survey protocol do not take away that I still consider many of the conversations I had thought-provoking, heartwarming, or humbling. Of course, the quality of the conversations also depends on the volunteer’s interpretation of the protocol. Neither do these criticisms take away that canvassing itself and the experiences of volunteers had impact on Milieudefensie as an organization, or (local) politicians.

8.1.2 LOCAL GROUPS

In my own experience interacting with people who are or want to become active on a local level, the connection of climate change to social justice issues was not well understood or supported by all activists (as also acknowledged in chapter 6). I encountered many people focused on raising alarm, promoting green capitalism and consumerist activism, issues also highlighted by Kenis and Swyngedouw’s works. The climate crisis and its consequences are approached as something that affects all equally and is thus a problem for all and should be solved by all. Social issues and contradictions should be sidelined for the war of collective humanity against CO₂, a disembodied, externalized enemy. Groups supporting such framings did not approach more diverse social movement actors to participate in local Climate Crisis Coalitions, as the focus of social justice groups

is not on the narrow perspective of climate, as defined by the local coalition. Neither would it be worthwhile for social justice groups to participate, as the battle against CO₂ has nothing to do with the social justice goals of these groups or the relation of the climate crisis to their goals.

However, many groups did include more diverse actors. The groups I stood in close contact with that approached, or were approached by more diverse actors, were (in my opinion) more successful in making politicized demands, more likely to sustain after the Climate Alarm, and created more thought-provoking line-ups for podium programs in which marginalized voices were included.

By including more diverse groups, discussions about climate change become warranted. Although, this will likely create time-consuming conflict, such discussions can also lead to more mutual understanding and solidarity. In Maastricht for instance, the local coalition supports and participates in other social justice actions. For instance, during the campaign for a higher minimum wage, the (aged) union members of the FNV were supported by climate activists. Or in IJmond local activists cooperated with TATA Steel union members campaign for a more sustainable factory. TATA Union members were in turn also invited to speak at a cycling protest organized by Milieudefensie in June. Next to this, in talks between the TATA Steel director and Milieudefensie director, Milieudefensie put the demands of the union first. As mentioned in 2.4, Gramsci argues that transforming society requires ‘ethically political’ groups (Kenis & Lievens, 2012). These groups do not only concern itself with their own immediate needs but defend general or even universal needs (Kenis & Lievens, 2012). This public pressure, in combination with alarming reports, resulted in TATA planning a new sustainability trajectory instead of reliance on subsidized CCS, answering the demands of the union workers (van Bokkum, 2021). Note, that this does not yet ask questions around what type of socio-ecological relations dependence on steel creates.

However, having complex discussions online is also incredibly hard, especially when time is short. Many of the coalitions were only formed in December 2020, three months before the climate alarm action (except for Maastricht, Groningen and Amsterdam). It is thus expected that such coalitions were not able to develop an ‘ethically political’ group and write politicized demands.

8.2 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

This section discusses the practical implications of the analysis for Milieudefensie as well as other actors in the climate movement. Section 8.2.1 discusses what it means to build a broad (politicized) movement. Section 8.2.2 discusses the relation of the SI-initiative to ‘transformation’.

8.2.1 BROADENING THE MOVEMENT

As explained in chapter 6, climate justice is not embraced by all local activist groups. The movement also fails to attract mass support from the people that climate justice is supposed to back, people that are disproportionally negatively affected by climate change and policy.

Since from a TSI perspective, these broader networks can also disperse or expand SI and new social practices, which effects are limited if the climate movement remains in a bubble. Since

participation in activism also shows that there are like-minded people, who do make changes in personal consumption, whether in diet, living or transport, and advocate for social justice issues. In TSI, to build synergy within the movement, a shared political voice is necessary for wider, long-term networks. Networks can exist of initiatives that have different narratives of change. The contribution of transformative change thus also depends on how well an SI-initiative can achieve synergy with SI-networks. Within these networks, values, norms, and cultural forms are consolidated. However, building and maintaining a politicized movement with critical activists is also in conflict with the top-down character of Big Organizing, in which decisions remain centralized, and volunteers can join if they agree with this central message. This is very well suited for individual campaigns, but not for long-term movement building.

Although not a panacea, Kenis (2021) hopes opening-up the movement, to include e.g., populists, Black Lives Matter or migrants, can politicize climate change again, as these movements can show what is at stake. Milieudefensie's head-office does also target other people next to Operation Climate and forms coalitions with broader social justice actors. Using community Organizing thus was also done more actively in the past (e.g., with Dutch Nigerians and Moluccans) but not yet connecting these groups to other local groups. The importance of community Organizing was discussed in 6.2.1. Currently, as many climate activists come from privileged socio-economic backgrounds, the system and its unjust hierarchies is more likely to work for them than against them. These people are likely more ignorant towards the classist or racist dimensions of solutions brought forward by this system (unless these people are educated to be aware of such dimensions). Meanwhile, further distancing themselves from people who will be negatively affected by climate (in)action. Only through actively including these people, educating the movement and fighting for their causes simultaneously, a politicized movement can emerge that actually addresses the root causes of climate change. Remaining 'neutral', going 'beyond politics', or other forms of refusal to identify oneself with a specific ideology or political theory dismisses allies and opens the door for co-optation or capture (e.g., by ecomodernists like Elon Musk and Maarten Boudry or worse, by ecofascists).

Kenis (2021) suggests campaigns like #ShellMustFall do internalize an enemy and through this tactic become political. ShellMustFall, differs from Milieudefensie's divest message in which Shell as a company still has a right to exist. Shell is thus treated as an adversary rather than an enemy to be dismantled. Approaching a company as an enemy, could also limit coalition forming between Shell (union) workers and climate activists.

8.2.2 TRANSFORMATION

For the Climate Crisis Coalition this was a first-time setting-up and working with local coalitions. This is also the first use of Big Organizing, campaigning with a central focus across localities for both Milieudefensie and for the Climate Crisis Coalition. As Bruno, said it takes time to change an

organization from within but changing the movement's definition of justice also takes time. So far, these local groups show the movement is broader than a head-office in Amsterdam and these two can work in synergy with one another towards the same goal. Likewise, the Climate Alarm did the same for a wider range of local actors. Thereby, the local branch of the movement was strengthened and received new responsibilities. Currently, many of these coalitions engage in sustained local action. As mentioned, TSI theorists recognize that the true impact of these SI-processes can only be assessed later if at all. Neither is (transformative) change something that can be achieved by a single campaign or a single actor. SI-actors need a range of different (perhaps paradoxical) strategies towards institutions, these strategies need to be continuously adapted to changing circumstances, but need to guard core intentions (e.g., regarding transformative ambition) (Pel et al., 2020).

However, the question remains whether a shift in the tax burden of the energy transition from households and SME towards large companies is enough to realize system change, to redefine socio-ecological relations, transforms institutional logics and is not based on incremental reform of a system which is not compatible with tackling the root causes of climate change. Through the lens of Kenis (2021) and Swyngedouw (2020), the goals would not be judged as transformative. It is not the people in power themselves that need to change, it is their actions. Now is the time for the climate movement to be critical of 'solutions' proposed by governments and multinationals. Solutions which might be meant to harvest more profit for the happy few or to put most restrictive policy measures on the poor. Such measures only create false rifts between the climate movement and other social justice-oriented movements, which eventually can lead to resistance or outrage towards sustainability transition policy. It is questionable whether an organization dependent on so many institutionalized actors can realize such transformative system change.

However, depoliticizing elements of climate movement actors as discussed in chapter 6, do not mean that there are no transformative qualities to the SI. Milieudedefensie's long-term goals are not to realize incremental gains, but to transform the public debate and policy regarding climate justice.

Milieudedefensie aims to frame climate change as a political problem instead of a scientific and technological one. For instance, in recent times the power and responsibility of multinational/large polluting companies has been put up for discussion in the Netherlands. This is of course a coproduced effort by many (trans)national actors and supported by the changing socio-material context. In the Netherlands, Milieudedefensie launched many campaigns along the lines of 'the polluter pays', such as lawsuits but also through lobbying, media appearances and canvassing. Even the liberal-right party shifted their party program towards the left regarding this topic (de Koning, 2020). As well as a vocalized push for climate action by the center liberal party D66 (Kaag, 2021).

Operation Climate's nonconfrontational character might be strange in combination with more long-term goals for system change and climate justice. However, as mentioned before, canvassing did serve movement building and motivating volunteers. Such conversations themselves can broaden the

movement as well, if they are structured better and specific people that can be included in the ‘us’ are approached. Through Organizing new people became part of the movement, both during the Climate Crisis Coalition and Operation Climate. Operation Climate is next to its focus on climate justice, an easy step-up for people that realize their choices as a consumer do not realize system change but do not want to engage in civil disobedience. During Operation Climate active citizenship was promoted through encouraging conversations with local politicians and neighbors. These conversations cannot realize a change of heart at once but can plant a seed for reflection. In collaboration with the network in the Climate Crisis Coalition, local groups connected with one another to form over forty networks across the Netherlands, of which some remain active and exert pressure to municipalities.

This thesis shows the need the climate movement has for more systemic analysis of its agency, its approach to justice, science, power and to define avenues that can assert emancipatory politics. Therein, it can move away from pandering to a ruling elite and the constraining definition ‘climate’. Transition research is equipped to do so, especially since the focus now shifts from the need for sustainability transitions to the actual execution of sustainability transitions. The next campaign for Milieudefensie will be largely focused on companies. Transition literature in general can provide valuable insights into system dynamics, regime change and the role of companies. Note, that both the Climate Crisis Coalition and Operation Climate will continue. The Climate Crisis Coalition next step is to focus on COP26 in Glasgow and mobilize people for a worldwide protest and smaller local actions beforehand. For Operation Climate, the local groups and the national organization will start campaigning for a responsible supply chain law, proposed by several political parties. Milieudefensie wants to make sure this law is in line with the Paris agreement. Milieudefensie calls it a ‘climate duty’ for companies. This law enforces companies to investigate their supply chain and take responsibility if there are any social or environmental injustices happening along this chain. This law should have consequences for misdemeanors and not rely solely on the goodwill of companies or their capability to greenwash. Swyngedouw (2020) sees such a law as a genuine effort to tackle the root causes of climate change and challenges the power of incumbent companies (and will receive serious backlash according to Swyngedouw). Milieudefensie aims to name and shame those that fail to comply with lawsuits as a consequence, while seeking alliance with those that do make efforts. However, allying oneself with companies, also risks capture and allows companies to greenwash their image.

8.3 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

Using activist research meant I would also discuss the ‘political’. In the analysis of the relations of the SI-initiative to institutions, research on the ‘political’ proved particularly useful. This political lens helped with analyzing tendencies within the movement towards copying institutions, uncovering paradoxes and ‘capture’. This also served to identify the ingrained tendencies of transition research to focus on heroic, successful projects and neglecting uncertainties, problems and contradictions (Turnheim & Sovacool, 2020).

This thesis also shows the relevance of studying social movements, especially in the light of the climate crises, as policymakers, companies, politicians etc. realize the scale of these crises and the necessity to break-away from business as usual. However, stuck in a worldview responsible for these crises, proposed solutions might have adverse effects on climate mitigation altogether, or bolster other social issues related to classism, sexism, racism etc. Now is the time to be critical of greenwashing and fake solutions. Those operating further removed from these institutions can provide such criticism and seeking solutions that tackle the root causes of climate change. Thereby, also destabilizing current regimes, which receives growing interest in transition studies (Turnheim, 2021). As seen in chapter 6, such actors engage in co-productive relationships with existing institutions, which lead to the realization of (incremental) goals, but also risking ‘capture’. STS and transition research are especially equipped to analyze system dynamics, power relations and transitions. Thus, answering important questions of the social movement’s agency, position in the system, and avenues for action.

Meanwhile, research on the ‘political’ in the climate movement does not talk about how discourses develop, are coproduced through e.g., their network, relations to institutions and socio-material context. Or how discourses are exactly shaped, and are shaped by the practices, activities and relationships of the people propagating these discourses. TSI can therein also prove a useful tool to further dismantle an SI-initiative’s relation to the political and search for avenues where actors can and cannot realize politicization. Combining these also answers the call for more investigation of paradoxes in SI and how to equip SI-initiatives with strategic repertoires that can manage paradoxes and avoid capture (Pel et al., 2020). Investigating the ‘political’ also means a more complex analysis of what regime destabilization entails: a struggle full of conflict and chaos.

Next to the discussion whether Operation Climate or Milieudefensie is transformative, there is also the question whether TSI itself prioritizes the transformative – in terms of what the scope and scale of ‘transformation’ is, in terms of what is studied and what is not. The authors of TSI note themselves that the case studies of SI-initiatives used to write TSI theory, solely focus on changing social relations in either narrow socio-ecological or narrow socio-economic terms (Pel et al., 2020). Thereby, other institutionalized relations remain unchallenged e.g., issues related to gender, sexuality or race, within or outside of the initiative (Pel et al., 2020). Some of these initiatives also aim to ‘go beyond politics’. Transitions do not consist of incremental improvements and techno-fixes but requires radical shifts to new kinds of systems (Köhler et al., 2019). To realize transformative ‘system change’, the focus of TSI should be on initiatives or even networks that aim to transform institutional logics, instead of those that focus on altering local or single institutions. It is these initiatives that can broaden their network and realize transformation on a larger scale. It is these initiatives or networks that need all the help to realize their potential.

8.4 LIMITATIONS

There are several limitations to the methodology of this thesis. Analyzing an SI-initiative ex-post could yield a clearer account of the goals of the initiative and its exact relation to transformative impact, or ambition. However, when it comes to activists, time is ticking and change is needed now, the next campaign is right-around the corner. This is also the case for Milieudefensie. Many of the aspects discussed related to e.g., canvassing are of lesser relevance. The lawsuit victory also had a large impact on the NGO. However, many of the tensions related to institutions and the socio-material context remain relevant.

This research took place over the time of eight months, thereby following an SI-initiative over time and space. However, information concerning the start of the initiative and its first pre-pandemic survey questions, was constructed to the best of my abilities. This is also the largest hurdle of activist research, its time-intensive nature, which also often requires continued involvement during the evenings and during a pandemic an overload of screen time. Next to this, operationalizing TSI in combination with activist research yields a lengthy analysis.

Both TSI, activist research, and investigating the ‘political’ highlights certain aspects while obscuring others. In analyzing the interviews, I chose what to include and what not to include, through these lenses. This means I might have been overly critical or uncritical of the initiative. The question remains if this bias and focus on a single initiative means the analysis lost some of its systemic character. Next to this, the interviewing, coding, and analysis were conducted by a single person, risking confirmation bias.

Regrettably, due to time constraints I was not able to do justice to the variety of local manifestation of climate action in the Netherlands and their politicizing and depoliticizing tendencies, which for instance would be relevant in judging what factors lead to the empowerment and agency of certain groups compared to others.

8.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This thesis provides some insight into the larger climate movement and its local manifestations, further analysis from different perspectives in the movement can help with investigating the position of this movement in larger practice fields, transition pathways or ‘deep’ transitions (Pel et al., 2020). Research can be done into the role of such movements in destabilization, phase-out and decline of incumbents and how this can be deliberately supported through policy. Especially as academics call for more research into regime destabilization (Avelino et al., 2020; Köhler et al., 2019a; Kuokkanen et al., 2018). Next researchers can investigate the notion of CSO’s and social movements into the political, success, failures, impact on policy, relations to government and (incumbent) companies. Researchers can investigate what such initiatives require to realize transformative change. Research can test and discuss strategies to avoid capture and co-optation by vested interests or the status quo. Thus, making TSI a productive tool for activists and other social innovators. Next to this, research can

investigate narratives of change, ideas of alternatives and futures that move beyond an apocalyptic future. Hence, research can help seed, catalyze, and nurture the broader unruly complexities of democratic struggles, essential for progressive transformation (Pel et al., 2020).

Other protest movements within the Netherlands such as the Black Lives Matter movement, the start of a new housing movement (woonprotest), also form interesting research topics, the latter at first sight seems very politicizing and connects the housing crisis to other social and environmental crises. There is also merit in investigating movements further removed from academia such as the anti-lockdown movement. Study of those movements can give more insight in the frustrations with the current state of representative democracy (or distrust of the government), and resistance to lockdown measures. These insights might be relevant in relation to resistance to measures which tackle the root causes of climate change that will require a far greater transformation in institutions, social practices, etc., than a lock-down or passport. However, the anti-lockdown movement is of course difficult to research using activist research because activist research relies on genuine engagement with the field.

Another option is to study the application of Organizing methods to governmental citizen participation initiatives. Such methods can bring shared focus, knowledge exchange across projects, as well as make citizens feel heard. For instance, for citizen participation in neighborhood sustainability renovation projects across the Netherlands, spearheaded by the national government.

9. CONCLUSION

This research combined work on TSI, the ‘political’, and activist research to analyze a SI-process in the Dutch climate movement. TSI defines four sets of relations: relations within SI-initiative, network, institutions, and socio-material context. Together these relations co-produce the process of an SI-initiative. Through the analysis chapters I answered four sub questions which reflected the four sets of TSI relations. Together they answer the research question: *“Why and how does the effort of the Dutch CSO Milieudefensie to institutionalize climate justice in the coalition agreement lead to transformative social innovations along four sets of relations as defined in TSI?”* This process involves the SI-initiative itself, which uses (Big) Organizing strategies to the Dutch climate movement (relations to network). By combining TSI with work on the ‘political’ and activist research this research shows the tensions, conflicts and contradictions that arise when interacting with its broader network, and dominant institutions on both a local and national level.

Next to the paradox of embedded agency, this thesis alludes to other tensions as well:

- Top-down versus bottom-up Organizing strategies. While Big Organizing is very effective in creating focus, this focus also limits long-term movement building in which volunteers can critically engage with the national organization.

- Framings of climate change differ across localities, contradicting one another. Some place the climate crisis in a larger context of other social crises and others see climate as a single cause.
- Creation of an 'us' and a 'them'. As written above, many actors in the climate movement fail to move outside the bubble of a very specific group of highly educated people instead of building a broader 'us' on shared issues.
- A tension between the long-term goal and short-term goals. For Operation Climate a shift in tax burden towards larger companies is an incremental improvement of a failed system and is far removed from challenging the undemocratic nature of these systems and challenging of the root causes of climate change.

These tensions also imply that Milieudéfense (and other actors as well) need to answer certain questions and hold discussions to realize a movement with a politicized voice. Milieudéfense walks a thin line between capture by dominant institutions and aiming for transformative change. As an organization, Milieudéfense decided to put Organizing and the local movement first. The question remains what this means in the context of a larger climate movement which contains actors that do not rely on dominant institutions as much as Milieudéfense. Milieudéfense especially can have a role in connecting different groups which are locally active through their expertise in Organizing and climate justice. Milieudéfense can provide resources to civil disobedience action groups which cannot access resources because they do not have an institutional home. Milieudéfense already has contact with a diversity of local communities from past actions and campaigns and connecting these with locally active climate groups using deep canvassing principles might lead to more solidarity between different social groups. Milieudéfense can play a role as educator through Operation Climate but also through the Climate Crisis Coalition, on other social justice issues which relate to the root causes of climate change. Through the groups taking part on the ground, the NGO does now have a local reach, working on the same campaign as the head office. Through Organizing local Operation Climate groups can connect with groups to broaden the movement. Therein, it is important to define together with local activists, which groups can be allies, who are adversaries and who are enemies. This requires defining the role of coaches in supporting the education and broadening of the movement. Other discussions can be held concerning the NGO's position is regarding institutionalization, the political and capture, which opinions are warranted, and which are not, who can be included and who cannot, questioning how far an NGO can go in challenging institutions. What position should Milieudéfense take towards green economy proponents, and consumer activists? How can the climate movement engage a more diverse support base and how can these other people be given a voice? Also, as described in chapter 2, because agency is constantly under negotiation between actors, institutions, and ecosystems these questions need to be reflected upon regularly. From the analysis chapters, Operation Climate's position and (current) agency became less obscured. Considering the lawsuit victory, Milieudéfense can acknowledge their own power and agency. With that validation of agency comes responsibility to act. Responsibility not only for member or donors but for the climate movement and the creation of new emancipatory politics or socio-ecological relations.

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11. APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: CLIMATE JUSTICE & JUST TRANSITIONS

Schlosberg & Collins (2014) wrote an extensive analysis of how discourses of justice moved from environmental to climate justice. They trace the concept of environmental justice back to PCB-tainted soil in 1982 North Carolina, USA. Here the African Americans community, civil rights activists, and environmental activists, joined together in a struggle against tainted soil. A first to combine black and white activism since the 1960's. Although seen as the start of the environmental justice movement, the poor, black Americans, and other minority groups have been involved with environmental activism long before. Environmental justice has a broad background in concerns around health, human rights, and the environmental conditions of everyday life, thus a later move towards vulnerabilities induced by climate change was not unexpected.

By the definition of activists, environment does not solely mean the wilderness – a nature detached from everyday life. However, this was the prominent interpretation of environment by large environmental organizations. For environmental justice activists it refers to the place where people, live, work and play. Environmental risks thus threaten everyday life, as well as non-human life. Justice here also does not refer to equity but is aimed at remedying existing and imminent injustice in the distribution of environmental costs, benefits and conditions. This thus involves determining how injustice occurs.

Participation and procedural justice have always had a presence in the movement. After expanding geographically and time went on, climate change became a prominent issue. After the 2002 UNFCCC COP6 meeting in the Hague several groups started developing climate justice principles. Meanwhile, in the US climate justice action groups also developed right before Hurricane Katrina. Wider recognition came during the 2009 Copenhagen COP9 by groups such as Climate Justice Action

Now. Climate justice differentiates itself from environmental justice by its geographical scale. Environmental justice often focuses on the local, while climate justice discusses how local actions induce global (climate) change and how a global (climate) system has local consequences. This definition shows that local activism has meaning in the fight against man made climate change, while global activism simultaneously remains important (e.g., protests at an UN COP or solidarity protest supporting activists or people in precarious positions abroad). Climate change helped move the understanding of environmental justice from one where the environmental risk is a symptom of social justice, to one where a functioning environment is a precondition for any form of justice. Thus, looking both to the human and nonhuman again.

Although the 2002 COP6 principles were largely abandoned, four new major ideas appeared; abandonment of fossil fuels, financial transfer from Global North to Global South based on historical responsibility, food and land sovereignty for vulnerable communities, including a transition to renewable and sustainable practices, and a critique of purely market-based policies to address climate change.

Schlosberg & Collins (2014) discuss the tensions between environmental and climate justice, and interpretations thereof. Some tensions occur in the engagement with mainstream environmental groups and the legislative area, concerning market logic, frame policies and ideas about consumerist and corporate responses to climate change.

In the academic sphere, climate justice has been discussed since the 90's. However, the academic field developed mostly separate from the social movement. Academics rarely interacted with the movement and the movement rarely cites academic articles on climate justice. More elite NGOs also engage with climate justice, but often based on market reform, while grassroots activists are tired of the futility of mere reformation of a system they perceive as broken. And some operate somewhere in between. More recent work by Stevis et al. (2020), discusses the rising prominence of the framing of climate justice issue as one that cuts across borders. As well as, the juxtaposition between the mass of poor under consumers, least responsible for climate change, yet most affected (also in monetary terms), while the super-rich with high-carbon lifestyles, are most responsible and least affected (Stevis et al., 2020). See for instance, recent work by Oxfam on the distribution of pollution, subsidies granted to polluting multinationals, costs deflected to the Dutch citizen and investments made by the EU and the Netherlands in multinational fossil fuel companies operating in the global south (Green Livelihoods Alliance Just Energy Transition Programme, 2019; Kartha, Kemp-Benedict, Ghosh, Nazareth, & Gore, 2020; Oxfam, 2015; Vergeer, R., Schep, 2018).

Chatterton et al. (2013) define climate justice as the “principles of democratic accountability and participation, ecological sustainability and social justice and their combined ability to provide solutions to climate change” (Chatterton, Featherstone, & Routledge, 2013, p. 5). Thus, acknowledging the relationships of social injustices, ecological destruction and economic

domination perpetrated by pro-growth capitalism. Climate justice thereby rejects capitalistic solutions to climate change (e.g., Carbon markets) and brings to the foreground uneven patterns of eco-imperialism, a result of uneven use of fossil fuels, exploitation of raw materials, offshoring, export of waste, pollution and emissions. Other popular framings include one that sees climate justice primarily as a struggle between the Global North and the Global South as framed by the Third World Network. The UN department of Economic and Social Affairs frames climate justice as a providing the Global South 'with a right to industrialize', without specifying who benefits from this industrialization. Lastly, climate justice is used to conform to market environmentalist approaches (e.g. The Mary Robinson Foundation) (Chatterton et al., 2013). At the time, climate justice was mostly a cry shouted on the streets during direct action and community work (Copenhagen). This requires more discussion on politics, values, tactics between groups using the climate justice label. As well as setting a political program At the time, these groups did not have the organizing capacity to realize legislatively, judicial, advocacy based change.

JUST TRANSITIONS

Just transition is a more recent concept popularized during COEefje1 in Paris. Referring to the process of how the transition should happen. Its history dates back to the 70s and 80s and was spearheaded by labor unions, who were joined by environmentalists, diffusing unionism in the environmental movement and environmentalism in unions. Diffusion beyond unions, took place mostly from 2013 onwards and adopted by larger NGO's as well, often named in one breath with climate justice. Just transitions discuss the injustices created specifically through transitioning to e.g. other energy systems and complements climate justice, in describing what a transition should value. Stevis et al. (2020) show how this concept has been presented in (bourgeois) academic literature as a rigid, ahistorical concept for policy makers, and to downplay its mobilizing capacity of the disenfranchised. Since 2010's just transitions has been a concept in transitions literature and overlaps with questions of environmental, climate, energy justice and the circular economy(Schröder, 2020; Williams & Doyon, 2019). In transition literature, concepts of energy justice, environmental justice are quite prevalent as shown by Williams & Doyon (2019) extensive literature study on justice in transitions. Although they discuss the concept, their work does not discuss transitions literature on climate justice specifically. Therefore, I assume little work has been done in this specific area of justice. Milieudedefensie¹³ also works with the concept and used this lens in combination with climate justice ideas to create their 'climate economics' policies.

¹³ For more information on the position of Milieudedefensie, see this webcast https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=511595573131766&ref=watch_permalink
<https://en.milieudedefensie.nl/about-us/just-transition>

Evan & Phelan (2016) discuss the overlap between just transition movements (mostly based in unions) and environmental justice movement (mostly environmentalists). They conclude that the environmental justice movement in 2016 had become too isolated from the just transition movement, especially on the local scale. Next to this, it has adopted climate change and climate justice into the campaign. The previous movement of the 70s and 80s subsided due to a lack of counter-hegemonic forces. Especially considering the coal boom in the 1970-1980s. Nevertheless, the 1970's efforts built an enduring counter-hegemonic force of residents in certain areas. Evan & Phelan (2016) conclude that synergy between the just transition and environmental justice campaigns challenges social, economic and political injustices. Successful synergy means drawing from the expertise of the whole community, building foundations for a broad, united community campaign, building resilience and equitability, engaging marginalized groups and co-define their position in the 'old' and 'new' community and avoids replacing one elite with another or one harmful industry with another. Successful synergy between the national and regional campaigns in which the labor movement and community campaigners collaborate, can become a powerful counter-hegemonic force, potentially affecting other global forces. Currently, the labor movement is too reliant on government initiatives. Siding with the environmental justice movement can bring about a more radical, speedy ecological, economic and social transition warranted by climate change and structural decline of the fossil fuel industry. Locally, collaboration is limited and conflicted, although there are emerging opportunities for collaboration.

APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

BASIC INFORMATION

Date:

Time:

End Time:

Participant:

INTRODUCTION

Sinds juli t/m maart heb ik stagegelopen bij Milieudefensie als coach bij Operatie Klimaat. Vanuit daar heb ik ook coachwerk gedaan bij de werkgroep lokale coalities van het klimaatalarm. Nu ben ik bezig met het schrijven van mijn scriptie. Mijn scriptie heeft als onderwerp 'Transformatieve Sociale Innovatie in de Klimaatbeweging' daarbij gebruik ik Transformative Social Innovation theorie om te kijken naar hoe een sociaal innovatieproces door verschillende actoren en de algehele context samen ontwikkeld wordt.

Om mijn onderzoek te doen heb ik je benaderd om een aantal vragen te mogen stellen. Na twee korte introductie vragen, stel ik een aantal vragen over hoe de samenleving veranderd kan worden. Daarna leg ik een aantal stellingen aan je voor. Als laatste stel ik nog een aantal verdiepende vragen. Het interview duurt ongeveer een uur.

Voordat ik vragen ga stellen wil ik nog even de hele procedure toelichten. Ik heb je een ‘informed consent’ formulier gestuurd. Heb je hier nog vragen over? Heb je deze ondertekent? Ter verduidelijking, dit interview wordt opgenomen zodat ik het kan transcriberen. Daarna stuur ik het uitgetypte interview naar je door, dan kun je eventueel wijzigingen doorsturen als ik ergens een fout heb gemaakt. Daarna verwijder ik de opname. Je kan je altijd terugtrekken uit het onderzoek.

QUESTIONS

INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS

1. Hoe ben je in aanraking gekomen met Operatie Klimaat / Klimaat crisis coalitie?
 - (voor als er iets niet terugkomt in het antwoord):
Voor hoe lang doe je dit werk al?
Wat is je rol in Operatie Klimaat / Klimaat crisis coalitie?

OPERATIE KLIMAAT

2. Kan je het narratief van OK kort samenvatten?

Wat is volgens jou het probleem omtrent klimaatverandering?

- Welke personen zijn nodig om deze toekomst te realiseren?
- Wie werkt niet of juist tegen?

Hoe ziet een samenleving eruit waarin dit probleem is opgelost?

3. Geloof je dat de strategie en het narratief van Operatie Klimaat leidt tot de nodige verandering?
 - Wat vind je zwakke punten?

- Wat vind je sterke punten?
4. Hoe is de huidige organizing strategie tot stand gekomen?
 5. Hoe verschilt deze strategie van eerdere strategieën van Milieudefensie?
Welke activiteiten leiden naar die toekomst?
 6. Heeft Operatie Klimaat voor nieuwe ideeën of perspectieven binnen Milieudefensie gezorgd?
 7. Hoe verhoudt dit zich tot de strategieën van anderen in de klimaatbeweging?
- Hebben veranderingen in de klimaatbeweging aan deze nieuwe strategie bijgedragen? (bijv komst XR en FFF)
8. Is er een verschil met het narratief en de veranderingsstrategie nu en aan het begin van Operatie Klimaat?
- Probes:
- Heeft corona hier invloed op gehad?
9. Zijn de strategie en het narratief lokaal overgenomen?

KLIMAATALARM

Voor mensen niet betrokken bij Operatie Klimaat maar bij de klimaatcrisis coalitie

7. Geloof je in het narratief van het klimaatalarm?
- Wat vind je sterke en zwakke punten?

8. Hoe is de klimaat crisis coalitie begonnen?
9. Hoe hebben jullie de strategie en het narratief opgesteld?
 - Waren er knelpunten en conflicten tijdens het opstellen van het narratief?
10. Hoe verschilt deze strategie van hoe de klimaatbeweging voorgaande marsen organiseerde?
11. Wat zijn de grote verschillen met de strategie van Milieudefensie/Operatie Klimaat?
12. Is het narratief en de strategie verandert door corona?
13. Zijn de strategie en het narratief lokaal overgenomen?

STELLINGEN

Ik heb ... stellingen meegenomen die uit documenten van Milieudefensie komen of die ik heb opgesteld. Ze omschrijven een aantal onderdelen van het narratief en de strategie van Operatie Klimaat. Per stelling vraag ik wat je erover denkt.

- Huidige onduurzame en ondemocratische systemen moeten niet verbeterd worden, maar radicaal veranderd worden. De systematische oorzaken van de problemen moeten we blootleggen, aanpakken en vervangen met systemen die duurzaam en democratisch zijn. (ABP)
- Iedereen is nodig om uit de klimaat- en economische crisis te komen. (handleiding frame)
- Klimaatrechtvaardigheid staat voor ambitieus klimaatbeleid waar de aarde en wij allemaal beter van worden. (website)

- Big organizing is de manier voor Milieudefensie om een grote beweging op te bouwen.
- Het voeren van Huis-aan-Huis gesprekken draagt effectief bij aan het doel van een klimaatrechtvaardige samenleving in 2025.
- De bruggenbouwers dragen effectief bij aan het doel van een klimaatrechtvaardige samenleving in 2025.

CONCLUSION

We zijn aan het einde van het interview. Ontzettend bedankt voor het beantwoorden van mijn vragen.

Is er nog informatie die jij graag wilt delen? En heb jij verder nog vragen?

Ik zal je binnenkort de uitgetypte versie sturen ter controle. Wil je ook op de hoogte gehouden worden van het verdere verloop van het onderzoek? Zijn er nog mensen die ik echt moet spreken volgens jou?

APPENDIX C: INFORMED CONSENT FORM

Toestemmingsformulier deelnemer

Scriptie: Transformatieve Sociale Innovatie in de Nederlandse Klimaatbeweging

Simone van Wieringen, Technische Universiteit Eindhoven

- Ik heb de informatiebrief gelezen. Ook kon ik vragen stellen. Mijn vragen zijn voldoende beantwoord. Ik had genoeg tijd om te beslissen of ik meedoe.
- Ik weet dat meedoen vrijwillig is. Ook weet ik dat ik op ieder moment kan beslissen om toch niet mee te doen of te stoppen met het onderzoek. Daarvoor hoef ik geen reden te geven.
- Ik geef toestemming voor het verzamelen en gebruiken van mijn antwoorden voor de beantwoording van de onderzoeksvraag in dit onderzoek
- Ik weet dat voor de controle van het onderzoek sommige mensen toegang tot mijn antwoorden kunnen krijgen. Die mensen staan vermeld in deze informatiebrief. Ik geef toestemming voor die inzage door deze personen.
- Ik geef wel
 geen
om mijn functie/rol omschrijving in de scriptie te gebruiken
- Ik geef wel
 geen
om mijn voornaam in de scriptie te gebruiken

Ik wil meedoen aan dit onderzoek.

Naam deelnemer:

Handtekening:

Datum : __ / __ / __

Ik verklaar dat ik deze deelnemer volledig heb geïnformeerd over het genoemde onderzoek.

Als er tijdens het onderzoek informatie bekend wordt die de toestemming van de deelnemer zou kunnen beïnvloeden, dan breng ik hem/haar daarvan tijdig op de hoogte.

Naam onderzoeker (of diens vertegenwoordiger):






Handtekening:

Datum: __ / __ / __



De deelnemer krijgt een volledige informatiebrief mee, samen met een versie van het getekende toestemmingsformulier

APPENDIX D: CANVASSING CONVERSATIONS AND PARTY PREFERENCE

Graphs were made using excel, by aggregating average responses to all survey questions from July 2020 until September 2020. To from the table, questions are judged based on their agreement with Milieudefensie policy propositions relating to access to sustainable food, transport and housing and a CO2 tax for large polluting companies. All results per question can be acquired upon request. Graphs made by Job van Heeten and Simone van Wieringen.



Figures ...: From left to right, responses of 87 VVD voters, responses of 40 CDA voters, responses of 208 D66 voters, responses of 37 CU voters, responses of 162 PvdA voters, responses of 462 GL voters, responses of 12 PVV voters, responses of 15 FvD voters



Figures : responses of 75 SP voters, responses of 190 PvdD voters, responses of 9 SGP voters, responses of 5 DENK voters, responses of 9 50+ voters, responses of 5 BIJ1 voters

APPENDIX E: CANVASSING SURVEY QUESTIONS

Translation by Leah Menting

Hello, We are volunteers from Milieudefensie. We are not asking for a donation, we are here to ask you about your opinion on climate change and about the climate policies in The Netherlands. Do you have +/- 5 minutes to answer some of our questions? (if no, ask them to take the survey online).

1. Are you worried about climate change?
 - a. Yes
 - b. A bit

c. No

What specific things are you worried about:

The corona crisis is currently demanding all of our attention. We have had to change our entire society in a short amount of time and we are going to need an economic recovery package. Milieudefensie is calling for a recovery package that addresses both the economic crisis and the climate crisis at the same time.

2. What lessons that we learned during the corona crisis should we hold on to in order to also mitigate the climate crisis?

1: Totally disagree

2: Disagree

3: Neutral

4: Agree

5: Totally agree

?: Don't know

3. Not everyone can afford to travel by public transport, and for others the public transport in their area is so infrequent that it is unreliable. Moreover, the large amount of current car-traffic causes unhealthy air and crowded cities. I think it is important that everyone can get on good public transport within 15 minutes of leaving home.

1-2-3-4-5-?

4. A lot of older houses are badly insulated. As a result, people have to heat their home more often. A lot of people with a lower income live in these houses. I think it is important that everyone can live in a well-insulated house.

1-2-3-4-5-?

5. The price of sustainably produced food is often higher than unsustainably produced food. This makes it difficult for people with lower incomes to afford this kind of food. Other problems we face today because of our current way of food production include the fact that a lot of food gets flown around between countries by plane and the deforestation the production causes in other countries. I think it is important that everyone can buy sustainably, locally produced food.

1-2-3-4-5-?

6. There must be a CO2 charge for big polluters to make green solutions affordable for everybody.

1-2-3-4-5-?

7. In March 2021 there are elections for the Dutch parliament (tweede kamer). How important is the climate crisis for your vote?

1-2-3-4-5-?

Explanation:

8. Which political parties can count on your vote in the upcoming elections in March 2021?

Beware: You can choose multiple parties, if you don't know yet which party you are going to vote for yet for example. You don't have to answer this question if you don't want to. Your answers will remain completely anonymous. We use these answers to paint a better picture for political parties about what their potential voters think about these statements and questions.

- | | |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|
| - VVD | - CDA |
| - D66 | - ChristenUnie |
| - PvdA | - GroenLinks |
| - PVV | - FvD |
| - SP | - Partij voor de Dieren |
| - SGP | - DENK |
| - 50+ | - BIJ1 |
| - Other, namely | - I don't know |
| - I don't want to say | - I am not allowed to vote |

9. Finally, do you have any suggestions for politics about how climate policy can be made more fair?

Thank you for answering these statements and questions! We are going to use your answers to make a plan, with which we are going to bring to our politicians.

We are surveying as many Dutch citizens as possible. Do you want to be updated about our work?

- Yes
- No

Email:

(the email address will be put in the system for the digital newsletter and for nothing else)

Phone number:

(We will give this phone number to a local coordinator, so that they can contact you. Your phone number will also be included in our administration so that we can involve you in our work.)

First name:

Insertion:

Last name:

How committed was the person you spoke to with the environment?

Less committed more committed

Was the person you spoke to below 28 years of age? Yes No

APPENDIX F: NARRATIVE CLIMATE ALARM

From website (klimaatmars2021.nl) February 2021

Narratief Klimaatmars 2021

Klimaatmars 2021

De klimaatcrisis is de grootste bedreiging van onze tijd. We moeten nu samen het roer omgooien. Blijven we kiezen voor verwoeste oogsten, dodelijke hittegolven en watertekorten, in binnen- en buitenland? Of kiezen we nu voor vruchtbare grond, schone lucht en voldoende drinkwater? De keuzes die wij maken hebben wereldwijde gevolgen. Want de klimaatcrisis kent geen grenzen. Mensen met de minste invloed op klimaatontwrichting worden het hardst getroffen.

Wat kiest de Nederlandse overheid?

Keer op keer kiest de overheid voor vervuilende bedrijven en hun aandeelhouders. Door miljarden euro's aan subsidies, leningen en belastingvoordelen te geven aan grote vervuilende bedrijven. Dit gaat ten koste van huishoudens en kleine ondernemers. De overheid kan ons geld maar 1 keer uitgeven. Nu maakt ons belastinggeld de klimaatcrisis erger. Dat moet anders

Wij eisen dat de overheid het roer omgooit en bedrijven dwingt zelf te betalen voor de klimaatschade die ze aanrichten, in binnen- en buitenland. De overheid moet erop toezien dat bedrijven hun verantwoordelijkheid nemen om te verduurzamen. Op eigen kosten. Wij kiezen mensen boven vervuilende bedrijven.

Wij eisen een eerlijk en daadkrachtig klimaatbeleid voor iedereen. Iedereen verdient een gelijke kans op gezond eten, duurzaam reizen, groene banen en een goede woning. In Nederland en daarbuiten. Alleen zo houden we onze aarde leefbaar. Een eerlijk klimaatbeleid komt er niet zomaar. Jouw stem is van levensbelang. Daarom gaan we 14 maart samen de straat op. Samen zorgen wij dat iedereen kiest voor klimaat!